

MEMOIRS
OF
MARSHAL BUGEÁUD

FROM HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE
AND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS,

1784-1849.

BY
THE COUNT H. D'IDEVILLE,
Late Prefect of Algiers

EDITED, FROM THE FRENCH,
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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
URST AND BLACKETT, PUBLISHERS,
13 GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET.

1884.

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MEMOIRS

OF

MARSHAL BUGEAUD.

CHAPTER I.

MEDEAH AND MILIANAH (1841).

Installation at Algiers—The Colonists of Dely-Ibrahim and the Dram sellers—Bldah—Travel in the Province of Constantine—Evacuation of small Military Posts—Return to Algiers—Victualling of Medeah—Report—Organization of an Arab Tribe—Letter of a Lieutenant in the 34th—Arrival of the Duc de Nemours—Victualling of Milianah—Passage of the Col—Battle, admirable Manœuvre—Accounts of the Battle

THE Governor-general had no sooner arrived at Algiers than he prepared for a campaign. In fact, he took very little time in settling himself and entering upon his government. Two days after his landing he went to visit the immediate neighbourhood of his new capital. Passing through the villages and uncultivated lands of Dely-Ibrahim and Douera, he dismounted from his horse to give some advice to the inhabitants, and especially persuaded them not to abandon their lands, though they had left them untouched from fear of pillagers and marauders.

Really, in these new centres, the miserable trade of the inn-keepers, commonly called dram-sellers' in Algeria, was the only one that had flourished. This trade arising from the passing, or collection, of

sporting purposes within any of the dependencies, except that of Bona, so as not to cause false alarms to the troops.

His first journey to the east had lasted twelve days. He had entrusted the command of Constantine to General Négrier, that of Philippeville to General Lafontaine. The new Governor had thus visited Bona, Ghelma, Constantine, Philippeville, and Bougie; and on his return from this rapid excursion he organized the native militia at Djijilly, at Medeah, and at Coleah.

The Governor-general left Algiers on the 30th of March, at the head of his expeditionary column and convoy of provisions. Twelve days afterwards he gave an account of the results of his first campaign.

In fact, on the 12th of April, he sent the following report to Marshal Soult, War Minister and President of Council:—

Algiers, 12th April, 1841.

SIR,—I left Algiers on the 30th of March, with all the transport I had prepared, and next day reached Blidah.

On the 1st of April I marched with the provision train intended for Medeah, proceeding in the direction of Aouch-Mouzaia. At the same time General Changarnier, with three battalions, crossed the Chiffa, and took a path up the Atlas to turn the Col de Mouzaia, and occupy it.

On his side General Duvivier, with three battalions, started from Aïn Téleizir to examine a road to Medeah, supposed to be less long and shorter than that of Teniah. This was a perfectly mistaken idea, and this column only found a detestable road, and a chain of hills very difficult to cross, although General Duvivier had not intended to impede him but fifteen mules with litters. This column had no encounter the firing of the Kabyles without being able to catch them and its rear-guard, two companies of the 17th Light, attacked the country covered with brushwood, had to meet an attack from one of Abdel-Kader's regular battalions; but this battalion was finally repulsed by an offensive reprisal.

However, General Changarnier passed through the tribe of Mouzaia without encountering resistance, and occupied the Col

On the 1st of April the Col was crossed. Nothing was to be seen but some Kabyle skirmishers. The column passed the night at the Olive Grove, and next day reached Medeah.

The same day I left Medeah, going towards the Olive Grove to spend the night there. On this march some thousand horsemen attacked the left flank of the column, I at once ordered the three battalions on the flank of the column to take off their packs, one of them being under the command of H R H the Duke d'Aumale, and I sent them at the double against the Arab cavalry, supporting them with 400 horse, the enemy left several men and their horses on the ground, and had many wounded.

Next day, the 2nd of April, at daybreak, the train climbed the slope of the Atlas. Day had only just broken, when 1200 to 1500 Arab horsemen, coming down the side of Medeah and the battalion of El Barkani coming from the Chiffa, attacked my rear guard. General Changarnier, who commanded it, held the enemy, but very soon I saw the two battalions of the Khalfates of Milinah and the Sebaou, debouching from the west marching towards the foot of the mountain, flanked by numerous Kabyles and aiming at the right flank of General Changarnier. I had placed two battalions in echelon, near the Copper mine and they were enough to alarm these regulars, who retreated, expecting to be attacked.

Seeing that it was impossible to come to close quarters with the enemy, I arranged a larger movement, carried out by a battalion of the 23rd and one of the 53rd who were to descend from ridges nearly to the level of the Col, and so turn the whole system of lower ravines, throw themselves upon the enemy, and take them in reverse. This attack was made at the double but the regulars broke and scattered about the ravines, however, a considerable number were killed, and eleven prisoners taken. Captain Allonville's Moorish gendarmes distinguished themselves in this engagement.

When the Arab cavalry opposed to General Changarnier saw the battalions of regulars so much compromised, they came up to

Ann^{them} the General at the same time resumed the offensive against the wou^s, and caused them some loss, at this moment he was struck in the shoulder. At first his wound was supposed to be mort^{al}, but the ball was extracted, and this brave officer again took up leading his men. As the fighting had ceased on the right, and was lessening on the left, I ordered General Changarnier to retire, and General de la Motte, who was on the heights to the left, to cover the retreat. He performed the duty bravely, and with a good knowledge of the for^{ts}.

ring to the same expedition. He says, 'Decidedly General Bugeaud is the man for this place. He manages to do thrice as much work as M. Valée in the same time, he tires his men much less, does much more harm to the enemy, and has hardly any wounded. . . . In this affair the Duke de Nemours has shown that he is not afraid to expose his person. At one time he and his staff were surrounded by Kabyles. I shot one almost close to him, and cut down another almost as close.'

This was the set of engagements before Milianah that Bugeaud, when Marshal, was proud to talk of, comparing the tactics to those of the battle of Isly.

The General in command mentions several of his officers in general orders, as he did after the victualing of Medeah, many of whom became the heroes of Africa, the Crimea, and Italy. Captain Vergé, General Changarnier, Colonel Gentil, Lieutenant-colonel the Duke d'Aumale, Lieutenant Ducrot, who killed two Arabs, Captain d'Adelsward, aide-de-camp to General Baraguey-d'Hilliers, who also killed two Arabs, Colonel d'Arbouville, Lieutenant-colonel Cavaignac, Commandants Leflô and Saint-Arnaud,*

* Saint-Arnaud, Jacques Leroy de, Marshal of France, born at Paris in 1798, died in 1854, was the son of an old Parliamentary Counsel, who was afterwards Member of the Tribunate and Prefect of the Aude. After being educated at the Lycée Napoléon, he joined the body-guard in 1816, passed as Sub-Lieutenant successively into the district legion of Corsica, and that of the Bouches du Rhone, and the 49th of the line; he retired from active service in 1822 to fight as a volunteer in the cause of Greece, travelled abroad for some years, and in 1831 resumed his rank as officer in the 64th of the line. When a Lieutenant he was employed in the war in La Vendée, was General Bugeaud's orderly officer, and attended him at Blaye. In 1836 he was sent to Africa in the foreign legion, made Captain there in 1837, and took a heroic part in the capture of Constantine. After the taking of Djijilly his fine conduct secured a mention in general orders of the army. Next year he became Chef-de-bataillon in the 18th light, 1840, in the Zouaves in 1841, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 53rd of the line in 1842, Colonel of the

Colonel Horte, Lieutenant-colonel Tartas, Lieutenant Valabrègue, Captain Allonville, Cavalry-sergeant Marguerite.

The day after the battle of Milianah, the Arabs took the offensive quite close to Algiers with an attack on Coleah, quite in the rear of the expeditionary corps, desirous no doubt of showing that they were not intimidated by the victualling of Medeah.

Sidi-Mohammed Ben Allal Embarek, Bey of Milianah, dashed himself fruitlessly against the ener-

32nd and afterwards of the 54th in 1844 His promotion was won by bravery displayed at the assault on Constantine, the attack on the Col de Mouraia, and the taking of Mascara. After being in command of the subdivisions of Milianah and Orleansville, he put down the insurrection of Dahra in 1847, compelled Bou Maza to give himself up, and was rewarded with the rank of *Maréchal de camp* 1847 He commanded the subdivision of Mostaganem after the revolution in February, 1848, that of Algiers in 1849, he led a brilliant expedition in the Kabyle territory of Bougie, and was raised in 1850 to the chief command of the division of Constantine In 1851 he subdued little Kabylia

Being mentioned to the Prince-President, General de Saint Arnaud was placed at the head of the second division of the army of Paris, and soon made War Minister He arranged the military measures required to make the *coup d'état* of the 2nd of December safe, and on the re-establishment of the Empire in 1852, received the bâton of Marshal of France, and the title of Grand Equerry to the Emperor His administration was marked by several improvements in the service the reconstitution of the general staff of the army, re-establishment of the reserve section for general officers and the commissariat, increase of pay for non-commissioned officers of all arms, improvement of the soldiers' bread, reorganization of the gendarmerie and artillery, of the sanitary corps of the local army, and the cavalry school of Saumur, the creation of a cavalry section at the Imperial military school of Saint Cyr, raising of the Regiment of Guides, and two new Zouave regiments, ten new battalions of Chasseurs à pied, and one regiment of Algerian light infantry

When the war with Russia broke out in 1854, Saint Arnaud became Commander-in-chief of the Army in the East In concert with Lord Raglan, he made a successful landing in the Crimea, won the battle of the Alma, and, just as Sebastopol was attacked, died of the sickness that had long been wearing him out His struggle with pain and death was worthy of antiquity His body was buried at the Invalides, and his bust in bronze has been placed in the court of the Lycée Napoleon Marshal Saint-Arnaud was an active, indefatigable, and most brave officer, with prudence and resolution, a clever tactician, an able administrator He has left some letters (Paris, 1855), charmingly natural and spirited and very precious in their particulars of the conquest of Algeria

Though the enemies of the Imperial rule have tried to heap abuse and calumnies on the hero of Marshal Saint Arnaud, the man, in spite of his prodigality and carelessness in money matters, nevertheless remained one of the most brilliant and most original personages of his time His heroic and Christian death would redeem many faults.

getic commandant Poerio. But, turning off towards Staouëli, he carried off the government cattle, and killed no less than forty of our men with their leader, Captain Muller, of the Foreign Legion.

Less than twenty days afterwards, on the 19th of May, at an interview with Mgr. Dupuch, Bishop of Algiers, the same Mahometan personage released a hundred and twenty-eight Christian prisoners, among them Assistant-commissary Massot, captured with his family near Douera, at the gates of Algiers, under Marshal Valée.

Although the negotiations had been commenced by the venerable Bishop before Marshal Valée's departure, it is allowable to believe that the vigour of General Bugeaud's first attacks prompted this act of mercy done in the name of Abdel-Kader, by his own brother, just after the attack on Coleah and Staouëli.

CHAPTER II.

TACKDEMPT AND SAÏDA (1841).

Mostaganem—March to Tackdempt—Report—Zouaves and Arab Cavalry—Mascara—Letter from the Sheiks—Letter from Saint-Arnaud—Destruction of Boghar and Thaza by Baraguey d'Hilliers—Advice to Soldiers—Another Expedition to Mascara—Léon Roches sent to Mecca—General Daumas in Charge of Arab Affairs—Arrival of the Governor's Family—Victualling Medeah and Milianah—Expedition to Saïda—Destruction of Sidi Mahiddin's Ghetna—Capture of Saïda—Failure of the 'Soldier-Labourer'—Letter to M Gardère—Summary of the Year.

THE day after the Governor-general despatched his important report of the campaign on the Chélif to Paris, he left General Baraguey-d'Hilliers in command of the province of Algiers, and himself embarked for the west.

On landing at Mostaganem, the 15th of May, he met the troops that Lamoricière was bringing him from Oran. On the 18th began the campaign of Tackdempt, in a fortnight the army returned to Mostaganem, its starting-point. General Bugeaud made his report of this short campaign to the War-Minister in the following terms:—

SIR,—I started on the 18th from Mostaganem, as I had the honour to inform you.

The artillery and engineer waggons were loaded with ammunition, tools, and other material for the expected siege of Tackdempt.

The means of transport at my disposal were used for the equipment of this service and the ambulances. I added everything that my resources would allow; every soldier carried eight days' provisions, and the cavalry horses were each loaded with a sack of rice sixty kilogrammes in weight.

My cavalry, by their devotedness, rendered an important service to the army. Horsemen carried their sacks all the way to Mascara,

being alternately troopers of the baggage train and cavalry soldiers when there was fighting to be done.

After several small combats of the rear-guard and flankers, we reached Tackdempt on the 25th of May, and took possession of it during a very sharp engagement between the Zouaves and the enemy's cavalry upon the neighbouring heights. This combat reflected great honour upon the Zouaves, who are a really choice corps.*

The town and the fort had been evacuated by the inhabitants, and they had carried everything off; some thatched houses were burning, set on fire by the Arabs themselves. Those of masonry, roofed with tiles, were intact, as also the arms manufactory, a saw-mill, and stores. The army immediately proceeded to the work of destruction, and the engineers to blow up the fort. Next day by eight in the morning, we were on the road for Mascara; and Abdel-Kader, on the neighbouring heights, was watching the blowing up of the citadel that had cost him so much trouble and money to build, where he had placed his principal magazines of arms and military stores of all kinds.

* An order of the 1st of October, 1830, approved by a Royal ordinance of the 21st of March, 1831, created two battalions that received the name of Zouaves, in Arabic *Zouaoua*. The Zouaoua are a tribe, or rather a confederation of Kabyle tribes, living in the most remote gorges of the Djurjura, a race of men brave, intrepid, and laborious, whose submission to the Turks was never anything but nominal; they were, however, well known in Algiers, being continually brought there by the necessity of exchanging their oil, and the produce of their rough industry, for the goods that were not to be found on their barren hills. As they were reputed to be the best foot-soldiers of the regency, and, in certain circumstances, had engaged their military services for hire to barbarous princes, their name was given to the new militia. Its ranks, however, received all natives without distinction of origin, mountaineers or men of the plain, town artisans or Kabyle labourers, Arabs or Couloughis; but they wanted leaders. French officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to drill and command them. They were volunteers, such as will always be found in the army, some disgusted (*rompus*) with infantry service like Levaillant, others just enlisted like Vergé, old Philhellenes like Molière, who died a general on his return from the siege of Rome, officers of special arms like Lamoricière; all men full of youth and energy, disinterested, brave, not attracted by the bait of larger pay, nor the hope of pleasant garrisons, who cheerfully entered upon a life of continual privation, severe labour, and constant risk, without being deterred by the uncertainty of reward.

The Royal ordinance of the 7th of March, 1833, fixes the number of companies of Zouaves at ten, eight French and two native. There were to be twelve French soldiers in each native company. The command of the Zouaves, with the rank of chef-de-bataillon, was given to Captain de Lamoricière, who had joined the corps on its formation, had several times been distinguished for his bravery and military qualities, and, having been lately engaged in organizing the first Arab office (Bureau Arabe), had, in that difficult work, shown that he already possessed a very complete knowledge of the language and habits of the natives, a quick mind, a great deal of boldness and prudence, great ingenuity and loyalty, with indefatigable ardour.—*The Zouaves and Chasseurs-à-pied*, by H.R.H. the Duke d'Aumale.

As I expected that the moment we had retired the Arab horse men would not fail to come and examine the destruction we had accomplished I placed the Zouaves in ambuscade behind the rubbish of the fort and a battalion of the 41st of the line among the ruined houses in the town. The column had hardly gone a cannon shot when 700 to 800 Arab horsemen crowded into the streets and squares. The battalion of the 41st of the line rushed out of their hiding place and fired upon them bringing fifteen to the ground and killing two horses. The Zouaves had no chance.

The same day and the following days as far as Mascara Abdel Kader kept two large masses of cavalry continually on our flanks while some thousand horsemen kept firing upon our rear guard. The principal forces remained at a distance and in such a position that it was impossible to bring them to an engagement against their will.

At Fortassa the enemy collected all his forces upon some hills we had to cross. This spot was celebrated in the history of the Arabs because eighty years ago they had here defeated the Bey Bou Cabous. I thought that they had chosen this spot to fight a battle with me so I massed my train caused the cavalry to put down their sacks and with hardly any delay in our march we advanced rapidly upon the enemy alarmed with the chance of at last getting a success that might be decisive of something. Our hopes were again frustrated. As soon as our battalions echeloned to the two wings and covering the cavalry had come within gun shot the enemy retired at a gallop and took up a position on some high hills about two leagues distant. I would not pursue them so as to avoid fatiguing the troops to no purpose and I returned to encamp at the place where I had left the train guarded by four battalions. There was water there and forage and wood.

On the 30th we found Abdel Kader again upon the heights around Mascara. He was reinforced by 400 horse brought him by Bou Hamed, Kaliph of Tlemcen. Everything showed that he intended to defend the approach to the town. We employed the same tactics as at Fortassa and with not much better result. However they waited for us to get a little nearer, and our skirmishers and shells killed some men and horses. We then took possession of Mascara and I was agreeably surprised when I found they had confined themselves to breaking the doors and the wooden furniture.

A great number of houses have long been in ruins. But as the city is very large for it formerly contained 20 000 to 25 000 inhabitants it was not at all difficult for us to find places for the hospital magazines and lodging for the garrison. I have reason to hope that in a short time these establishments will be very convenient. It would even be possible with some work to lodge 1000 or 7000 men and it would be very advantageous to keep them there, the difficulty only lies in feeding them.

At this moment the garrison is made up of two battalions of the 15th light, one battalion of the 41st of the line, and three companies of engineers, under Colonel Tempoure; and they lost not a moment in setting to work to establish themselves. Two half-batteries of reserve field artillery were left in the town with gunners enough to serve the pieces.

All the stores left in the train, except those given out to the column for their return to Mostaganem, were taken into the town, and made about fifty days' provisions for the garrison.

We stayed at Mascara the 31st of May, and on the 1st of June took the shortest road to Mostaganem, namely, the one through the defile of Akbel-Kredda. We hoped that it would be possible to pierce this little chain of mountains, three leagues in depth, by a carriage-road, as that would have greatly simplified the victualling of Mascara, but this seductive hope was completely disappointed. It is the most horribly broken ground I have yet encountered in Africa.

You may form an idea of it, sir, when you hear that the rear-guard of the column, having been attacked by 5000 or 6000 Arabs, it was impossible for me to give it any flanking support, anxious as the troops and I were to do so; and as its way was along a very narrow ridge, it was completely useless to give any direct assistance. It had to meet the attack unassisted, and did so with a courage worthy of the greatest praise. General Levasseur was in command. It was composed of two battalions of the 6th and 13th Light, and one battalion of the 41st of the Line, supported by a section of mountain artillery, and some wall pieces.

The enemy had only to repent of having engaged in this combat, for they lost at least 400 men, of whom two were chiefs, and a number of horses. Our loss was ten men killed, one an officer—Sub-Lieut. Rachan, of the 6th Light—and 54 wounded taken into the ambulance. Perhaps we should have lost fewer men if our battalions had not made such a stubborn resistance that, seeing my orders for a rapid retreat were not being put in execution, I was obliged to go myself to withdraw them from the fight, and take them to a less difficult spot, where I was resolved to make an offensive reprisal if the enemy had then engaged himself, but he did not do so. They retired in silence to carry off their killed and wounded. We carried off ours, and left not a single man in their hands, living or dead, nor a single vestige that might enable them to boast of a victory. It is curious that they did not even follow us next day, though we rested two leagues from the field of battle.

On the 3rd of June we reached Mostaganem, without seeing another enemy.

Our loss in the whole campaign was only 20 men killed, and 85 wounded.

Our left column, in an offensive reprisal before we reached Tackdempt, made 7 prisoners

The sanitary condition is good ; we have brought back but few sick. The number of these, and the wounded in the ambulance, reached 208 on our return, five being officers.

Our cavalry and all our transport animals found forage in abundance everywhere, furnished by the still standing crops of wheat and barley

We are making most active preparations for another campaign about the 7th or 8th. I cannot here tell you all the means I can find to carry the greatest possible quantity of provisions to Mascara, hospital stores, tools, reaping-hooks, &c.

I have great reason, sir, to praise my troops, in this long and difficult expedition.

Then follows mention of several officers who distinguished themselves.

While the walls of the fortress and arsenal of Tackdempt were crumbling to the ground, Abdel-Kader surveyed the work of destruction from the neighbouring hill ; he had made up his mind to it beforehand. But the French army had to fight every step, and keep on guard day and night, without peace or truce, before they became possessed of the Arabs' land.

On the 3rd of June the army reached Mostaganem, and the Duke de Nemours took ship there, and returned to France. General Bugeaud had returned thither to fetch the stores required by the garrison of Mascara. A large train reached Mascara on the 10th of June with the army. And then the wise Governor thought that, instead of burning the harvests of the fruitful plain of Ehgris, it would be more logical and easier to reap them, and so victual the place, and increase its store. For more than a fortnight our soldiers, with the reaping-hook in one hand and the musket in the other, scoured the most accessible parts of the territory of the Hachem Ehgres.

Colonel Tempoure being ill, was relieved by Colonel Gery at Mascara, and the army returned to Mostaganem by the 27th.

After some sharp engagements with the tribe of Metdjar, on whose territory Mostaganem is built, the General returned to Algiers, but for only a short time. In fact, he was recalled to Mascara by the submission of this tribe and some others; and he installed a phantom of a bey at Mascara, Mustapha Ouled Othman, whose father had been bey of Oran, under the Turks.

This was the first campaign in the province of Oran; but that province was only the half of the Emir's kingdom.

Marshal Saint-Arnaud in his letters says, We saw clearly that the Emir would not risk a battle. He saved his regulars, to keep the tribes up. General Bugeaud pursues his purpose with most able and praiseworthy perseverance. He is an admirable man. He is not known, nor justice done him. I follow him, and examine him dispassionately, and every day discover fresh qualities in him. Frank and loyal to excess, he sometimes becomes rough. With incredible activity he descends to minutiae. A farmer for fifteen years, living in continual contact with a low class of society, he has not quite the dignity or bearing desirable. But what conscience, what rectitude, what delicacy of feeling, what complete self-denial! And he is surrounded with difficulties! Little cliques raise up trouble for him: the press kills him with pin-pricks. I should like to be in France and shout this from the house-tops.

* * * * *

Abdel-Kader had collected all the resources of the province of Titeri at Boghar and Thaza. General Bugeaud, having announced his intention of destroying these fortresses, reputed impregnable, the astonishment of the natives was immense. This very curious letter was addressed to the Governor-general at Algiers by their principal sheiks:—

What is this spirit that impels France, calling itself such a power-

ful and strong nation to come and make war upon us? Has she not territory enough? What loss will the land she takes be to us in comparison with what is left us? She will march forward and we shall retire but she will be compelled to retire and we shall return.

And you Governor of Algiers what harm can you do us? In fighting you lose as many men as we do. Sickness decimates your army every year. What compensation can you offer your king and your country for your immense losses in men and money? A little land and the stones of Mascara! You burn you waste our harvests you cut our barley and wheat and rob our silos. But what is the plan of Ehgris and you have not wasted a twentieth part of it when we have the harvest left in (here follow thirty names of places) and besides that the harvest of Morocco itself? The mischief you think you have done us is like a cup of water drawn from the sea. We shall fight when we think fit you know we are not cowards. For us to meet all the forces you drag along with you would be madness but we shall weary them and harass them and destroy them in detail our climate will do the rest. Send man against man, ten against ten a hundred against a hundred a thousand against a thousand and you will see if we recoil. Do you see the wave rise when a bird brushes it with its wing? This is the image of your passing over Africa.

Meanwhile General Baraguey d'Hilliers* was finishing his operations, thus summed up in the *Moniteur Algérien*, of June 8. 'The expeditionary division started from Blidah on the 18th of May, provisioned Medeah on the 19th, left that town on the 21st,

* General Baraguey d'Hilliers Achille was born at Paris in 1795. Enlisted as a soldier while yet a youth he lost his left hand at the battle of Leipzig. After the fall of the Empire he became an enthusiastic adherent of the house of Bourbon and was one of the King's guards. He was made colonel after the taking of Algiers. In 1839 King Louis Philippe made him second in command of the school at St. Cyr afterwards of the Polytechnic. In 1840 he was sent to Algiers and had the Duke d'Aumale under his orders. Lieutenant general in 1843 in command of Constantine he was placed on the unemployable list next year in consequence of some failures.

Brought elect in 1845 as representative by the department of Doubs. General Baraguey d'Hilliers always sat on the Right and after the 2nd of December joined Prince Napoleon. He commanded a force sent to the Baltic and took Bomarsund. Then took an active and distinguished part in the campaign in Italy where he won the battle of Melegnano. During all the war of 1859 Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers lived in retirement and refused in 1873 to be president of the court-martial on Marshal Bazaine. Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers had a quick mind and grand military qualities but an obstinate and difficult disposition.

destroyed Boghar on the 23rd, Thaza on the 25th, left provisions at Milianah on the 29th, again touched at Medeah on the 31st, and returned to Blidah by the 2nd of June.

‘No enemy made any serious resistance, and the force returned with a very small number of wounded.

‘H.R.H. the Duke d’Aumale, who shared in all its fatigues and privations, never ceased to encourage the troops by his example.’

The Commander-in-Chief published a general order commending the conduct of this expedition.

It may here be interesting to give the distinction between the two names that have often occurred—Arabs and Kabyles. The Arab is a nomad. He transports his tent over the plains like the Bible patriarchs. The Kabyle lives assembled in villages, generally in the mountainous regions.

The first came as conquerors from Asia; the second descends from the aborigines. He speaks a peculiar dialect, bearing traces of an origin previous to the Mahometan conquest. As, for instance, his calendar preserves the Roman names of the months.

The Arab fights on horseback, the Kabyle on foot. The Arab is generally polygamous, the Kabyle not. With both one and the other the notables of the tribe meet in a council, *djemâa*, to regulate the affairs of the community. The head of the Arab tribe is called *sheik*; of the Kabyle village, *amin*; he is a sort of *maire*.

The Arab changes the position of his cultivation and pasturage nearly every year; the Kabyle is almost as stationary in his territory as the French villager; he also cultivates his vines and his fruit

trees, which the Arab cannot do. He has often been called the Auvergnat of Africa.

There are Kabyles on all the mountains of Barbary, but the largest group is at the foot of Djurjura. Not subdued by the Turks, and perhaps not by the Romans, they enjoyed complete independence even till 1857.

Marshal Randon's expedition placed them under our control. We have respected their organization, and never had more submissive Mahometan subjects.

General Baraguey-d'Hilliers, in his report of the 4th of June, says that this campaign, with only a few wounded, and not one killed, had escaped its first element—fighting. The result was curious. This was one of the most fruitful of the list of our African campaigns. After the excursion to Boghar and Thaza, all that district, the region of the upper Chélif, was pacified. Except the mountains of Milianah and Cherchell, all the province of Titery, of which Medeah was the ancient capital, was almost finally lost to Abdel-Kader, and he was thrust back towards the west, upon the Ouarensenis, the Dahra, and the province of Oran.

Bugeaud, faithful to the system he had preached from the tribune, consisting in perpetual harassment of the enemy, and wasting of his territory, immediately after the expeditions to Medeah, Milianah, Tackdempt, Boghar, and Thaza, arranged two others in succession to Mascara. And as the army had been obliged to go through Mascara on the way to Tackdempt, there had in consequence been three visits paid to Mascara.

The Oran division started from Mostaganem for

a detachment to fetch food ; it must be taken to them with sufficient force to be secure from attack.

The cattle guards will take their rations with them, and cook their soup a-field.

All possible steps will also be taken to prevent civilians from travelling, or going to work alone and unarmed beyond the protection of the posts.

A list will be kept of those who allow themselves to be captured by the enemy through a breach of these rules, or who allow themselves to be carried off without making any defence, as has sometimes happened ; and when circumstances favour an exchange of prisoners they will not be included.

On the 2nd of July, Lamoricière went again to Mascara and came back in thirteen days. This triple expedition to Mascara answered well to the system Bugeaud had explained from the tribune for the subjugation of Africa, the occupation of one fort on the coast, and a corresponding one inland, and a column moving between the two, preventing the Arabs from getting in their harvests, in a word impeding what Deputy Bugeaud called their agricultural interest.

He also had said that the most active army possible was wanted to fight the Arabs, and therefore had not used the artillery or waggons at the Sickack, to the great surprise of his comrades in arms. This was still further carried out by Lamoricière, and is described by one of his aides-de-camp, the Marquis de la Guiche :—

The Arabs had one final advantage over us, they carried no food with them. Lamoricière answered those who asked how we could live without carrying victuals, 'The Arabs do it very well, we will do the same.' The Arabs managed to dispense with carrying victuals because they found corn in their silos, subterranean granaries, knowing the spots. So we had another difficulty to conquer, to find the Arabs' silos. Lamoricière started with a column that carried only four days' victuals, and kept a-field for twenty days. He only had some of the little hand-mills used by the Arabs added to the equipment. Our men baked their own cakes when

they had found the corn. To find the silos, a chain of soldiers was formed one or two leagues in length who went forward probing the ground with their ramrods, or the points of their swords, until they met with the stone that covered the mouth of the silo level with the ground. Then every man setting to work with his hand-mill, ground the corn to flour, and the cake was very soon kneaded. The silos furnished the corn, the razzias found the meat, and so provisions were not wanted. The men no doubt did not live so well, but they marched faster, and comforted themselves for their bad meals by beating the Arabs.

It was at this time, in the month of July, 1841, that General Bugeaud employed his interpreter on a secret mission to Mecca, so as to obtain a sanction to the permanent submission of the tribes he had just conquered. M. Roches's ability, adventurous character, and perfect acquaintance with the Arabic language and religion, naturally suggested him to the Governor-general. This delicate and dangerous mission was completely successful. The object was to obtain from the grand medjlis, or council of the ulemas, a kind of papal brief, or religious firman (*fetra*), explaining to the faithful certain points of doctrine and practice. The *fetva* that M. Roches brought back from Mecca, after a perfect Odyssey of travel, amounted to this: 'The Mahometan may tolerate a truce when the infidel invader leaves to the Mahometan his wives, his children, his faith, and the practice of his religion.' This was a very important step towards the pacification of Algeria. General Lamoricière, who was face to face with some fanatical tribes, wrote to General Bugeaud to congratulate him on the excellent effects of this religious decision. After the publication of the *fetra*, the Arabs, in a kind of friendly adoption, never recognised the Governor-general's interpreter by any other name than that of El Hadj Omar; Hadj, pilgrim, being the title given

to any man who has been on pilgrimage to Mecca, and visited the Prophet's tomb. According to their notions the French had all along been mistaken in supposing El Hadj Omar to be a Frenchman. The man, they said, is evidently an Arab; he is a Mahometan of the purest blood, chief of a great tent, and, better than that, a respected marabout. M. Roches has told us that he had a French servant, and when he spoke to him in our language so that the Arabs should not understand, they fully believed that the speech was Turkish. On his own side M. Roches did not wish to contradict this reputation: it is easy to see what a valuable instrument such an interpreter would be for the Governor-general. And so we find Léon Roches always by the Marshal's side, and rendering him most important services in this secondary situation. After his interpreter's return from Mecca, the Governor-general had a seal engraved with this inscription in Arabic, 'The earth is the Lord's, and he gives it in heritage to those whom he has chosen,' a short sentence taken from the Koran, and well calculated to make an impression on the Arabs. All General Bugeaud's proclamations to the tribes, and all his letters to Arab chiefs, were countersigned with this seal.

General Bugeaud had left his family in France and gone to Algiers alone when he received the appointment of Governor-general. We find the following letter among his correspondence, written soon after his installation to his youngest daughter, whom he had left ill in France:—

How sorry I am, my good Léonie, that you have been ill again. All the turns of your sickness have been running in my head. I see you in bed, I hear your fits of coughing, I see your cheeks flushed

with fever, I feel your pulse, I read your condition in your doctors' eyes, and thank them for having cured you. And your good mother, I see her too at your bedside, anxious and attentive. But let us forget this, and only think of your recovery. I hope that this letter will find you well, and that you will go to the watering place at the end of May, and come and see your dear father in September, as he wants you to reward him for his fatigues.

You will have a pretty town house and a charming country house. You will also have a theatre, a piano, as much military music as you like, and a bishop for confessor.* There is also good society to be picked out. I have looked to it for you and Charles. As for your father, he wants none but yours.

Write to me, dear Ninie, and kiss Marie for me.

General Bugeaud's young family did not join him at Algiers until the 6th of September. But the Governor, after resting more than a month, was proposing to set out upon an autumn campaign longer than the previous ones.

While the Governor remained at Algiers, not more than five weeks, he visited Blidah and the continuous line, the contrivance of such doubtful efficacy invented by General Rogniat, before mentioned, a kind of wall of China that the Arabs crossed without scruple or difficulty.

Being convinced of the importance of having the administration of the subject Arabs under his hand, the Governor-general re-established in August the office for the management of Arab business,* and placed it under the management of Chef d'Escadron Daumas, who was, as is well known, one of his most valued assistants with the pen as well as with the sword †

* The office for the management of Arab business, established on the 25th of April by Governor general Damrémont, was wrongly placed by Marshal Vake among the duties of the general staff.

† Daumas, Joseph Eugène, born the 4th of September, 1803, joined the army as a volunteer, 1822. He was sent to Saumur in 1827. In 1830 he sailed for Algeria, and was in the campaigns of Mascara and Tlemcen under Marshal Clauzel. His

CHAPTER III.

CHÉLIF AND OUARENSÈNIS (1842).

Report of January 4, 1842—Tempoure's Operations—General Rumigny in Algeria—March on Tlemcen—Preparation for the Spring Campaign—Massacre of Beni-Mered—Letter to Mdme. Bugeaud—Road by the Chiffa—Impulse to Colonisation—Letter to Mdme. Bugeaud—Campaign of the Sebaou against the Ben Salem—Correspondence with Guizot—Hasty Pamphlet—Letter from the King—Campaign on the Chélif and the Mina—Letter to Gardère—Description of the Ouarensénis—Success of Changarnier and Lamoricière—Rout of the Tribes—Submission—The General's Mercy.

THE last days of the year 1841 were marked by some brilliant successes in the province of Oran, and the Governor-general on the 4th of January, 1842, forwarded the following despatch to the War-Minister :

Algiers, 4th January, 1842.

SIR,—An extraordinary mail from Oran brings me letters from Colonel Tempoure that are most interesting. Certainly Abdel-Kader's power is rapidly diminishing in the province of Oran; and when his defeat is complete in that quarter it cannot fail to extend speedily over all the rest of the territory ruled by him as far as the province of Constantine.

You will see that the chiefs of twelve tribes accompanied Si-Mohammed ben Abdallah-Ouled-Sidi-Chigi in the solemn interview that he had near Tlemcen with Colonel Tempoure and General Mustapha. This combination is powerful enough to give reason to expect that it will be able to maintain itself alone; but it is wise to give it a powerful support, and I have written very positive instructions to Colonel Tempoure for that purpose. . . . There is reason to hope that the great union of douairs that goes by the name of Beni Amer will join the confederation, and then we shall be masters of the territory from Oran almost to Mascara.

* * * * *

When General Bugeaud went to the province of

Oran on January 10, 1842, he appointed as chief of the government General Count de Rumigny, king's aide-de-camp, who had come a few weeks before to take command of the province of Algiers, and, it was said, to await the abeyance of the Governor-generalship.

So a report spread, both in France and Algeria, that General de Rumigny, an intimate friend of King Louis-Philippe, was destined to supersede General Bugeaud, who would not return. And this gave rise to a strange state of things; the opposition in the press and in parliament, only one year before irreconcilable enemies of General Bugeaud, suddenly set to work, with the violence of the time, to oppose this supposed substitution of a court favourite, for a man considered by all to be the conqueror and pacifier of Algeria, after his campaign of 1841.

King Louis-Philippe was really too much of a patriot, and too wise, to think differently, and he could only congratulate himself on the change of opinion in favour of a man whom he valued so highly; and he readily sacrificed his aide-de-camp, if, indeed, he ever had any serious thoughts of making him Governor-general.

General Bugeaud went to Oran with the purpose of organizing a winter campaign, to deprive Abdel-Kader of the only town left him, the old Arab capital of Mauritania; the relinquishment of which by Bugeaud himself, at the treaty of the Tafna, had been the subject of such severe criticism.

General Bugeaud commanded the troops in r and with him was the old native general M ben Ismaël. The general order published

head-quarters in Algiers on the 25th of March, 1842. says shortly :—

The column collected at Oran, towards the end of January, operated during the most difficult season of the year. It was stopped neither by flooded torrents nor by the snows covering the hills. In this campaign of twenty-five days it secured the submission of all the tribes that extend from the Habra to the frontiers of Morocco. The occupation of Tlemcen has been the consequence.

The indefatigable Bugeaud did not stop at Tlemcen, though the weather was so bad. To complete the subjection of the west, he pushed on to Seldou, a fortress of the Emir situated thirteen leagues to the south-west of Tlemcen. The fort was destroyed on the 9th February; stores of iron and lead were found there, and seven brass guns, two of them cast at Tlemcen.

He returned to Algiers after only five weeks' absence; the powerful stimulus he gave to his lieutenants was never relaxed. The Governor-general was known to be at Algiers, with a steam-boat in the harbour with her steam always up, ready to be at any of his posts that was threatened, or was only inactive, within twenty-four hours. And so razzias were made on all sides, and the King's aide-de-camp sent to victual Medeah. This was done without interruption, though the only road lay through the Col de Mouzaia, and had always been found to cause a certain loss of men, calculated on beforehand by the staff.

Admiral Fourichon, lieutenant commanding the Governor-general's steamer, *Pharos*, in 1841, told us a short time ago, that the Marshal's activity of mind and body was incomparable. He slept very little, and had no hesitation in waking up his atten-

dants when he could not sleep himself. He very seldom wrote himself, and always slowly and with an undecided hand; but his private secretaries, Trochu, Vergé, and myself, were always occupied in writing under his dictation. Having indefatigable powers as a worker, he made the mistake of judging others by himself; and yet his wit, gaiety, liveliness, cheerfulness, and kindness, made him adored by all those who lived in intimacy with him. He delighted in talking, and was always lecturing. He was a wonderful story-teller, and able to give his tales a picturesque, original, and always varied turn. I remember one day, at the palace in Algiers, in 1841, he was sitting on a little low stool, and three deputies on their travels were standing round him, commissioners, and in some sort inspectors of his acts and deeds, MM. de Beaumont, de Corcelles, and de Tocqueville. M. de Corcelles was the only one of these who did justice to the Marshal, and who really loved him. The Marshal was telling his guests about the capture of Saragossa, and did it with so much warmth, animation, truth, and simplicity, that M. de Tocqueville, habitually not much of an admirer, came to us and confessed that he had never imagined our General could be so eloquent.

Admiral Fourichon was much affected as he said the Marshal's heart was very lofty, and full of nobility and greatness; in what multitudes of instances have I been witness to most splendid and affecting conduct on his part.

During the periods of rest, razzias* were made

* M. Cherbonneau, the learned professor of Arabic, almost all of whose life was spent in Africa, has given us a picturesque definition of the word. He says it really means in Arabic an attack by surprise, before break when the woman is ungirt, and the horse unbridled.

on all sides, only as a better preparation for the spring campaign.

By the 25th of March, the Governor-general was issuing a general order threatening the hill Kabyles, and causing expectation of a grand expedition into the interior of the Tell. 'They think themselves impregnable in their rocks, but we will show them that there is no retreat where our brave infantry cannot reach them.' This was quite a new departure, as hitherto all the expeditions had worked in the plains.

Towards the end of the month of May 1842, Baron Larrey, Napoleon's distinguished surgeon-in-chief, then being seventy-six years of age, was commissioned by Marshal Soult, the War-Minister, to make a sanitary inspection in Algiers. Baron Hippolyte Larrey, who accompanied his father, told us that the interview between the Governor-general and the sanitary inspector was, at first, rather cold and constrained, but soon became very unreserved. They discussed all the questions relating to the feeding of the troops in Africa, the hospital regulations, the provisions and stores accumulated in the great vaults at Algiers, the arrangement of the sanitary service of the troops, the conveyance of wounded, the use of coffee instead of alcohol, and such matters. The Marshal expressed his determination to check the spread of the constant Algerian intermittent fevers, by issuing sulphate of quinine to the troops; but the Baron pointed out to him that this active, and frequently adulterated, medicine could not be administered to sound men as a preventive without inconvenience, while it would be sufficient to insure there being a sufficient quantity of the

pure article to enable the sick to wrestle with the fever. General Bugeaud gave up his plan.

Now, instead of little journeys such as those from Mostaganem to Mascara, or from Oran to Tlemcen, the General determined himself to lead a grand expedition from Oran to Algiers by the valley of the Chélif. When a military commander committed himself to this long valley of the Chélif, between two chains of mountains unexplored and peopled with thoroughly hostile tribes, he had to calculate upon engaging in a most hazardous expedition; the slightest breath of war would rouse the mountaineers to the right and left, and might, in a way, repeat the retreat of Xenophon's ten thousand Greeks. His start was delayed by an event that showed how insecure was the state of things at this time, even at a short distance from Algiers.

On the 11th of April, at the gates of Boufarick, on the territory of the Beni-Mered, a little detachment of twenty-two men under Sergeant Blandan was attacked by three hundred Arab horse. These were Arabs from Sebaou. The brave non-commissioned officer called to his men to defend themselves to the death, he was killed, as well as five others; eleven were so seriously wounded as to require amputation. The firing lasted an hour and a half. Lieutenant-colonel Morris, hearing the sound of the firing, came up at full speed with a troop of the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique, and saved the rest of the infantry detachment; only five men being unwounded. 'This was better than Mazagran, as then the men were under cover of walls,' said the Governor-general when he heard of it, and the names of these twenty-two brave men were published in general orders.

General Bugeaud did not leave Algiers till the 25th of April, leaving General de Bar* in command of the Algiers division ; and we find the following letter written to Mdme. Bugeaud, but without date :

Sidi-Ali ben Aichoun, upon the Oued Fodda, 1842.

MY LOVE,—Notwithstanding the bad weather, I have visited all the tribes to the south and north of the Ouarensenis. Almost all of them have submitted to me, and have been condemned to disarmament ; this has commenced, but proceeds slowly.

To sum up, this vast insurrection is drawing to its close, and its final conclusion will be favourable to us ; for the fetters of the natives will be better riveted than before.

I shall be at to-morrow, by eight in the morning ; and find your letters there with news of all my people, so I shall be very happy.

I am very well, indeed, only for my lips being burnt by the sun. A thousand loves.

* * * * *

I shall try to go and visit you on the 10th of June ; try to wait for me till then.

M. Louis Veuillot in his fine book, *The War, and the Man of War*, says, ‘God had treated him as one He loved. Placing in his heart an unbounded love for everything that is good and pure, respect for everything grand in his mind ; his house and home was the abode of simple sweet Christian virtues, all powerful over his soul.

‘The newspapers drew ridiculous and odious portraits of this fierce soldier, but he was a most tender

* General de Bar was born at Thiais in 1783. He enlisted as a volunteer, and won his stripes in the battles of the Empire. Seriously wounded at Bautzen, and made prisoner. He was distinguished at Waterloo, and seriously wounded. In 1823 he was fighting in Spain as lieutenant-colonel, and made colonel in 1830. Maréchal-de-camp in 1837, he took a glorious part in our fights in Algeria, and Marshal Bugeaud procured him the rank of lieutenant-general. He several times did the duty of Governor in Marshal Bugeaud's absence, being treated with great affection and confidence. In 1848 he retired as colonel of the third legion of the National Guard. Senator in 1852, and Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. General de Bar died in 1861.

husband and father, most devoted friend, most generous patron, and one of the few men I have known who readily forgot ingratitude and injury. This ambitious man's only aspiration was to live peacefully in the bosom of his family, on the patrimony he had nobly preserved by his work.

'Being compelled by the public service to leave this dear family, and these beloved fields, he went to battle wearing on his breast a medal of the holy Virgin given him by his youngest daughter, Léonie Bugeaud, Comtesse de Feray, and all around him could see the value he attached to this talisman. What a fine smile lit up his manly countenance, when I told him, on parting at night, "Marshal, think of the God they are praying to at Excideuil."'

Bugeaud announced his return for the 10th of June, and really did reach Algiers on the 11th; on the 20th Mdme. Bugeaud and the family sailed for France in the *Pharos*. In six weeks the Governor-general had come back. He had taken command of the Oran division, and brought them as far as Blidah up the valley of the Chélif, nearly in the line of the present railway from Algiers to Oran. There was no serious resistance; the tribes either submitted, or buried themselves in their mountains, saying, that they were not hostile, but feared that they should not escape Abdel-Kader's terrible vengeance. The Oran division met that of Generals de Bar and Changarnier from Algiers, and then returned as quietly to Oran. The Governor-general now remained stationary for four months, an unusual time for him; it seemed as if he was expecting a serious alarm that would again cause him to move in person.

'Our work is changed,' says the *Moniteur Algé*

every page of which, evidently, contains passages inspired by the Governor-general. 'When we were only assailants we could select the time and place for our attacks; now that we are protectors we must march at all times, and to every place, to save the subject tribes from invasion. To keep is no less difficult than to conquer. Our brave soldiers will not be weary; they will not stop till they have destroyed the Emir's power even in its smallest holds. It must be dissipated to the last traces, so that this extraordinary man may not reappear.'

The Governor-general considered the army's duty changed, but he did not think it ought to rest, not by any means; and proclaimed that it ought to be more than ever ready to march. Writing to M. Guizot, the Foreign Minister, on the 18th of October, 1842, General Bugeaud says, 'While I am chasing the Emir, you will be striving to keep your majority against inconsistency and fickleness. You will see, as well as we shall, that it is as difficult to keep as to conquer.'

A good proof of the pacification at this time was the fact that Medeah and Milianah were now victualled by sutlers, and almost without application to the military administration. For eleven years this had only been accomplished by the periodical sacrifice of a number of soldiers, calculated beforehand, at the infernal Col de Mouzaia. Now these sutlers had to be recalled to prudence by an order of the director of the home department, approved by the Governor:

Merchants are in the habit of proceeding alone on foot from Blidah to Medeah, and Milianah unarmed; usually carrying merchandise with them, and passing the night in desert places. All Europeans are desired not to go alone to Medeah or Milianah, or any place in the interior. They should join in small caravans of seven or eight men, well armed. They should never bivouac in desert places, but sleep in the douairs nearest their road, and communicate with the kaïds and sheiks who will protect them.

The General was especially desirous of avoiding the difficulties and dangers of supplying Medeah by crossing the Col de Mouzaia, and he therefore had the splendid road through the gorges of the Chiffa surveyed, and immediately proceeded to the construction of it. This is one of the wonders of Algeria, of the beauties of the world. For a length of five leagues the road was made by pick and blasting through rocks towering three hundred feet above it, with the torrent below. The vegetation is beautiful, and a fact in natural history will show how inaccessible are these gorges, for a tribe of apes still continue to live in peace upon the Chiffa, defying the hunters' arms of precision, the only place in Algeria where they are now to be found except the mountain of Bougie.

This temporary pacification, obtained by the stupefaction of the Arabs at the number and vigour of the blows inflicted upon them in 1841 by the new conqueror, did not disarm General Bugeaud's numerous critics and keen opponents. In the press and on the tribune these opponents never ceased to pursue him; and the General showed himself much too sensitive to these attacks, as unfortunately he always did.

However, he took advantage of this summer of 1842, to give a hitherto unknown impulse to colonisation. More was, in fact, done than in the previous twelve years, nine new villages were planted, and the following year nine more.

On the 30th of August France had received the submission of the Isser, a powerful tribe holding the first hills to the east of the great plain. This submission completed the pacification of the tribes of the Mitidjah.

But our indefatigable General was planning another campaign, even beyond the Isser, against a little chief, named Ben-Salem, who held the valley of the Sebaou, and on the 29th of September he went in command of the column to operate in the east beyond the gorges of the Isser. The expedition destroyed a small bordj, the capital of Ben-Salem, having encountered but little firing; Colonel Leblond of the 48th of the line being unfortunately killed, a valuable officer. The Governor-general returned to Algiers on the 16th of October, and there found Mme. Bugeaud, who had arrived with her children on the 19th.

Another chief, formerly a khalifa of Abdel-Kader, Si-Mohammed Ben Mahi-Eddin, a man of great energy, gave us his assistance most devotedly in this campaign, especially as the column was returning. He took charge of the transport and escort of the sick and wounded, and he did it as well as French soldiers could have done.

The Governor-general rewarded him with the style of Khalifa for the hundred and twelve tribes of the Sebaou district just conquered. He wished to strike the fancy of the natives by making this first ceremony of investiture at Algiers a grand solemnity. At eight o'clock in the morning, the Khalifa proceeded to Government House, accompanied by his brother, three agas, and the hundred and twelve kaïds of the tribes placed under his command, guided by Chef d'Escadron Daumas. The Governor-general made them an address through the interpreter, M. Léon Roches, exhorting them to be faithful to their contract of alliance; and promising them greatness, threatening punishment and transportation to France

if they broke it when once undertaken, and then he invested the chiefs with suitable robes.

Though the General's activity had been crowned with success, he thought he could perceive an intention to reduce the number of troops in Algeria, shown in some acts of the War Minister. As he was unfortunately always interested in the discussions of the Chambers, and the attacks of the press upon Algerian matters, he did not confine himself to addressing observations to his superior, Marshal Soult, he chose to bring his case before the public, by publishing a pamphlet, protesting against any measure of this kind. Marshal Soult was very properly annoyed at this proceeding, and did not conceal his displeasure with the Governor-general.

M. Guizot was in regular correspondence with General Bugeaud. The great Minister displayed an unfailing esteem and attachment for the soldier, notwithstanding the divergence of their temperament and character. M. Guizot's *Memoirs* give some interesting particulars of this intimacy. It may be seen how cleverly and dexterously the politician brought the Governor-general round to his opinions, not directly opposing him, as the War Minister too often did. These are the fine and wise words that M. Guizot addressed to his friend General Bugeaud, in order to allay the irritation produced by the reproof that the War Minister had thought it his duty to convey to his immediate inferior in rank, in reference to the pamphlet mentioned :—

M. GUIZOT TO GENERAL BUGEAUD.

Paris, 20 September,

You complain of me, my dear General, and you

reason to do so. Yet I am not without excuses. I have a great dislike to empty words. I had nothing necessary, nothing practical to say to you. I venture to think that you trust me, whether near or far off, whether I speak or am silent. So I have not written to you. I have rejoiced in your success, and believed in it beforehand, because I have confidence in you. I have supported you in the Council and elsewhere, whenever I had a chance. I have laboured with some success to secure the predominance of the only policy that can support you, and that you can support. These are my proofs of friendship, my dear General, be sure you have gained mine; and I shall be faithful to it, and always charmed to prove it to you.

You are entrusted with a great work, and you will succeed in it. That is glory, you love it, and you are right. There are only two things in this world that are worth caring for,—domestic happiness and glory. The public are beginning to believe that they must rely upon you as regards Africa, and give you all you want to complete what you have begun. I have just read what you have just written, it is conclusive. In your place, I do not know if I should have written it; deeds are more authoritative than words. But your reasoning is supported by your deeds. I shall make use of it in the next session. Meantime, finish your work of securing and completing the military supremacy. Then we will consider the territorial establishments. I am as much impressed as you are with the necessity of action in Algiers while Europe is at peace. Africa is the business for our leisure time.

The General's reply was thus :—

GENERAL BUGEAUD to M. GUIZOT.

Algiers, 18 October, 1842.

Yes, I trust you, far or near, writing or silent, my dear Minister, and am honoured by the friendship you assure me of.

You tell me, 'In your place I do not know if I should have written, deeds are more authoritative than words.' I have not written to turn my deeds to account, and have not said a word about them. I wrote, chiefly to oppose a notion that appeared in the papers, in private conversations, in letters, and especially in the War-Minister's letters, the reduction of the army in Africa. The Marshal War-Minister has found fault with this publication. Had he a right to do so according to precedent? You can judge by the reply I made him, and enclose a copy of it for you. But supposing that I was to blame, was it right to admonish me in the papers? I was very much vexed at an article published in the

Moniteur of Paris. I do not think I have failed in discipline or propriety, and I flatter myself that no general in command, two hundred leagues from his country, has been better disciplined than I have.'

There was some reason for the African General's vexation. Although Marshal Soult was dictatorial and quick to take offence, he highly esteemed his old comrade of the grand army. He liked to remind him that they had both been present at the battle of Austerlitz, one with his corporal's stripes, the other invested with the dignity of Marshal of France. Unhappily, General Bugeaud was not patient.

The year 1842 was fatal to France. The death of the Crown-Prince, the Duke of Orleans, killed* on the 13th of July upon the road to Neuilly, destroyed the hopes of a whole people. The African army, having seen him in action on the field of battle, loved him, and held him in high esteem. The Duke, intelligent and brave, had the rare power of charming and attracting. And so the hearts of men were drawn to him irresistibly; and it must be said that few princes were more popular, more beloved, or more sincerely and bitterly lamented than was the father of my lord the Count of Paris.

In the month of October, 1842, the Duke d'Aumale, promoted to the rank of general, returned to Africa.

Before leaving Algiers, the General-in-command wrote the following letter to his friend Gardère; and in it will be found, as is always the case at this

* By a carriage accident.—Ed

period of his life, Bugaud's two great subjects of thought, Abdel-Kader and the opposition.

Algiers, 12 November, 1842.

MY DEAR GARDIERE.—You have not written to me for a long time, neither have I to you, because you were in the midst of the honeymoon, and I in the midst of the labours of Hercules ; that is to say, in those labours that consist in subduing thousands of wild beasts, and it must also be said some great citizens, who want to give the Arabs a nationality.

You have been travelling, I know ; you have been at Bordeaux to show your young wife to your relations and friends ; that is charming. I presume that you are happy, and wish you the continuance of that delightful state.

As for me I am always fighting against Abdel-Kader, who strives against his ill-fortune with grand energy and ability. He is really a master man, worthy of a better fate. I consider his business is done, without recovery. He may support himself for a time as a partisan chief ; he can never regain a sovereign's power ; and I think that in the spring we shall finally expel him from the last territory that provides him with any resources, between the Chélif and the Mina.

Now the important enemies are no longer there, they are at Paris. Around those in power there are envious men, incapable of believing anything, detracting from everything that is done, and so managing to inspire doubts in the minds of the Minister and the King. These speeches come to me, and I sometimes see traces of them in the official correspondence. I am in a rage ; but what can be done ? I console myself by thinking that generals have always been subject to such mortifications.

I am sending the King six horses, that the Minister had told me to buy for him. I request Marshal Soult to cause the price of the purchase, amounting with incidental expenses to 7200 francs, to be remitted to you.

Answer me, and tell me of your young brother, of your travels, and your plans.

My wife and daughters are here, and well. Charles has stayed in Périgord, as we dreaded the climate for him.

BUGAUD.

All the way along the valley of the Chélif, the eye wandering along the blue line of the southern

mountains, rests upon the grand dome of Ouarensenis, a rock giant, rearing his bald head above wooded attendants. The Arabs call it 'the eye of the world,' thus alluding to the hemispherical form of the peak, and the incomparable view to be enjoyed from it of the course of the Chélif, of the fresh valleys at the mountain foot, and lastly over the sombre blue of the Sahara, commencing far off to the south, in the direction of Tiaret.

The region of sloping woods, that range around the foot of the peak, is really charming. Everywhere else in the provinces of Oran and Algiers, what bears the official name of forest is only poor copsewood and brushwood.* Here the forests of green oak, Aleppo pines and pistachios, deck the undulating flanks of fresh valleys, and terminate towards the east in the splendid mass of the cedars of Teniet-El-Had, the marvel of forest bouquets in this French land.

In these woody undulations of the Ouarensenis, whose freshness is a delicious contrast to the furnace temperature that exists for nine months out of the twelve in the long valley of the Chélif, there was everywhere a crowded population fifteen or twenty years ago. The typhus of 1867, the evil year, the Arabs call it, made frightful ravages among them. The solitude of most of these gorges is only disturbed by the passage of small caravans, and the sudden sound of the partridge's flight, or by the companies of wild pigs that they disturb.

The chain of the Ouarensenis was then a rampart of stone, to the south of which Abbel-Kader could take shelter where he had never been attacked.

* The Arabs have only one name for forest and brushwood—*ghazal*.

Bugeaud had already twice examined the calcareous giant with his eyes, and he was not the man to be scared by this unknown region. He had once approached the scarped flanks of the chain, without trying to penetrate them, in May, 1841, in the pursuit after the battle at the bridge of the Chélif, under Milianah. A second time he had in 1842 defiantly reviewed the whole mountain, while ascending the Chélif from west to east. The mountaineers had not issued from their gorges. Bugeaud was determined to seek them there, and he did so in his campaign of November and December, 1842.

Four affluents of the Chélif descend almost as parallels from the chain of Ouarensenis to the river from south to north. These are, beginning from the west, the Oued Rihou, the Oued Isly, the Oued Fodda, and the Oued Rouina, this last taking its rise in the region of the cedars.

To the west of these four valleys, the most considerable was that of the Mina, where by the General's orders Lamoricière and Gentil stopped the passage like beaters for game.

The General-in-command started from Blidah on the 22nd of November, speedily reached the Chélif, and buried himself in the mountainous mass of the left bank, thrusting the tribes before him. The Flittas, forming the advanced guard of the enemy's masses, immediately effected a movement in retreat, finding at the eastern opening of the defiles Lamoricière before them, and were obliged to surrender to him. The others, after retiring across the three first rivers, made head in the gorges on the Oued Rihou. The Emir himself had hastened up to encourage them.

Changarnier, having collected the principal corps d'armée from Milianah, after having repulsed a first attack of the Arabs on the 28th of November, attacked the tribes on the 8th of December, and caused them great loss, himself only having two killed and seven wounded. Abdel-Kader had come in all haste from the south, to encourage by his presence these masses of the faithful, driven back by an unexpected attack at this season; he felt that the loss of the Ouarensenis would be an irreparable disaster to him. His horsemen engaged man to man with Colonel Korte's Chasseurs. Three days following did they repeat their furious charges upon the French cavalry. This time our loss was more serious, amounting to seven killed and seventeen wounded. Artillery Captain Persac allowed himself to be cut to pieces upon one of his guns which was in danger for a moment. After this combat, as usual, far more sanguinary for his men than ours, the Emir disappeared.

While Changarnier's column was thus taking possession of the Oued Rihou, and executing a turning movement in the secondary valley of Oued Talata, thus closing all exit towards the west, the principal corps d'armée, under the Governor-general and the Duke d'Aumale, followed the line of the crest; thrusting before it the vast crowd of mountain tribes, warriors, women, children, old men and cattle.

This maddened crowd, knowing the localities, felt as if it was being driven to certain death. In the last march it would reach the very dome of Ouarensenis, at the great peak of Chenba, suddenly cut off into slippery and broken rocks, forming a precipice. At the foot of the peak, 71

sword in hand, and behind him Lamoricière, were expecting the fall of the human vintage.

Bold horsemen might still dash over at the risk of breaking their horses' legs, but what would become of the families, the children, and the old men? Here they were, a prey to an unknown conqueror, a foe to the true religion, whose cruelty the Emir had hundreds of times described. The dread of a general massacre, and horrible death at the bottom of the precipice, was just the thing to terrify the tribes; for such, no doubt, would have been the cruel conclusion under the Turks, their usual enemies.

The 15th of December was a fearful day. The French kept on advancing. The tribes were in unutterable confusion. The chiefs excitedly deliberating, surrounded by the terrified multitude, amid the lowing of the herds hard driven in flight, amid the guttural shrieks of the Arab women, unpleasant in sound even in their expressions of joy, and now denoting nothing but despair.

On the morning of the 16th, the oldest of the chiefs, Si-Mahommed bel Hadj, kaïd of the Beni-Ourag, came to the Governor-general and sued for mercy, asking him if such a number of families were devoted to destruction. He thus addressed General Bugeaud :

The word of a Beni Ourag is proverbial. If you are merciful, I am yours for ever ! I will tell Abdel-Kader, ' I have lost six sons for you in battle. The tribe has sacrificed everything for you ; we can do no more for you, as you cannot protect us.'

Mercy tempered the General's disposition, and also his views. Such a man as he could not dream of a massacre. Such a large body of prisoners would have been very difficult to bring back by these

difficult goiges. So he judged it the best policy to leave them free; and when Mahommed bel Hadj offered his youngest son as hostage, gave this answer :—

My mercy shall be complete I will have nothing to do with a hostage, your face gives me confidence Besides I have better than hostages—power, activity, knowledge of your mountains, and the certainty of resuming all our advantages if you fail in keeping your word

This was the end of the first expedition to the Ouarensènis The army remained a week resting among the tribes and their herds The Duke d'Aumale was to lead the Algiers division back towards Medeah and Milianah Changarnier, the hero of Constantine and the Titer, received orders to retire upon the coast towards Tenes, as the General thought him good in all kinds of country, especially the unknown. Bugeaud considered the occupation of Tenès necessary in order to take possession of the central Chélif, as a base of operations upon that long coast where no point was occupied between Cherchell and Mostaganem. General de Bar had been sent from Cherchell to Tenes in the beginning of 1842, and had not succeeded in getting there Bugeaud expected to do better by sending Changarnier. This time again, by a singular fatality, the attempt failed, as Changarnier found the arid rocks of Tenès would not feed his cavalry, though there was no opposition from the tribes; so he had to turn back to the east, and was obliged to feed his horses on biscuit for the last two days, since the barley had failed. The Governor had a steamboat awaiting him at Mostaganem, and touched at Tenès on his way to Algiers, expecting to find Changarnier there, but found nothing but solitude.

The campaign of Ouarensènis had lasted forty-seven days. The Governor-general had returned to Algiers on the 30th of December, not in a humour for long repose, and besides an offensive return of Abdel-Kader almost immediately obliged him to take up arms again.

CHAPTER IV.

TENÈS AND ORLÉANSVILLE (1813).

Bugeaud's Vexation—Confidences to Guizot and Gardère—Saint Arnaud's Sortie—Reappearance of Abdel Kader—Return of Aumale and Chan-garnier—Disturbance from Morocco to Sebrion—Building of Orléansville and Tenès—Cavaignac Governor—Razzia by the Governor and Pelissier—Submission of False Chiefs of Ouarensèns—Ahmed Ben Sûm, Chief of Laghouat, asks Investiture

AN old Algerian of the first days of conquest lately told us he was in Africa from 1832 to 1812, so that he only saw General Bugeaud for one year; but that he certainly did more in that one year than all his predecessors in ten years.

The execution of the design for 1841, followed by the remarkable results of the campaign of 1812, seemed to be a reason for an exceptional reward, and everybody thought so in France and Algeria, Bugeaud as well as the rest. In fact the King and his ministers, through the medium of State Councillor Laurence, had made him expect his speedy promotion to the rank of Marshal. He was always too high-minded to ask for anything.

He experienced the keen vexation of seeing a Marshal's baton just vacant bestowed upon another, and himself only receiving the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. His feelings in this matter are displayed in letters to M. Guizot, and to his intimate friend Gardère:—

About the end of April, 1813, says M. Guizot, in his *Memoirs*, I received this letter from General Bugeaud:—

MY DEAR MINISTER,

* * * * *

In my first impulse I had written the enclosed letter to the War-Minister. On reflection, I decided not to send it; but I forward it to you as a comfort to my oppressed soul, and justly wounded pride. If anything could console me, it would be the thought that they must have a high idea of my devotion and self-denial, to substitute for a promised recompense a cordon that has been given for very small services to men who have not been distinguished.

In the month of January Bugeaud had expected this disappointment, and had written as follows to his friend Gardère :—

Algiers, 9 January, 1843.

There is some truth in what you tell me about the delay in rewarding my services; but I cannot believe in ill-will. It is quite certain that, through weakness, men are more careful of their foes than their friends. They are sure of me, and so do not treat me with respect.

However, they write that they are now considering me. We shall soon see. Whatever comes of it, I shall devote neither more nor less zeal to my difficult duty. I toil for the country and for honour.

* * * * *

And again in April—

* * * * *

After sending me formal information by M. Laurence, from the King and the ministry, that I should be made Marshal in January last, they have appointed another, and sent me the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour.

* * * * *

I do not know to whom to put down this remarkable treatment of a devoted man, who had asked for nothing, but thought he had the word of the King and Cabinet.

* * * * *

Nevertheless the great Algerian work took up much more of the Governor-general's attention than personal vexation. Now in winter-time, just after the campaign of forty-seven days, the Duke d'Aumale

had despatched an officer completely in the General's confidence—St. Arnaud—to finish the work in the Ouarensenis. Bugeaud wrote to the Duke, discussing the arrangements, and showing great interest and anxiety. The Prince also in his reply says, 'The responsibility of St. Arnaud's movement weighs upon me. I would remind you, General, that I had always thought of this operation as combined with a sortie from Blidah. If this is not to take place, would it not be wise to write to M. St. Arnaud not to prolong his stay at Teniet-El-Ahd, but to return to Milianah?' St. Arnaud himself writes to his brother: 'I have explained to the Prince our position in the south, become critical by the repeated razzias of Ben Allal upon our ally, Ameer Ben Ferrath, the aga of the Ouled-Ayad. I have shown him the necessity of my making a sortie, and laid out my plan of campaign. His Highness leaves me 200 horses more; and whatever be the weather, snow or frost, I go to-morrow, and shall be out twenty days at least.'

Some sudden information, of unexpected gravity, came to increase tenfold the Governor-general's anxieties for his old aide-de-camp of Blaye, St. Arnaud, to whom he was very much attached, as well as for the responsibility of the Prince, under whose orders St. Arnaud had proceeded upon this adventure.

The Emir had penetrated into the heart of the Titeri. He was reported only a few leagues from Cherchell. Abdel-Kader, who had carefully avoided fighting, and had left us undisturbed while we plundered and subdued the tribes of the Ouarensenis, dexterously took advantage of our retreat to appear in the midst of the populations, through whom we had just made

securing the submission of the nearest tribes. A frightful storm of snow and hail had assailed his column, torn down his tents, caused the loss of beasts of burden, some muskets, stores, and even two unhappy soldiers, carried away in torrents.

‘When the fine weather returns,’ says the Governor-general rather disappointed, anonymously, in his organ, the *Moniteur Algérien*, of the 10th of February, ‘there will be an opportunity of resuming the work, with some security of success.’

The unexpected incursion of Abdel-Kader, and the Governor-general’s premature return, spread some alarm in the colony. The strangest and most exaggerated reports were in circulation: victories by the Emir were talked of, French columns completely destroyed, even the leaders were mentioned by name. These reports, propagated by two equally dangerous sentiments—fear and malice—were transmitted across the Mediterranean by private correspondence, being received and magnified by the hostile press; and this did not fail to produce the usual annoying effect upon General Bugeaud.

He was especially vexed about the secondary check in the matter of Tenès, for it seems that a somewhat premature notice had appeared in the *Moniteur Algérien*, and it was fortunate, perhaps, that bad weather had prevented any tradesmen from making their way there in the expectation of finding a settlement.

We find some letters addressed to the Duke d’Aumale, as Commander of the provinces of Medeah and Milianah, that show the Governor’s anxieties. There were many tribes to chastise in the Prince’s province of Titery, although it was so near, and the roads were for the time unsafe.

General Bugeaud's principal object in his grand campaign of the first half of 1843 was the complete establishment of the French power upon the central Chélif. Before starting for this long absence, he did not forget his love of farming and gardening, being no doubt reminded by the return of spring. In a circular, dated 7th of March, he advises all the commandants of the care to be taken of plantations, trenches to be dug at the foot of the trees, bundles of thorns to be reared round them as a protection from the teeth of cattle; he proscribes the bad habit of cutting off the head of mulberry-trees, &c.

In spite of this affectation of tranquillity, the Governor-general was really anxious. Ben Salem, whom he left behind, was from the Djurjura stirring up the tribes of the Sebaou, placed under the Khalifa Mahiddin by the French; and in another direction the political situation of the region comprised between the Mina, the Chélif, and the sea, was far from being splendid in the month of April, 1843. Insurrection was still at the gates of Cherchell; all the Dalra, except the great tribe of the Beni Jeroual, subdued by General Gentil on the 22nd of March, felt Abdel-Kader's influence. All the tribes of the Chélif and the Ouarensenis obeyed him. The west of the Titer, the east of Mascara, were in movement. Letters from the Emir, profusely distributed from Morocco to the Sebaou, were making our allies uneasy, and encouraging his partisans. With 800 horse, and 2000 regular infantry, our intrepid antagonist had recovered confidence in his luck.

A vigorous offensive action was necessary; in the Governor-general's ideas it comprised—first, the immediate formation of two forts in the central region

the Chélif, Tenès, and Orléansville; of a third line of posts, running from the south-east of Mascara to the south of Medeah: Tiaret, Khmis of the Beni Ourag, Oued Rouina, Teniet-El-Had, Boghar; secondly, the pursuit of the Emir's smalah in the desert with two light columns taken from the divisions of Algiers and Oran, and starting one from Boghar, the other from Tiaret.

The opening of the road along the Chiffa, during the summer of 1842, through a most difficult country, had naturally made Bugeaud think of having others made by the army. The road, starting from Milianah, across the little chain of the Gontas, was the first for notice. By the 15th of March, eight battalions were established upon the communications between Blidah and the Chélif to open a road for wheel carriages between that valley and the Mitidjah. The General said that in a few months this road would be as useful for trade as for war.

In spite of the activity shown, the communication was not practicable till the 20th of April. On the same day the Governor, having left Algiers on the 17th, crossed the Gontas with a large train of carriages and animals. On the 23rd, having collected his troops under Milianah, he marched without losing time.

Descending the course of the Chélif, he at last on the 26th reached the point of El-Esnam. This was to be the site of the future town of Orléansville.

The upper Chélif is known by the name of N'har-Ouassel (nascent river). It rises near Tiaret, and is enlarged eight leagues further on by the Sbain-Aioun (seventy springs). A country legend declares that it was an ancestor of Khalifa Sidi-el-Aribi who, like

Moses, made these seventy springs rise from the ground.

One day the Khalifa was telling General Bugeaud the story of the miracle, probably with the object of glorifying his own ancestry. He told a lengthy tale that this country was in those days entirely without water, and that the people asked his ancestor, Sidi-el-Aribi, who lived in the ninth century of the Hegirah, to procure them some by his baraka (blessing).

Sidi-el-Aribi, touched by these prayers, granted their wish on the spot where he was upon his horse. He invoked God and caused his horse to make seventy bounds, and at each bound there immediately burst forth a spring of water from the spot the horse's shoes had struck. When the Marabout thought he had raised water enough from the ground, he made his horse walk. The springs joined and followed him in form of a river, to which he gave the name of N'har Ouassel. Then the holy man thought he would conduct this river over as much land as possible, so that the Mahometans should have the benefit of it. And, therefore, when Sidi-el-Aribi had led the N'har Ouassel, which afterwards took the name of Chélif, to the mountains of the Titer, he conducted it along to the sea, and placed its estuary near Mostaganem, almost under the meridian of its source.

General Bugeaud listened attentively, and said to our Khalifa, 'That is very fine, but our Chélif has a much older origin than that you give it, being known to the Romans long before your ancestor's time.'

The Khalifa was at first disconcerted, but then he answered, 'Possibly, but then the Chélif had no water in it.'

The site for the town was selected at the confluence of the river and the Tigraouet, where a spot on the left bank was marked by Roman ruins. Some statues thrown down and mutilated had caused the Arabs to call this spot El-Esnam (the idols). The General stopped there, as he had arranged a meeting with General Gentil coming from Mostaganem.

On the 27th of April, General Bugeaud marked out the situation of the capital of the plain of the Chélif on an irregular parallelogram of six hundred by three hundred mètres, pointed out by the Roman ruins of Castellum Tingitanum.

The vast agricultural plain of the Chélif extends between Cherchell and Milianah on the east, Mostaganem and Oran on the west. The passage of the river is obstructed by the mountainous region bearing the historic name of Dahra at its eastern end, and it is obliged to run parallel to the Mediterranean for three hundred kilomètres, though its course is directed towards it in the first instance.

When this territory was conquered there was no palpable centre of population either in mountain or plain. The submission of almost all the tribes over this vast space had been obtained, and these advantages would certainly have been secured if it had been possible to leave a portion of the army upon the central Chélif. But they were obliged to retire behind the first range of the Atlas.

For the subjugation of the valley of the Chélif, the Dahra, and the Ouarensenis, General Bugeaud, according to the plan so often explained by him from the tribune, desired to have a double base, the camp in the interior, and the supplying town on the coast.

As soon as the site of the future camp town was

selected, an order established the military subdivision of El Esnam :—

Camp, El Esnam, 26th April, 1843.

Colonel Cavaignac is invested with the command of the subdivision, El Esnam, and the active brigade established at that spot.

Though the territory of El Esnam is comprised within the province of Oran, the superior officer in command at this post will correspond direct with the Governor-general. But he will address his general reports to the commandant of the province, who will be the chief commanding officer of the troops collected at El Esnam. The territory assigned to the subdivision of Esnam will be determined subsequently.

(Signed)

BUGEAUD

Pelissier.

On the 28th, that is to say, the very day after he had marked out this new camp, that eventually became an important town, the Governor-general went northwards toward Tenès.

This was a fourth attempt. And really curious ill-luck had obliged four expeditions to be made before a point on the coast could be occupied, although we were uncontested masters of the sea. This was on the site of the Roman colony of Cartenna.

Crossing the Chélif, Bugeaud marched at the head of the train, himself opening the road for the carriages, personally encouraging the workmen, and having the chief obstacles removed.

This military march, complicated by road-making, and conducting an important convoy through the heart of a hostile country, caused such a dispersion of the companies as the enemy was sure to try to take advantage of.

On the 29th of April, Ben Kassili, agha of the

Dahra, made an attack upon the left flank of our troops, as they were scattered over a long line of march, with four or five hundred horse and as many foot ; but he was put to flight and pursued for three hours by General de Bourjolly, whom the Governor-general had placed in reserve to cover the works.

A road for wheels had to be made over calcareous rocks only just marked by a narrow path. Pickaxe and shovel could no longer be used ; it was blasting and the miner's pick. It might have been supposed that it would take a fortnight, but the ardour of the troops was so great that in a week the train arrived at the port of Tenès.

On the 1st of May, almost as soon as the army reached the spot by land, the arrival of three steam-vessels from Algiers was signalled, and the shore was soon covered with merchandise and material of every kind.

After prodigious labours, that only the army could execute with such rapidity, the road from Tenès to El Esnam was fit for the passage of carriages by the 8th of May. The first train started on the 9th with the Governor-general at its head, and the newly-subdued tribes were most eager to furnish three hundred and fifty beasts of burden to add to the transport. It was reasonable to suppose that the road from Tenès to El Esnam would be quite safe without an intermediate post, and that the trains could go without escort.

There was every prospect that these two places would be not only military posts, but soon become most important trade posts.* Two hundred and

* Tenès has now 3000 inhabitants, Orléansville (El Esnam) 4000.

forty-three artisans or tradesmen had applied for permission to establish themselves at Tenès by the 16th of May, and the custom-house had taken 1500 francs. The camp of El Esmam was abundantly supplied.

The tribes did not remain inactive; they were working on fortifications at both points, gardens, barracks, and permanent army establishments, building lime-kilns and bakers' ovens, fresh hewing the rubbish of old Roman ruins to be used in new buildings, and clearing out the old cisterns to be used as cellars or magazines.

Gardens were portioned out to all the corps, and brought into cultivation, being sown with the seeds of all sorts of vegetables.

Everything was arranged so that the work of erecting a permanent camp at El Esmam should be most actively carried on, as it was placed in a most favourable situation. Stone fit for lime had been found on the spot, and a tile-kiln was in process of construction. The wood they had at hand ought to be enough to last the whole army consumption for five years.

At El Esmam the dwarf jujube tree that covers large spaces of the stony plains on the left bank of the river had removed any fear of want of fuel. The venerable roots of this shrub made an inexhaustible store, and the Governor-general gave orders that the stocks should not be entirely destroyed.

By orders of the Marshal, President of Council, War-Minister, dated May 16, 1843, the camp of El Esmam took the name of Orléansville, and this homage to the reigning dynasty and to the memory of the Duke of Orleans was adopted at the suggestion of the Governor-general.

Colonel Pelissier was sent into the Dahra (Beni-Madoun), while the Governor-general, having left a convoy at El Esnam, descended the Chélif and made an attack from the south. By the 12th the junction of the troops was effected, and the enemy were attacked by the advanced guard under Colonel Pelissier. After a skirmish that cost the enemy thirty men, we made one of the largest razzias of this war, two thousand prisoners of both sexes, four or five hundred mares, seven or eight hundred asses, twelve thousand head of cattle.

On the 25th of May, the General left Orléansville with two columns to invade the Eastern Dahra in concert with columns from Milianah and Cherchell. The Khalifa Berkani left those mountains and fled to the Ouarensenis. The tribes submitted. Colonel Ladmirault was left in command.

Meanwhile, Changarnier was establishing posts, and punishing the Beni Fera, to the east of the Ouarensenis. He caught a large number against the rocks, and took 2000 prisoners, eight thousand sheep, eight hundred cattle, and a hundred and fifty beasts of burden.

Lamoricière was also establishing the post of Tiaret, but was disturbed by an incursion of Abdel-Kader, who had with eighteen hundred horse raised the whole tribe of Hachem. Lamoricière placed stores in Tiaret, and then turned to operations in pursuit of the Emir.

Sidi-Mohammed-bel-Hadj and Ben Marabot were faithful to their promises. They joined the General in the beginning of June, and offered to act as negotiators. Bugeaud appointed Ben Marabot his Khalifa, and Mohammed-bel-Hadj his aga.

They were the chiefs who had capitulated on the 16th of December at the great peak. They kept their plighted word ; but, as often occurs with Orientals, especially nomades, the General was mistaken as to the rank of the individuals.

None of the great chiefs who could be considered as the real masters of the mountains, by their riches, and moral power over the people, had been taken in the sweep of the net in December, 1842. As soon as our columns had taken their departure, these chiefs appeared upon the spot still bearing traces of our devastations, and had immediately induced the tribes to cease their obedience to us. And thus the Governor-general was compelled to make a second campaign of the Ouarensenis in the summer of 1843. When he went away this time he felt he should soon be obliged to return again.

The capture of two khalifas of Abdel-Kader, who were in the neighbourhood, was missed once by Colonel Leflô in a night attack, and afterwards by the Governor-general himself, who chased them unsuccessfully in the direction of the desert, from the 5th to the 8th of May.

On the 9th General Bugeaud returned to Orléansville. His rear-guard, following him, was attacked by the mountaineers on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of July. Everything showed that it would be necessary to return in autumn.

About this same time Colonel Yusuf entered into communication with the great tribes of the desert, the Larbaa, the Laghouat, and the Ouled-Nails. The chiefs came to Algiers, awaiting the Governor-general.

Changarnier, on the 16th of June, entered the

Ouarensènis, and returned after divers razzias and submissions. At Medeah, Colonels Korte and Yusuf made an enormous razzia on the 29th of June, capturing 15,000 head of cattle.

The sudden extension of our influence over the oases in the south of the province of Algiers, over the territory called the desert, was to be the manifest result of the check inflicted upon Abdel-Kader in person to the south of Boghar by H.R.H. the Duke d'Aumale.

The capture of the smalah is important enough to be given with full particulars.

CHAPTER V.

THE SMALAH (1843).

Abdel-Kader not to be Caught—Capture of the Smalah—Bugeaud's Idea—Abdel Kader Enclosed in a Triangle—Aumale to Seize the Smalah—Floury's Account—Aumale's Official Report—Abdel-Kader's Account to Dumortier—Submission of the Chief of the Ouled-Chad—Made Marshal—Banquet to Bugeaud—Tourist and Officer—The Marshal's General Views on the Army and Colonisation.

IN all parts of Algeria the year 1843 was to be glorious and decisive for our arms. We then occupied all the central places of the Tell, that we had abandoned after the treaty of the Tafna, and all on the coast, according to the map presented, in 1835, by Marshal Clauzel. General Bugeaud had considered necessary, and had effected, as we have seen, the establishment of a second line of forts, intended on one side to control the most distant tribes of the Tell, and on the other to awe those of the Sahara, by at will opening or closing to them the country whence they drew the corn necessary to their existence. The Romans had pursued the same plan, pointed out by nature and observation, and Abdel-Kader, whose keen intelligence divined what we learn by tradition, had the same idea.

Brilliant feats of arms, following upon incessant pursuits, had marked each month of this fruitful year.

General Bugeaud hardly remained in Algiers, but was always campaigning, scouring the country at the head of his troops. Never had the expeditionary columns under his orders, and those of General

Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Changarnier, cut deeper furrows in all directions, through the plains inhabited by the Arabs of the tent and the mountainous regions occupied by the Kabyles.

An Arab proverb calls war, 'artifice applied by force.' If the Emir made a practical use of this proverb, his opponent, General Bugeaud, took quite as much advantage of it. Thus, without in any way detracting from the valour, audacity, and coolness of the Duke d'Aumale in the execution, the pursuit, and capture of Abdel-Kader's *smalah*, it was an admirable military conception and wonderful combination of General Bugeaud's. His three little corps d'armée were really acting separately, and not one of them had any certain information as to the real object, the encounter with the *smalah*. General Bugeaud told one of his friends that any previous announcement would have endangered success; 'the shock could not fail to come, when Abdel-Kader was enclosed in a circle or triangle. Napoleon said, "chance was a third part; I allow half." Abdel-Kader keeps us on the alert by his artifices, by his incomparable strategy, by the impossibility of catching him. We must also contend with him by artifices.'

This, then, is the reason why Lamoricière and Bedeau were often fuming against the incomprehensible orders of their chief, for they knew not the real object of their marches and counter-marches. It was through the incomprehensibility of his orders that the great man hoped to be successful, and was successful at that cost.

The *Moniteur Algérien* says:—

H.R.H. the Duke d'Aumale, having placed a dépôt of provisions in the ruins of Boghar, advanced into the south of the

Onarensenis in search of the tents and families of Abdel-Kader and his khalifas. This collection, supposed to amount to about 10,000 persons, makes up what is called the smalah, and is entirely peripatetic. Our Arab allies all say that the capture of the smalah would be a notable blow to Abdel-Kader's power. H.R.H. the Duke d'Aumale has been sent to capture it, but the enterprise is difficult. There must be forced marches upon territories where water is scarce, and crops to feed the animals scarcer still. As much as possible, H.R.H. was provided with the necessary means: but, however active and intelligent he may be, fortune must come to his assistance, to enable him to reach the smalah, as it is so moveable, and kept so well informed by the zeal and devotion of the country.

General Lamoricière* is upon the Serson, seconding H.R.H.'s operations.

In fact, after the capture of the Emir's two citadels, Tackdempt and Boghar, Abdel-Kader's smalah had been on the move avoiding the approach of our columns, when General Bugeaud, learning by his spies that the smalah was in the neighbourhood of

* Lamoricière, Christophe-Louis-Leon Juchault de, born at Nantes in 1806; died in 1865. On leaving the Ecole Polytechnique and the Practical School at Metz, he entered the Engineers, was engaged in the expedition to Algiers in 1830, and became captain in the newly-raised Zouaves. He was director of the first Arab office, and chef-de-bataillon in 1833, lieutenant-colonel in 1835, colonel after the taking of Constantine in 1837. Made *maréchal-de-camp* after the combat of Mousu in 1840, again distinguished himself in the expeditions to Tackdempt and Mascara in 1841, became lieutenant general in 1843, and was engaged in the battle of Isly in 1844. He was the person employed by the Governor general to arrange the expedition that resulted in the smalah of Abdel Kader falling into the hands of the Duke d'Aumale. In 1847 he had the honour of personally receiving the Emir's submission. Having been the year before elected deputy for Saint-Calais, he was at Paris when the Revolution of 1848 broke out. He marched against the insurgents, and was wounded. Representing the Sarthe in the constituent Assembly, he fought in the Faubourg Poissonnière and at the Bastille, then accepted the post of War Minister, and held it till the election of the President. Again elected to the Legislative Assembly, and made Vice-President, he opposed Prince Louis Napoleon's policy. He was arrested at the *coup d'Etat*, and imprisoned some days at Ham, then banished from French territory. In 1857 he was permitted to return to France, and in 1860 he went to take command of the Pope's troops against the Italian Revolution, was attacked by the Piedmontese Generals Fanti and Cialdini, defeated at Castelfranco, and obliged to capitulate at Ancona. Author of *Reflections upon the Actual Condition of Algiers*, 1836; *Project of Colonisation for Algiers*, 1845; *Report on Breeding Studs*, 1850.

The name of Lamoricière is to be found on every glorious page of the history of France. His name is given below; his memory some

Boghar, suddenly gave orders to General de Lamoricière and the Duke d'Aumale, who commanded at Medeah, for the pursuit of the Emir.

The Duke started from Boghar with thirteen hundred foot, six hundred regular horse, Spahis, chasseurs, and gendarmerie, under the orders of Colonels Yusuf and Morris, and a goum of two to three hundred horse.

Three days afterwards he received information that the smalah was encamped fifteen leagues from Goudjilas. After a fatiguing march of thirty hours, allowing but very little time for sleep, with the horses' bridles over the men's arms, eating biscuit and chocolate so as not to betray his presence by the bivouac fires, he reached an uncultivated country. This was the 16th of May.

In the morning, at daybreak, some stragglers of the smalah were caught; the Prince was misled by the information they gave, and made a reconnoissance towards the south.

It was eleven o'clock when the aga of the Ouled-Ayad, who had been sent on to look for water, came back at a gallop, gesticulating wildly, and pale with excitement, to say that the Emir's whole smalah was just taking up its position at the very springs of the Taguin. The undulations of the ground still hid it, but he said there was a vast crowd to be seen behind the hillock, that alone separated it from the column, and that it was senseless to think for a moment of attacking it.

Colonel Yusuf,* marching on advanced guard

* Yusuf, born on the Island of Elba in 1805; died at Montpellier, in 1866. He was on his way to Florence to be educated, when the vessel he was in was captured by Corsairs from Tunis. The Bey of Tunis bought him, was delighted with his cleverness, and had him brought up in his palace, and placed him in the corps

with his spahis, had received the first report from the Arab Mohammed Ben Ayad, and chose to ascertain for himself the truth of this alarming intelligence he took the aga to the Prince. With his orderly before officer, Lieutenant Fleury, and the aga Mohammed, he went as quickly as possible to the top of the hillock that concealed the smalah from the column.

The Arab had not exaggerated the importance and number of the confused masses that were unfolding themselves quite out of sight. The smalah had just reached the stream of water, and was preparing to encamp. Women, children, guards, cattle, were all mixed up together; and in the midst of this multitude could be distinguished the glitter of the weapons of a number of the Emir's regulars presiding over the encampment. The case was serious; our little column was astonished to find itself in front of a crowd of fifteen or twenty thousand souls, and about five thousand muskets.

of Mamelukes, the leaders of his guard. The young Italian was obliged to make his escape to Algiers, in consequence of a love intrigue with the Bey's daughter. There he took service in our army, under the patronage of Marshal Clauzel, attracted attention by his remarkable ability and bravery, and made himself especially useful by his knowledge of the language and habits of the natives. He was made captain of Spahis, and sent on various difficult duties, took Boni by a daring surprise, when he blew out the brains of two Turkish officers, and made the campaign against Abdel Kader, near Tlemcen.

He was appointed Bey of Constantine, but did not take up the office; commandant of the Spahis of Oran, then commandant of all the irregular cavalry in 1841; *marchal de-camp*, not on the staff. The following year he went to Paris, became a convert to Catholicism, and married General Guilleminot's niece.

We find him commandant of Medeah, after the Duke d'Aumale's departure in 1847. Thence he made the first expeditions south of the province of Algiers, 1851; then placed on the regular staff. — the expedition to Laghouat, :

He was engaged in the role the campaign in the Dobrutska, and returned to Africa to command the Algiers division in 1853, as general of division. His last expedition was that to Kabylia. In consequence of differences with Governor-general MacMahon, Yusuf was transferred to the command of the Montpellier division in France, where he died, worn out with disgust and home sickness for the soil of Africa.

While this reconnoissance was taking place, the Prince had come up with all speed, being informed by one of Yusuf's officers, sub-lieutenant du Barail. The commander of the spahis met him just at the foot of the hillock, not a mile at most from the smalah. He quietly explained the difficulties and gravity of the circumstances, without concealing them. At this moment a kind of improvised council of war was held.

The native chiefs commanding the goum had come up. They advised retreat in haste, before the presence of the column should be discovered. Colonels Yusuf and Morris were of opinion that an attack should be made, but the Prince's aides-de-camp, Colonels Jamin and Beaufort, thought it their duty to make some prudent suggestions, in respect of the responsibility to the King that rested upon them. They vehemently insisted upon the young Prince, at least, awaiting the arrival of Lieutenant-colonel de Chasseloup, with his Zouaves and section of the artillery.

The Prince collected himself a moment after these different opinions, and gave this fine answer :

'Gentlemen, we will go forward! My ancestors have never fallen back; I will not set the example!' And very coolly making his arrangements, the young General gave orders to Yusuf to attack on the left, while he himself would go to the right with Lieutenant-colonel Morris and his Chasseurs d'Afrique, penetrating the centre of the smalah, and cutting the resistance in two.

All in a moment, at sight of our horsemen charging full speed, the women, children, and old men, fled with fearful shrieks. Abdel-Kader's regu-

lars, who endeavoured to cover their flight, were caught and cut down. All these masses, now surprised, were seized with a panic, and in an hour four thousand prisoners, the Emir's treasure, his tents, his standards, and the families of all the great chiefs, were in the power of our cavalry. The mother and wife of Abdel-Kader were made prisoners for a moment, but they were saved by a faithful slave, and in the confusion escaped upon a mule.

It is difficult to form a just idea of this combat of a handful of brave men, where there were prodigies of individual bravery, where six hundred determined men overthrew more than five thousand armed guards, killed three hundred of them, and spared the lives of a vast unarmed crowd.

Respecting the capture of the smalah, the Republican Colonel Charras, who was no bad judge of courage, thus spoke :—

A man must be three and twenty to do like the Duke d'Aumale, and attack such a crowd with five hundred men, he must not know what danger means, or else have a very devil within him' The very women need only have stretched out their tent ropes in front of the horses to have thrown them down, or have flung their slippers at the heads of the soldiers, to have killed them all from the first to the last.

Some months ago I chanced to meet an old Algerian, General Fleury, and took advantage of it to obtain some fresh information from him as to the capture of the smalah. The General gave me such a picturesque and exciting account of this brilliant feat of arms, in which he had taken part by the side of his friend Colonel Yusuf, that I was much impressed by it. I wrote it down as soon as I returned home, and can give it almost word for word as I remember it.

The General said :—

As far as I can remember, it occurred thus : On the 16th of May, Yusuf, who was the soul of the expedition, had gone far in advance of the cavalry, so as to be the first to receive the accounts of his runners, and forward them to the Prince. For about an hour past we had been puzzled by a cloud of dust that rose in the distance, when a horseman, hitherto concealed from us by an undulation of the ground—an effect of southern mirage—rose before us, rushing to meet us at the best pace he could go, excited, pale, and like one haunted by a dream.

‘Fly! fly!’ he said, ‘while you can. They are there, all close, behind the hill.’ And he pointed in the direction. ‘They are coming to camp upon the Taguin. If they see you, you are lost! They are sixty thousand, and with their sticks alone could kill you like hunted hares. Not one of you would get back to Medeah to tell the tale of your disaster.’

Yusuf, accustomed to the excitable disposition of the Arabs, said, ‘Come, keep quiet, and tell me exactly what you saw.’ And when he had again heard what was the case, with less excitement and more precision, he turned to me : ‘We will leave the escort, and go and see for ourselves; while you, Barail, go and inform the Prince of what is going on, and ask him to come on at a gallop.’

Then we went off like lightning, only followed by the Arab runner, keeping apart so that we might not raise the dust, and thus we reached the top of the hillock in a few minutes, like three ghosts.

There lay a most exciting spectacle before us at our feet. The real danger had not been exaggerated by Mohammed Ben Ayad. The smalah had really just reached the stream, and was arranging the encampment. Women, children, guards, muleteers, cattle, were all in confusion, and we could hear the shouts and lowing of this mixed multitude. With the glass we could see the arms of the Emir’s regulars, presiding over the arrangement of the camp. A few white tents had but just been set up, to shelter the women of Abdel-Kader, or the great chiefs. Everything was fermenting like a hive. Thousands of camels and mules were waiting, still loaded. Such as were relieved of their burden were straggling along the green banks of the little river. There were also innumerable flocks of sheep and goats to increase this gigantic disorder. All these thirsty beings seemed as if they must dry up the precious thread of water that wound its way through the turmoil.

‘He is right,’ said Yusuf, when we had looked at this inimitable panorama : ‘Ben Ayad told the truth. There is not a moment to lose! Come!’ And we went back as quick as we had come to meet the Prince, now much nearer.

As soon as we joined him the Duke stopped and a council of war was held by the native chiefs and the French. The native chiefs were unanimous in their opinion and entreated the General to stop, saying it would be madness to go on. The Prince listened to his cavalry leaders report and then very quietly asked him 'What is your opinion?' 'My opinion answered Yusuf is that we must attack at once if we do not want to be crushed by a very numerous enemy who may at any moment discover us but I ought not to conceal from your Royal Highness that the undertaking presents serious difficulties.

Colonel Morris was asked, and gave the same answer boldly advising the attack. 'I am entirely of your opinion' said the Duke d'Aumale 'we will go forward.' Then he turned to his two aides de camp Colonels Jamin and Beaufort 'Desire the infantry to hasten their march to support us and at the same time give his orders to Colonels Yusuf and Morris just as if it was a parole.

As we were all going to our fighting posts Colonel Beaufort said 'Monseigneur Colonel Jamin and I are here responsible to the King and appointed to watch over your Royal Highness. Allow us to point out to you that the infantry is still at a distance wearied by the forced marches of these last few days and that it would be prudent to wait till at least Colonel Chasseloup-Loupes and artillery are in reach. The Prince replied 'The infantry is sent for and will make an effort but the hazardous situation you point out is exactly what makes it necessary for us to go forward. My ancestors have never retreated and I will not set the example' said the young Duke. At this moment he took his place among the generals of the future.

In Marshal Saint-Arnaud's letters we find observations on the capture of the smalah — 'The Prince made thirty leagues in thirty six hours, and his infantry was more than nine leagues behind him, when he saw this immense multitude before him, and attacked without hesitation. It was good, it was brave, it was brilliant!

* * * * *

'We had twelve men killed and sixteen wounded

* * * * *

'I cannot say how pleased I am at the P.

having gained this success. It is a good augury. There is promise for the future in this trait of character.'

The Duke d'Aumale's official report, addressed to General de Bar, his divisional commander, dated May 20th, 1843, gives this information :—

* * * * *

On the night of the 14th we caught some persons in the woods, and heard from them that the enemy had gone towards Taguin, on their way to the Djebel Amour. I also heard that General Lamoricière was a few leagues off to the south-west, and that his presence had caused this sudden movement. The Emir was watching him with 250 horse, that he might put the smalah in safety, not fearing the eastern column, as he thought it had returned to Boghar.

This information left me only one course to adopt, and that was to reach Taguin, to catch the smalah if it was there, or to stop its road to the east, and compel it to retire upon the Djebel Amour, where it would be caught between the two columns of Mascara and Medeah, and find difficulty in escaping, for in these extensive plains, where water is scarce, the roads are marked by the precious springs that are to be found. . . . One tract had to be crossed where there was not a drop of water to be found for twenty leagues. But I reckoned on the energy of the troops, and the result proves I was not mistaken.

I divided the column in two, one part essentially moveable, the cavalry, the artillery, and the Zouaves, with 150 mules, to carry packs and tired men; the other composed of two battalions and fifty horse, was to escort the train under the orders of Lieutenant-colonel Chadeyson, all to rendezvous at Ras-el-aïn-end-Taguin.

On the 16th, at daybreak, we had met some stragglers from the smalah. From the inaccurate information that they gave I made a reconnaissance four leagues direct to the south without result. Fearing that the horses would be uselessly tired, I adhered to my former plan, and again took the direction of Taguin, where the column was to unite.

We had no further hope of meeting the enemy that day, when about eleven o'clock, the aga of the Ouled Aïad sent on to ascertain the position of the water, came back at a gallop with the information that the whole smalah, about 300 douairs, had taken up its position on the very spring of the Taguin.

We were not more than a thousand mètres from them, and they had scarcely noticed our approach. There was no room for hesi-

tation, the Zouaves were being rapidly brought up by Lieutenant colonel Chascloup, with Dr Beuret's ambulance, and Captain Aubac's artillery, but with all their energy could not arrive before two, and in another half hour the women and cattle would be out of reach. The numerous fighting men in this city of tents would have had time to unite and make arrangements, success would have become unlikely, and our situation very critical. And so I decided upon an immediate attack against the entreaties of the Arabs who begged me to wait for the infantry, looking to our small numbers and the enemy's immense force.

The cavalry form line and rush to the charge with the impetuosity that is the distinctive feature of our national character and does not permit a moment's doubt of success. On the left the spahis led by their brave officers attack Abdel Kader's douair, and overthrow the regular infantry, though they defended themselves with the courage of despair. On the right the Chasseurs make their way between the tents under a sharp fire of musketry, overturn everything in their way, and head back the fugitives whom many brave cavaliers are vainly trying to rescue. Here, General my task becomes more difficult. You ought to be told of a thousand acts of daring, a thousand brilliant episodes of this hand to hand encounter, that lasted more than an hour. Officers and men rivaled one another, and multiplied themselves to disperse an enemy so superior in number. We were only 500 men, there were 5000 muskets in the smalah. Only combatants were killed and 300 bodies remained on the spot. When the crowds of prisoners saw our squadrons return from pursuing the enemy's horse to a distance, they asked to see their conquerors, and could not believe that this handful of men had scattered the immense force whose reputation, both moral and real, was so great among the tribes.

We had nine men killed and twelve wounded, sixteen horses killed and twelve wounded.

You know, General Colonel Yusuf and Lieutenant colonel Morris. You know their brilliant courage and military ability, but I do not hesitate to tell you that this day they surpassed their reputation.

About four, after a splendid march, thirty leagues in thirty six hours the infantry arrived, weary, but in good order not having left a man or a mule behind. Thanks to some skins I had caused to be filled with water, it had been possible to distribute some in the morning so as to quench the soldiers' thirst a little. The Lieutenant colonel led his column with an energy that he managed to communicate to every one, and deserves great praise.

On the 17th I remained stationary. The cattle were collected, the tents were burnt, and all the booty that could not be carried away.

Next day I moved off. Our march was slow and difficult; our stages, marked by water, are long. We are only 1800 fighting men, and we have to drive the cattle and keep a force in readiness to repulse an attack, that must be expected, and becomes more likely every day, for since the 16th we have not burnt priming. We have to escort a large population that have fallen into our power, and I am taking them to the Mitidjah, where you can dispose of them; they chiefly belong to the tribe of Hachem, among which Abdel-Kader was born, whom he had lately brought away from the plain of Elgris; they came to beg my mercy two days after the fight; but we are every day finding important personages, more or less strangers to that tribe.

I send you a list of those already recognised: you will notice among them the whole families, men and women, of the Khalifa Sidi-Embareek; of Jacoubi, Abdel-Kader's first minister; of Bel Azzi, his intimate adviser, a nephew of the Emir, the daughter of Ben Aratch, several Government servants, officers and soldiers of the regular troops. Abdel-Kader's mother and wife escaped upon a mule, escorted by a few riders, whom our exhausted horses could not catch.

The happy end of this operation—that the Arabs thought could not possibly succeed—has already made a great sensation. Already Djeddid, of the Ouled-Chaib, Djeboul-den-Ferath, and Ben Aouda-el-Moktari, who were all three in the Emir's camp, and are, as you know, chiefs of the grandest families in the country to the South of Thaza and Boghar, as far as Beni-Massar, have sent their relations to beg for mercy and profess their submission.

I send you Djeddid's letter, as its form is interesting. In two days we shall be at Boghar, and if I do not receive fresh orders, our little column will conduct its prize into the Mitidjah, where I shall have the honour to present you with the standards and trophies captured by our brave soldiers.

Receive, &c.,

Maréchal-de-camp, commanding the province of Titer, y,

HENRI DE ORLEANS.

When General Daumas was in attendance upon Abdel-Kader at Toulon, the Emir gave him an account of this event, and the notes that he took seem very interesting. The definition of a smalah will be found in it. It is a word that has no French equivalent, but may be thus defined: a large assembly of individuals for the purpose of locomotion, the Latin *agmen*.

When my smalah was attacked by the Dule d'Aumale, I estimate the population composing it at not less than 60 000 souls, not the tenth part of them were captured.

I had with me the whole of the tribes of the Hachem the Beni-Medrin, the Oulad Cherif, the Oulad el Akreud the Beni Lent &c, &c. And, more than that portions of almost all the tribes that had submitted to you. These portions were composed of Marabouts, and Tholbas (chiefs), who did not choose to live under your laws. They were very useful to me, for they had all been influential in their country, kept up communications, and obtained for me information of all your movements.

This multitude extended from Taguin as far as the Djebel Amour. When an Arab had missed his family among them it would sometimes take him two days to find it again, and if a herd of gazelles rose before them it was all killed without need of firing a gun by the common men's sticks alone. Where we camped we dried up the brooks, the wells, and the pools. So I had carefully arranged a service, to watch over the water, and prevent the herds from soiling or wasting it. In spite of all these precautions much people died of thirst.

My smalah contained armourers, saddlers tailors, all the trades men necessary to our organization. There was an immense market held in it, frequented by the Arabs from the border of the Tell. As for corn, it was either brought us, or we went to fetch a store from the northern tribes.

The encampment order of the tribes was perfectly fixed. When I had set up my tent everyone knew the place he should occupy. Around me and my family and my little treasure I had always 300 or 400 regular foot soldiers my Khialas, and then the Hachem of Lhgris who were more devoted to me than any others. By this you see that it would not have been easy to reach me, not that I took these precautions from a feeling of cruelty, but because I felt that I was necessary to accomplish the work of God, for I was the arm that carried His banner. I had taught my men the good practice of going to watch you, where you were, instead of guarding themselves in the neighbourhood of the smalah. I was myself near Tackdempt, watching the Oran division, which was in the neighbourhood and I thought I had most reason to fear. I had 1500 or 1600 horse with me and thought I had no reason to be uneasy as to the side of Medeah, and none of my Khialas was watching the King's son.

Notwithstanding this, we should not have been surprised, had not God blinded my people. Why? when your spahis were seen coming with their red burnous it was thought in the smalah that they were my Khialas coming back with me. The women shouted for joy in our honour, and were not undeceived till the first shots were fired.

There was then an inexpressible confusion that frustrated the efforts of those who wished to defend themselves. If I had been there, we should have fought for our wives and children, and beyond a doubt you would have seen a great day. But God did not will it. I did not hear of this misfortune till three days afterwards. It was too late.

Some fugitives having told General Lamoricière of the capture of the smalah, he proceeded in the direction pointed out as that which the remnant of the smalah were likely to pursue, and he came up with the fugitives thinking that Abdel-Kader was among them.

This population of 2500 souls, destitute of everything and dying of famine, implored the conqueror's generosity. Lamoricière had pity on them; they were led back to the plain of Ehgris, and all their needs provided for. The capture of the smalah cost us the death of the oldest and most faithful of our allies. On his return to Oran, Mustapha Ben Ismael, chief of the Douairs and Smelas, fell into an ambush and was killed. After the capture of the smalah, several tribes sent in their submission to the son of the King of France, and the letter of one of the most important chiefs shows how much their resistance was caused by dread of the Emir.

The Governor-general addressed a most congratulatory letter to his young lieutenant, begging him also not to return to Algiers till the conclusion of the campaign. Also, on the 15th of July, we find a letter to Madame Bugeaud, in which he says :

Letters show me plainly enough that the Government would not be willing to give me leave in the midst of this decisive state of things. I may add that the army and the people express the same wish, and I feel myself that I am risking my undertaking if I leave it at this moment. You must then, my love, bravely take your part, and decide if our daughter's marriage is to take place without me.

After all, if you are quite determined for me to be present at the marriage, you must meet me at Algiers in the last fortnight of September. Or I will go myself to Périgord, for I have been told

that I shall have the leave I want a little later. I also am quite determined, I take my oath to you, to request my final recall if in a month from this time I am not Marshal of France, but everything seems to make it probable that I shall be. If this is the case, why should not you come and spend the winter with me, since the climate agrees with Léonie? It will be the last for you to spend in Africa. I leave you quite free choice. If you do not come, I will come to you, I swear it, but let me entirely decide this great work. I will not say finish it, but put it in such a state that it will not go back, and there will be nothing to do but to put a finish on the work.

Adieu, my dear souls

BUGEAUD

An order to the army, dated 19th of July, announced that H.R.H. the Duke d'Aumale was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-general.

A few days afterwards, on the 31st of July, General Bugeaud was raised to the dignity of a Marshal of France.

Three months before, by order bearing date 9th of April, General Bugeaud had been appointed to the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, and his two lieutenants, Changarnier* and Lamoricière, made Lieutenant-generals.

* Changarnier, Nicholas-Anne-Théodule, born at Autun Saone et Loire, on the 26th of April, 1793, left Saint Cyr in 1815 with sub-lieutenant's rank and was placed in one of the privileged companies of Louis XVIII's body guard. He obtained his Lieutenancy in the 60th of the line made the campaign of 1823 in Spain and became Captain 9th of October, 1825. In 1830 he was in the 1st regiment of the King's Guard. Reinstated in his rank he was sent to Africa and distinguished himself by a series of remarkably vigorous actions. He was engaged in the expedition to Mascara. Chef-de-bataillon 31st December 1835 he became famous for his heroism with the 2nd light, who always made head against the enemy as rear guard during the disastrous retreat from the first expedition to Constantine, and may be said to have saved the army. He was made Lieutenant colonel in 1837.

Colonel of the 2nd light after the expedition to the Iron Gates in 1839, he was made Maréchal-de-camp after the expedition to Meleh where he received a severe wound and of the fight on the Chelif 21st June, 1840. General of Division 1843 he then returned to France. In 1847 he was sent to command the division of Algiers. When the Duke d'Aumale left the colony to go into exile he handed over the government of the colony to Changarnier, who after the 24th of February, 1848, returned to France and offered his services to the Republican.

On the 20th of September the Duke d'Aumale returned to Algiers after a short stay in France, and the Marshal came from Oran to meet him. The young hero of the *smalah* was enthusiastically received, and a banquet was given to him and the newly appointed Marshal by the chiefs of the civil population.

In replying when his health was drunk, the Marshal said that he considered he could most promote colonisation by establishing security, that the army could only be reduced if a force were provided by military colonies attached to the spot; and in giving thanks for the health of the army he said:

Gentlemen, the army will not lay down its sword as you have just advised, but will hold it in one hand, and work with the other; will keep it always displayed to the Arabs, *always*, observe the word,

Lamartine appointed him ambassador to Berlin, but he preferred to remain at Paris, and assisted in the restoration of order at the revolutionary manifestation of the 16th of April. In the month of May he went to Algiers to relieve General Cavaignac, who had a seat in the Constituent Assembly. In the elections of the 4th of June, he was himself elected a representative of the people for the department of the Seine. When General Cavaignac had become chief of the executive power, he entrusted the command of the National Guard of Paris to Changarnier, who held it after the election of Prince Louis Napoleon as President, and even on two occasions, 9th of January, and 14th of June, 1849, held also the command of the troops at Paris, then amounting to 100,000 men.

General Changarnier held a most important place in politics, but having taken part against Prince Louis Napoleon's Government, he found himself arrested on the morning of the 2nd of December, and then sent out of France by the decree of the 9th of January, 1852. After that he resided in Belgium, refusing to take advantage of the permission given him to return to his country.

On the declaration of war against Prussia, July, 1870, he offered his services to the government of his country, and accompanied the Emperor, Napoleon III., to Metz. Prisoner of war in Germany, Changarnier returned after the armistice, and was elected as representative to the National Assembly for several departments. He died at Paris in 1880.

On the 24th of May, 1873, when M. Thiers, the President of the Republic, was defeated in the Chamber, General Changarnier was very nearly being invested with the office. The Bonapartists had the fatal notion of putting up Marshal MacMahon, and so the republic was saved and secured. It is now stated, that according to the very evident wish of the Chambers and of the country, the republic would very soon have disappeared, if instead of selecting the Duke de Magenta, the Deputies had appealed to the patriotism and decision of General Changarnier.

It is said Changarnier always put on a new pair of white kid gloves for going into action.—ED.

for it cannot be laid down without risk Your existence depends upon the sword ; a warlike people cannot be influenced, or a portion of their land seized and kept, without keeping the sword in sight after it has been bravely used

* * * * *

There are three columns in the *Moniteur Algérien* of the 25th of December, 1843, which give the Marshal's views under the signature of 'A Tourist.' The subject is the necessity of razzias, which had horrified the tourist, who is conversing with an agreeable officer whom he had chanced to meet when travelling.

The tourist asks whether the Arabs would not have respected a definite boundary, and the officer replies, 'That was tried by the treaty of the Tafna; they came into our towns, saw our power and civilisation, but that did not prevent their making a general attack in 1839, and murdering 250 soldiers and colonists in one day, and thenceforward the war had gone on continuously.

Tourist —I see the war was necessary, but could not the same results be obtained without these barbarous razzias that are condemned by all the philanthropic and all the merciful minds of France?

Officer —The philanthropists and merciful men, not confounding them, are equally mistaken. What is war in Europe and everywhere? Is it the destruction of the belligerent armies? No, it is an attack upon the interests of the people. What is done after winning battles? Why, the great towns are seized, the centres of population and commerce, the navigation of rivers, and the great roads, in the next war the railways will be seized.

War is made and nations compelled to capitulate by seizing upon these great interests. . . . The agricultural interest, though neglected in Europe, is the only one that can be injured in Africa; it is harder to get hold of in Africa than anywhere else, for there are no farms or villages among the Arabs. This people live in their tents, and all their moveable wealth can be placed on the beasts of burden that they possess. . . . As soon as our columns moved there was desolation before us, the villagers mounted upon camels, mules, and bullocks, and fled away with their wives and children. There was nothing left for us to make war upon but the harvests at their ripening. . . . It took us a long time to find out how to

reach these fugitive populations, but at last we have managed it, and from that moment you might see the progress of pacification. It is therefore to the *razzia*, at which you shudder, that we owe all our progress, and especially the security that has allowed you to visit such a large part of Algeria in peace.

When General Bugeaud penned these lines he never supposed it would be possible to obtain any indemnity from rebellious Arabs but cattle or corn. But thirty years after, Vice-admiral the Comte de Gueydon, in 1870, obtained a considerable money fine from the revolted Kabyles. He did more for the colony in three years than all Napoleon III.'s governors had done. After the fall of the Empire and the Prussian invasion, our African colony was almost lost. Revolt ran like a flame in a train of powder through all the three provinces. The hateful and idiotic decrees of Crémieux, giving to the native Jews equal rights with the French, and to the civil and radical element, full power over the Governor, completed the disorder. But for the energy of some generals who hurried from France our colony was lost. Massacres, burnings, and pillage took place up to the gates of Algiers.

When the revolt was put down, as soon as Governor-general de Gueydon had landed, he considered how to make the Kabyles pay some of the cost of the war. He called the council and asked what the indemnity should be. They smiled and said the Arabs had nothing. The Admiral sent for the chief of the customs, studied the books with him all night, and next day told the council he required ten millions of francs from the Kabyles, and would have them in a fortnight. And so he did. The Kabyles, rather than have their fields ravaged, brought the savings the Admiral had calculated on

observations on the export of cattle and goods
lands, and paid in 5-franc pieces of Louis-
and Napoleon III. A second contribution
exceeded millions, and besides they ransomed for-
feited lands so that more than 60 millions were got
for the colonial chest.

Prejudices are strange things. There was an
outrage against the razzia; and yet in Europe it is
quite natural to starve and bombard a town, and
when non-combatants, women, and children, inno-
cent victims of war, wish to leave the place or are
thrust out lest they consume too much, the attacking
force drives them back. The razzia is much less cruel.
There is no murdering of women and children with
shells, as in Europe. The captured are fed and cared
for, and when the tribe has capitulated and given
security, are restored.

You who made me what I am, without whom I should be nothing !
You to whom I owe everything I know, and the little I am worth !
Oh, no, this word respect should never be applied by you to me !*

Some report of an attack of the Emir on Lamoricière in the province of Oran, now caused the Governor-general to hasten thither. Just at the end of August 1843, our indefatigable adversary had thrown himself upon those southern tribes of Oran who had submitted to us. All our first line was immediately put in motion. On the 26th, Lamoricière had some success at Oued-Bourbour. After a forced march of ten leagues, in fearful heat, Colonel de Bourgon attacked the camp just as it was being struck ; killed forty, took twelve prisoners, captured sixty camels, and a quantity of wheat, barley, and gunpowder.

On the 22nd of September, a more serious engagement took place between Lamoricière and the Emir. We had twelve killed and fifteen wounded ; on the Arab side was ascertained the death of Abdel-Baki, Abdel-Kader's lieutenant. He himself fled westwards.

It was in this combat that occurred the instance of devotion by the brave trumpeter Escoffier, that

* Harispe, Jean-Isidore, born in 1768 at Saint-Etienne de Bigorre, Basses Pyrenees, died in 1855, began his military career in 1792, a captain of a free company of Basque chasseurs, won the rank of chief of brigade by his gallantry in the war with Spain in 1793, took part in the operations that were carried on in the Grisons in 1800, then joined the army of Italy in Moncey's division. Colonel in 1802 he was distinguished at the battle of Jena in 1807. General of brigade the same year, he was wounded at Friedland, then went into Spain as Chief of the Staff under Marshal Moncey, was distinguished at Tudela, and the siege of Saragossa. He was made General of Division in 1810, and took an important part in the sieges of Lerida and Tarragona ; made Count of the Empire in 1813. Under Soult's orders he fought bravely in defence of the French territory invaded in 1814. He became unattached at the Restoration, and retired in 1825. Again on the active list in 1830 he was appointed Commander of the Hautes and Basses Pyrenees, Inspector-General of Infantry, and Peer of France in 1835. The Emperor, Napoleon III., gave him the Marshal's baton in 1851.

Parisians may remember was rewarded afterwards by the place of keeper of the Tuileries gardens. He gave his horse to his captain who was dismounted, telling him, 'You had better take it than I, captain; for you can rally the squadron, and I cannot.' In a moment he was taken prisoner. The King gave him his nomination to the Legion of Honour without waiting for his release.

M. Léon Roches gives the curious information, that the Emir, wishing to rival his enemies in magnanimity, having been informed of this, presented his prisoner with the cross of the Legion before a grand parade of his troops.

The Marshal proceeded to Milianah, met the column from Orléansville upon the Chélif, and was obliged to return to Algiers by sudden illness. When he had recovered he immediately returned to the west, and, travelling to Mascara in November and Tlemcen in December, was received and fêted all along the road by the Arabs, as Abdel-Kader would formerly have been.

On the 11th of November, General Tempoure gained a more important advantage than any other in the campaign. Starting from Mascara, Tempoure had gone in pursuit of the remains of Abdel-Kader's infantry, led by Khalifa - Ben - Allal - Ouled - Sidi - Embarek. On the 9th of November, in the evening, the General found he was three days' march from the enemy, and must catch them by superior speed.

The rain was falling violently, but the wet ground obstructed the flight more than the pursuit. After a night march, he came upon the posts on the Oued Kacheba, with the

still burning, and then to their camp on the Oued Malah.

Eight squadrons were sent forward, two-and-two, under Colonel Tartas ; the infantry to follow at the double.

Ben Allal's troops, in two close columns, with standards at their heads, stood firm and bravely awaited the charge ; the cavalry rushed upon them with perfectly French fury, broke them, took the standards, and cut them all down. The carnage only ceased upon our infantry coming up and receiving prisoners.

Ben Allal attempted to escape, and had reached the rocky slopes ; Captain Cassaignolles, of the Spahis, not knowing him but thinking he was a chief, pressed on in pursuit, two corporals of the second Chasseurs and a troop-sergeant of the Spahis followed him. Ben Allal, surrounded by four enemies, held out the butt of his gun to Corporal Labossay, and then, quick as lightning, turned the muzzle to the corporal's breast and laid him dead at his feet. With his first pistol-shot, Ben Allal, killed the captain's horse, with the second he slightly wounded Sergeant Sicot, of the Spahis, who had given him a sword-cut on the head. Ben Allal, having no more shots, defended himself with his empty gun, when Corporal Gerard shot him in the breast with a pistol and put an end to the struggle. Ben Allal died like a hero.

Captain Cassaignolles was still ignorant of his enemy's name, but had observed his courage, coolness, and dexterity in the use of his arms. A well-known mark put an end to the doubt, the Arab had but one eye ; he could be no one but Ben-Allal-Ouled-Sidi-

Embuck, former bey of Milirnah. His head was taken to the General.

Ben Allal had under his orders the remains of the battalions of Medeah and Milirnah, about 700 men, 10 to 50 men of the Mascara battalion, 150 dis-mounted horse, about 20 schiafs (officers without troops)

The results of the combat were 104 regulars 20 of them officers, killed, 361 prisoners 13 of them officers, 3 standards, 600 muskets. Of the prisoners 101 were seriously wounded.

The loss of the French was only Corporal Libossay, killed, and 8 chasseurs seriously wounded.

The three standards and the head of Sidi Embuck were sent to the Governor general at Algiers. And several officers were mentioned in the despatch.

On the road between the scene of the action and Oran, the people crowded to see the formidable chief's head.

Whatever repugnance we may feel says the *Moniteur Algerien* to this barbarous practice the incredulity of the Arabs is so great that it was necessary to show them this irrefragable proof that the warrior marabout who had so much influence over them was dead.

Ben Allal was Abdel Kader's closest adviser, his real man of war, the most important personage next to himself and our most determined enemy. The Marshal ordered the remains of the ex-khalifa of Milirnah to be taken to that city and exposed for three days in the sight of his former subjects. After that the body was to be delivered to our Khalifa, Sidi Ali Ouled Sidi Embuck, his nearest relation, who had it carried to Coleah to the family burial place.

The Marshal desired that this ceremony should take place with all the solemnity due to the personage's

rank, and military honours paid him as to a French superior officer to do homage to the bravery of a conquered enemy. Thus, knowing the Arabs well by this time, he made a double appeal to their imagination; first, by exposing the head of their former chief to their gaze, and afterwards by honouring his memory with obsequies worthy of a hero.

The Emir, whose mind was of high mettle, would not allow himself to be depressed by the blow that had overthrown his first lieutenant and destroyed almost all his infantry. Two days after the catastrophe of Oued Malah (salt river), he had come to the field strewn with his soldiers' bodies, and paid them the last honours. From there he went towards his deira, situated near the western extremity of the Chott-el-Garbi (western swamps), at a place called Gredir, more than forty leagues south-west of Tlemcen, on the undetermined territory of tribes who are neither Moors nor Algerians.

One of these frontier tribes, the Hamianas, was then at war with Morocco. Abdel-Kader made a razzia upon them at the head of horsemen from the neighbouring tribes; and sent fifty prisoners in chains to Ouchda as revolted subjects. No doubt this was to conciliate the authorities of an empire where he was afterwards to seek assistance.

The *Official Journal* several times mentions supposed proofs of the exhaustion of Abdel-Kader's resources. The Marshal also writes to the Duke d'Aumale on 21st January, 1844:—

Abdel-Kader is in a small chain of mountains, three days' journey south-west of Tlemcen. He has four or five hundred horsemen, sick or well; and he can collect five or six hundred more to make a razzia, among the tribes that remain faithful to him upon this extreme frontier. His deira is forty leagues further off in the same

direction, but in a nearly neutral territory, although opposite Morocco. The Emir has sent an embassy to the Emperor, Muley-Abder-Rahman, composed of Berkani, Miloud-Ben-Arach, and Tefanchi. They put a report in circulation that the Emperor is sending them to France, with a letter requiring the King to make peace with his khalifa, Hadj-Abdel-Kader, who has, it seems, done homage to the Emperor, and placed himself completely under his protection. He is writing in every direction to say that he will have peace for a year, and resume his estates. These reports have caused some anxiety upon the frontier, and the Ouled-Ouricch, who dwell eight leagues south of Tlemcen, have deserted.

* * * * *

For two months Abdel-Kader has made no military movements; but he has not been inactive in diplomacy and intrigue. He is anxiously begging for help from Morocco, and I think he has received some secretly. He is writing to all parts of Algeria to foment insurrection, and compromise our Arab chiefs. No one can be more active or persevering than that man.

* * * * *

The Marshal endeavoured to take advantage of this distress. As we know, he had by him the interpreter Roches, who thoroughly knew Mahometans in general, and Abdel-Kader in particular, for he had lived with him two years at Mascara, after the treaty of the Tafna. M. Roches was therefore desired to sound Abdel-Kader, and offer him a retirement into the holy land of Mecca, with all honours, and a large pension secured by France. Singular conjunction! This proposal, made in 1813, was no other than that realised in 1852-by the retirement of the Emir to Damascus.

A secret correspondence, which we are enabled to give, was exchanged. There is remarkable dignity in the replies of the Emir, who, notwithstanding his almost desperate situation, claims to some extent the execution or the renewal of the treaty of the Tafna.

OMAR, SON of ROCHES, to the EMIR ABDEL-KADER.

I have received the letter brought me by Kaddour; in it you inform me that you have already replied to that I had written to you from Tlemcen, and sent by the negro of El-Kharroubi. I have received no information as to this missive, and am sorry for it. However, I understood from your last words that your mind was not yet enlightened as to the facts that are every day being accomplished, and that you are still cherishing hopes that repose upon anything but a firm basis. . . . If you understand properly what Kaddour will tell you, that will be enough to give you a notion of the strength and intentions of France in this country.

* * * * *

You tell me you will accept any proposal not contrary to your religion. . . . If nothing is more desirable for every good Mahometan than the power of going on pilgrimage to Mecca, what should be the happiness of living in the country where God caused Mahomet to be born, and daily to visit the temple of the Lord and the tomb of His Prophet? The King of France will allow you to retire thither, you and your family, and all your warriors whom you choose, to the number of a hundred. Those of your army who do not go with you shall receive mercy (aman), and be received into their tribes. Every year you shall receive from the King's consul a sum royally sufficient for all your needs, and all theirs, and make you able to do good and give alms to the wretched of your religion.

* * * * *

To sum up: you have two roads before you, One, straight and laid with sand, leads you to the end of your career, causing your name to be blest by Mahometans, and honoured by Christians. The other, winding and strewn with rocks, that will lead you to an undistinguished death, and make your memory abhorred by the Mahometans, whose ruin you have caused, and the French, whose generosity you could not appreciate.

* * * * *

(Motto on the seal: 'He who puts his faith in the Merciful.')

OMAR, SON of ROCHES, in the year 1258.

ABDEL-KADER to OMAR, SON of ROCHES.

Praise to God!

* * * * *

I am far from refusing what might be useful to the servants of God, and would do all in my power to obtain happiness and peace for them, as far as is compatible with our religion and the rules laid down in our holy books. If even beyond these rules, arrangements

were proposed to me not forbidden by our law, and our habits I could still accept them

But the proposals you make me with a promise that they shall be ratified by Marshal Bugeaud are really very far from reasonable especially coming from you, who are a sensible man

How could you who are like my son and say you are guided by sincere friendship in doing this how could you imagine that I should accept as a favour a refuge that it is in my power to reach with my own strength and the assistance of the faithful who are still around me?

Let the Frenchman not despise my weakness for the goat can blind the lion And let him not glory in his success for after success the greatest checks are to be feared

I know my creed perfectly, and am well aware that one hour spent in fighting the infidel is better for my salvation than seventy years spent at Mecca When you tell me that I may very likely encounter a fate like that of my brother and my friend Sidi Mohammed Ben Allah very far from dreading this fate I pray to God that it may sooner or later befall me and all Mahometans

Now, O my friend if the Marshal has any intention of making me hear words that would be to the advantage of all let him send me one of his people with letters of credit let him give me secret information I also will secretly send one of my friends perhaps my brother Bou Hammiddi to meet your envoy near Tlemcen

* * * * *

Written by order of Sidi el Hadj Abdel Kader Nasser el Din son of Sid Mahdi el Din whom my God assist.

1st 10th of Safar, 1260 (3rd 10th of February 1844)

At the same time, Bou Hammiddi, the Emir's confidant, forwarded the following letter, written by Abdel-Kader's sanction, to the Marshal —

Greeting to all those who follow the true path mercy and blessing!

I am grieved at the miseries that oppress the servants of God in consequence of the war and rivalry existing between you and the Prince of the Believers If written correspondence with its delays, does not suit you name one of your followers to come in secret with your consent into the neighbourhood of Tlemcen Write to the Emir to send me to meet your agent and we will conclude everything that should be concluded between the two parties.

It is for God to do the rest Greeting!

M. Léon Roches replied to Abdel-Kader's letter :

* * * * *

The French were undecided, but now are quite agreed upon the Algerian question. The King, the Chambers, the Ministers, the nation, all choose to keep our conquest. A proof is that the King has sent his son to Constantine to be taught, and afterwards to be Sultan of Algeria. . . . In the time of doubt and our inexperience, you were master of the whole country. Six thousand regulars and two thousand khielas received their pay from your treasury; now the French have conquered you, and you have not been able to take one of our block-houses; now the country obeys France, all the gowns are French, and you have not a single regular soldier left, but still wish to continue this struggle! . . . Come to the Marshal, throw yourself upon his discretion and generosity; nowhere will you meet such a reception and consideration; you will be treated as a noble enemy and princely guest.

* * * * *

In this Arabic correspondence the Marshal allows the notion to appear of speedily resigning the government of the colony to the Duke d'Aumale, the King's son. This was the secret view of the Government, clumsily betrayed by Marshal Soult in his letter to the Governor on his promotion to Marshal, and accepted by the latter without objection, thanks to his entire devotion to the Orleans dynasty. He had only been hurt by the form, not the matter. In fact, he understood, and entirely approved, the serious political reasons that were to confer the government of Algeria upon the King's son.

After the brilliant feat of arms at the attack upon the smalah, the Duke d'Aumale had made a short visit to France, but soon returned with the rank of General of Division, and the post of Governor of Constantine, a province subdued, or nearly so. The young Prince was to get practice there, in ruling Arabs, while waiting till the old Marshal could hand

over to him the Government of Algeria entirely pacified

Marshal Bugeaud wrote to the Duke in January, 1844, a letter from which we extract the following —

I think as you do that the natives will accommodate themselves very well to our justice and that we ought to interfere as much as possible in their affairs. It is the only way to get a real moral authority over them. I think we should very quickly proceed to substitute Frenchmen for the great Arab chiefs but it will take time for the power of the aristocracy to be weakened and for us to have enough of officers capable of ruling the Arabs and willing to devote themselves thereto. This is a career open to all noble ambition and already a good number of officers are looking towards it and are all ready to engage in it

* * * * *

The application of Commandant Marquet seems to me to be too large. Our interest is not to make large landowners but a great many little ones to increase the population. In my opinion the best capital is a pair of arms fixed to the soil by right of ownership. Capital does not fix any one, men pass over its property like the figures in a magic lantern. So I would reduce the grant to be made to M. Marquet by half

* * * * *

In the month of February, 1844, the Duke d'Aumale proceeded to the Ziban, to re-establish the authority of Sheik Ben Gannah, and drive off Si Mohammed-El Sgrir, Abdel Kader's last Khelifa on the Ziban. Si Mahommed had escaped to Mount Aures, and collected some Kibyles. The Prince in the latter part of March dispersed this assembly, after a combat that the *Moniteur Algérien* called 'most honourable'. As he fled to the Aures, he had left some of his property at Mechmech (the Apricot) a pretty little oasis eight leagues north east of Biskra. The Aures then terminate in steep rocks. The Oued el Abiod (white river) coming out of an impassable gorge, waters a little valley of palm-trees

It was flanked by three little forts upon the steep hills at the side, and an entrenched village served as a depôt for the oasis, and the neighbouring region of the Sahara.

When our horsemen approached Mechmech on the 11th of March, they were fired upon, and retired upon head-quarters. On the 15th the Prince left Biskra with 1200 bayonets, 400 horse, and two mountain guns. Three thousand hillmen saluted our approach with their war-cries. Our soldiers carried the western position at a run, and thence the howitzers fired shell on the eastern position and the oasis. It took four-hours' severe fighting to win the position and the three forts. Our loss was 6 men killed, 1 captain; 16 wounded, 5 officers. Among them the Duke de Montpensier* slightly struck on the cheek.

The Marshal had an eye to everything. He observed between Blidah and Milianah a quantity of splendid wild olive-trees, so he sent thither and to Mostaganem a number of Europeans with grafts of good kinds to improve the produce. He also gave the mountaineers a quantity of sweet chestnuts for planting, as at a certain height the climate is similar to that of France. He also issued a notice forbidding the sale of any olive-wood, to prevent the destruction of the trees for firing. Great attention was paid to the roads. There were advertisements to be seen:

Coach from Algiers to Medeah and back leaving every Wednesday and Saturday.

So the journey that could only be made by a

* Fifth son of King Louis-Philippe, born 1824. Served in the artillery. In 1846 he married Marie-Louise-Ferdinande de Bourbon, sister of Isabella II., Queen of Spain. Since 1870 he has lived in France and seems to have ceased to engage in politics.

column of all arms only fifteen months ago could now be done by omnibuses coming and going twice a-week. In two years' intervals of fighting, the army had made 357 leagues of road.

The Marshal's chief efforts in the military line were directed against his great opponent, the Emir; but he could not overlook the fact that his capital, Algiers, was threatened by independent tribes on the east, and remarkably close to it. In the autumn of 1842, he had conquered the province of Sebaou, and placed the administration in the hands of the Khalifa, Mahi-Eddin, a faithful officer, but too often troubled by the independent tribes of the neighbourhood, in obedience to the promptings of Ben Salem, a fugitive in the Jurjura.

The very coast of Dellys, the landing-place so near Algiers, was not subdued. The Marshal planned a little campaign, and issued a proclamation to the seven tribes, calling upon them to drive away Ben Salem, and surrender themselves at his camp on the Isser, when no harm should be done to them.

In May the Marshal easily took possession of Dellys, and set up a permanent establishment there, that has developed into a flourishing little town. This was easier than at Tenès and Orléansville, for the Moorish town of Dellys was still standing upon the ruins of an old Roman colony, named Rusucurum. The gardens, planted by the Moors, are still famous. An attack was made upon a portion of the French force, but easily repulsed, and four days afterwards the great tribe of the Flissas made their submission.

Two days before his return to Algiers, the Marshal

wrote the following pleasant letter to his daughter Léonie :—

Algiers, Camp of the Oued-Sebaou, 25 May, 1844.

You want your little letter, dear Léonie ; here it is. You are proud of being my daughter, and would like to be captain or lieutenant, to go everywhere with me. I like your wish, but should not love you a bit more if you were. You would not be so nice as you are, when you choose to be good, and are well.

I am glad to hear that you walk a great deal. Exercise of your arms and legs is certainly the best cure for you. If you were a gardener, working at your vegetables, and carrying them to market, you would soon be cured, and all the world would be wanting the pretty gardener's salads, for they would be dressed for customers with a delightful smile.

Most likely Marie is at Excidenil, spoiling Charles ; your wisdom will set this to rights.

I have again applied to return to France, but man proposes, God disposes. He alone knows when I shall be able to fondle you in our little house of La Durantie. I should be very glad if it could be in September.

I have organized the agalik of Taourga with the seven tribes round Dellys, and two days ago settled that of the Flissas ; to-day it is the turn of the Amraouas and several other tribes. You see that two little victories are more eloquent than the speeches of our politicians, and the sentimentality of our philanthropists. I now hope to get back by the 28th. What a long month I have been away from my pets ! It is long ; and yet the parting will be still longer, for you go home, and I stay.

I kiss you, my loves.

BUGEAUD.

Biskra is the finest oasis of the Sahara, with 130,000 date-palms, and 5000 olives, said to have been there in the time of the Romans. It is 234 kilomètres south-west of Constantine, and about 125 from the sea, at the foot of a spur of the Aures, bare mountains, one of them bearing an Arabic name that means 'red cheek.' Its torrent comes from the Aures by the magnificent breach of El Kantara, the Fom es Sahara (mouth of the desert). If it always

contained the immense volume of water that sometimes is poured into its bed by storms, it would overcome the Sahara for a long distance; generally its flow ceases close to Biskra, and then the palms, as they must have 'heads in fire, feet in water,' are moistened by neighbouring springs, at the rate of 180 litres a second (some 40 gallons).

The Duke d'Aumale had occupied Biskra, and the expedition thither appears to have given rise to some cautions to him from the Marshal, who writes:—

Why did you detach M Tremblay, eight leagues from Biskra on the 11th, with a battalion and a squadron, for the enemy had retired thither, and your whole column was to march there on the 13th?

Small detachments far away are very dangerous especially with an unknown country and enemy. It is better to march with the whole force. Evidently M Tremblay's little column had no effect, good or bad, if checked, the moral influence would have been bad.

* * * * *

Ever since I was in Spain in 1809, I have always been opposed to detachments or reconnoissances of such a nature as to risk fractions of the army, and I told you that reconnoissances must be either very strong or very small, some horsemen, without infantry, or the whole army. In that way nothing is risked. Besides the inconveniences arising from the nature of things, there is the risk, in sending detachments to a distance, of having a clumsy, weak, or imprudent commanding officer, who might cause a partial check. It is better to play a safe game, and leave as little as possible to chance. You understand that these are general principles, and I do not apply them absolutely to this instance, for I do not know the particulars, and you may have had good reasons for detaching M Tremblay.

Biskra was not enough, so the Marshal very soon gave orders to take El Aghouat, an oasis on the meridian of Algiers, 446 kilometres from Algiers, and 347 from Medeah. A year and a half ago Sidi-Ahmed-Ben-Salem, Sheik of El-Aghouat, sent presents and horses, begging for investiture. The Governor-

general had regularly refused them, answering that he did not treat with unknown persons, and that if the Sheik intended to become a servant of France, he must come to Algiers in person to ask the favour.

As Ahmed-Ben-Salem was ill with liver-complaint, and not able to move in person, he sent his brother Yahia to General Marey, who was operating against Ouled-Nails. The envoy was forwarded to the Governor-general at Algiers, and was there invested conditionally; the full effect not to take place till a French column had traversed the country and received the tax.

A French column received orders to penetrate to the south of Medeah and Boghar, as far as El-Aghouat, and further if necessary.

Two thousand eight hundred men left Medeah on the 1st of May under General Marey,* seven hundred of them being Arab auxiliaries. They were very honourably received at El-Aghouat, and even advanced eleven leagues beyond it, where the heat was very great, and water and grass had quite disappeared. The Turks had never been beyond El-Aghouat itself.

Colonel Saint-Arnaud was in this expedition, and we find in his letters to his brother:—

* General Guillaume-Stanislas Marey-Monge, born in 1796, died in 1863, was the son of the Conventional Marey, and grandson, by his mother, of the celebrated Monge. Entered the Ecole Polytechnique in 1814, and was engaged in the defence of Paris against the allies. He raised the Chasseurs Algériens, and the corps of Spahis, served with distinction in Africa. In 1848 he was in the army of the Alps, and had just been appointed to the Senate when he died in 1863. After the establishment of the Empire he revived the title of 'Count of Pelusium' that his grandfather, Monge, had received from Napoleon I.

General Marey-Monge was a capital soldier, a learned and clever man, but of an awkward disposition. Marshal Bugeaud had a great opinion of him, though without much love instinctively for Polytechnicians, as their absolute and systematic principles often clashed with his practical mind and admirable good sense.

I have crossed the desert under quite different circumstances than I expected. After some days of burning sun, we met such severe cold, that on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and especially the 21st of May, we wore our burnous on horseback, and wanted bivouac fires. . . . When we left Taguin we went to Tedgemont, and reached it on the fifth day. This town is like a fine opera scene, only from a distance, for like all Arab towns it is all ruins; walls, mud mixed with stones, without opening outwards, very high, and with wide very low gates . . . Tedgemont, built upon a height, with its girdle of gardens, themselves surrounded by a river of silver, flowing over fine white sand, is a beautiful sight, with the dark verdure of apricot trees and carob trees. Imagine a multitude of palms, and in the background the grey sharp lines of the town, and this under an African sun, and admire this country, one of the most beautiful I have seen in Africa.

The Governor was not at Algiers to receive the despatch on the return of the expedition to El-Aghouat. He had been obliged to embark in haste for the west, having received a very disturbing despatch from General Lamoricière. The storm was threatening in that direction, and most important events were in preparation.

disclaiming any wish on the part of the French for increase of territory, and laying the blame on Abdel-Kader. 'I can tell you Jugurtha was no cleverer, no bolder, no more persevering than this man, and if there was a Sallust in our days, Abdel-Kader's history deserves to be written. There must no longer be a state of things giving occasion for war.'

While the Marshal was marching upon Ouchda, he desired to leave open a door for peaceable arrangements. He therefore wrote to El Gennaoui, complaining of the violations of French territory by the Moors, saying that though the French did not desire any increase of territory, they would certainly not consent to retire their frontier to the Tafna, or recede from their present line. After General Bedeau being fired upon during the conference, the Marshal would be quite justified in vigorous reprisals, but his desire was to settle the difficulties peaceably.

El hennaoui's reply was ambiguous as to the outrages, and also expressed a desire for peace. The Marshal again replied to him on the 18th of June :—

Greeting! In all your previous communications you have accused us of violating your territory, and infringing the laws of friendship. This means that you make a point of laying the blame for all you have done upon us, so that you may have nothing to reproach yourself with. I am not used to these diplomatic tricks. I loyally go straight to the point. I am a soldier, who is obedient to his King and the interests of his country. You say you are still desirous for the maintenance of harmony now existing between the two empires. I wish it as much as you do, but we must have a clear explanation. Reply to me as clearly what you wish.

We intend to preserve the frontier, as held by the Turks, and Abdel-Kader after them. We want nothing that is yours. But we desire that you should not receive, or succour Abdel-Kader any more, revive him when he is almost dead, and launch him afresh

against us. That is not good friendship. It is war and you have been thus warring against us for two years. We desire that you should confine in the interior of your country the dera and the chiefs who have served Abd el Kader. disperse his regular troops, goums and askers, that you no longer receive troops that emigrate from our territory, and immediately send back those who have fled to you.

We bind ourselves to do the same by you if occasion should arise. These are the conditions of the observance of rule of good friendship between the two nations. on these we shall be your friends. shall favour your trade and the Government of Muley Alder Rahman as far as is in our power. If you choose to do the contrary we shall be enemies. Reply to me immediately and without any subterfuges for I do not understand them. Greeting,

M. d'Haussonville in his *History of the Foreign Policy of the French Government*, after saying what very large interests were involved, observes that if ever an expedition was suddenly resolved upon energetically managed, and brilliantly concluded it was that against the Moors in 1844. The rapidity of the operations was quite consistent with French policy, and even party spirit was for a moment silenced. Yet may we not suggest in reply to M. d'Haussonville that in case of defeat at Isly or Mogador, or complications with England, it is possible to suppose that the Government, led by M. Guizot might have disavowed the action of the Marshal and the Prince?

It is as well to recur to the difficult and disturbed times through which the monarchy of July had to steer its way, in order to fully understand the position of the Governor general of our African possessions towards the representatives of the nation and the King's Ministers. M. Guizot's correspondence with the Marshal is in evidence of this strange situation of affairs and its difficulties. It must be acknowledged that the Marshal's temperment was not

great at accommodating itself to Parliamentary necessities and constraints. Thus the ambiguous advice and instructions that he received from the Cabinet at the Tuileries were not always exactly followed; and this is the reason why at every step we meet with unmistakable traces of the Governor-general's initiative, in the preliminaries of this Moorish campaign, as well as the resolutions adopted. A General in command, separated from France by the sea, entrusted with both political and diplomatic interests, even if he had been ever so desirous, would have found it impossible to refer to his Government at every hour of the day, and so relieve himself of responsibility. Marshal Bugeaud never recoiled from taking the initiative, as the result of this glorious campaign clearly proves.

It must be allowed that the old Marshal was admirably seconded under these circumstances by one of the King's sons, the young Admiral the Prince de Joinville,* who was commanding the cruisers off the

* François-Ferdinand-Philippe-Louis-Marie d'Orléans, Prince de Joinville, is the third son of King Louis Philippe. He was born at Neuilly in 1818, entered the navy and served regularly on board ship. In 1838, during the war with Mexico, he showed great skill and daring in an attack upon the batteries of Saint-Jean d'Ulloa when serving in the corvette *Creole*, and also broke open the gates of Vera Cruz and captured General Arista with his own hand; for this he was given the Cross of the Legion of Honour and promoted to be Captain.

In 1840 he brought back the remains of the Emperor, Napoleon I., from Saint Helena, and, as it may be remembered there was some danger of a war with England, he loudly proclaimed his intention of fighting to the death in defence of his precious charge, if it should be attacked. In 1843 he married the Princess of Braganza, sister of the Emperor, Don Pedro, of Brazil. The same year he was made an Admiral, and had a great deal to do with the organization of the steam navy. In 1844 he bombarded Tangier, and captured Mogador.

In 1848 he retired with his brother, d'Aumale, to England, and lived in privacy till 1861, when he went to New York with his son, the Duke d'Enthièvre, and his two nephews, the Count de Paris and the Duke de Chartres, and presented them to President Lincoln. His son entered the United States Naval School, while his nephews became officers in MacClellan's army.

In 1870, on our first disasters, the Prince de Joinville applied to his old comrade, Admiral de Genouilly, Minister of Napoleon III., for permission to serve France,

Moorish coasts. The Prince was now nearly twenty-six, and his keen intelligence, energy, and decision of character, never-failing love of independence, and extreme sense of honour, naturally attracted the old soldier of Spain.

The Prince de Joinville had been equally desirous with the Marshal of vigorous action, but had been restrained by the instructions of the Government, enjoining moderation upon him at any cost. A letter of the Minister contained this expression, 'As long as the flag (afloat) of France is not insulted, you are not to act.'

The young Commodore sent this portion of his instructions to the Marshal; and he, whose standard (on land) had several times been insulted by the Moors, answered:—

How long, Sir, has an endeavour been made to distinguish between the flag of France afloat and ashore? Be careful, my Prince not to listen to such subtleties. The flag of France ashore has been insulted and it is your duty and mine to make it respected. Care for your glory, my Prince, ought to prevail over the fear of diplomatic complications. Listen to nothing but the inspirations of honour personified in you.

By way of answer, on the 10th of August, the

but this was refused by the Republic, as well as by the Empire. With his brother d'Aumale, and his nephews he went back into banishment. But when the army of the Loire was formed he again endeavoured to serve in the French ranks under General Aurelle. Covered by the American name of Colonel Lutherot, like his nephew, the Duke de Chartres, in Normandy, as Robert le Fort, he was present at the actions of the 15th corps before Orleans, served in one of the sailors' batteries, and only left the town with the last of the soldiers. On the 21st of December he waited upon General Chanzy and requested to join in the operations, preserving the most strict incognito. The General received him with delight, reserving the right of reference to the War Minister. But the lawyer, Gambetta, considered he ought not to confirm this decision, caused Colonel Lutherot to be arrested by commissaries of the police, confined five days at the prefecture of Marne and then shipped at St. Malo for England. He was elected for two deputations to a *Grand* the Chamber in 1871, but not admitted till M. Thiers had destroyed the last single and most royalist of the French Chambers secure by position and influence.

The Prince de Joinville is very handsome and, perhaps, a very liberal, but has never ceased, even when his father was king, to show his independence, and freely expressing his opinion. He has written some valuable works on marine engineering.

Marshal received a letter from the Prince de Joinville, informing him that he had on the 6th bombarded Tangier, with the English looking on, and that he was going to bombard Mogador. The Marshal without delay replied with this short sentence:—

SIR,—You have drawn a bill of exchange upon me. Be sure I shall not be long in honouring it. Vive la France!

At the same time he forwarded the plan of the battle of Isly, and it will be found to have been punctually executed on the day announced.

The Marshal's patience was exhausted, as has been said, and he entered Ouchda on the 19th of June. The frontier was violated. The situation becoming serious, the Emperor sent orders to all his provincial Governors for a general levy. Abdel-Kader, avoiding the observation of our advanced posts, made his way into the Djebel Amour, and endeavoured to raise the southern tribes against us. They all remained faithful; the Emir only obtained a promise that they would join the Moorish army when it met the infidel forces.

The 1st of July, on the banks of Isly, the Moors made a timid attack upon our rear-guard, but fled at the first musket-shots. Our troops ascended the river on the 11th, and on the 13th we killed some hundred horsemen of the Moorish tribes, losing only two men and five horses. On the 19th the French troops returned to Lalla-Maghrnia for refreshment.

In France, the Government decided for action under pressure of public opinion. Notwithstanding the jealousy and almost threats of England, M. Guizot, in answer to questions from the Right and Left unanimously, announced his completely fixed

intention of obtaining just reparation and securing the safety of our possessions in Africa. Instructions were sent. The Prince de Joinville, cruising in the waters of Cadiz with a flying squadron, received orders to proceed to Tangier to receive our Consul, the Comte de Nyon, and the people of our nation for conveyance to Spain. Before leaving his residence, M. Nyon forwarded to the court of Fez Marshal Bugeaud's ultimatum to the Kaïd Si-El-Gennaoui.

The Moorish Government gave a hypocritical answer, promising exemplary punishment of any Moorish chiefs guilty of aggression upon our territory, but on the express condition that Marshal Bugeaud should be dismissed, on account of the occupation of Ouchda. As to the fate of Abdel-Kader, it was only just alluded to in obscure language.

The French squadron anchored before Tangier. The town contained a numerous garrison, and was defended by several batteries mounting 105 guns, served by Spanish deserters. Our squadron was composed of three men-of-war, the *Suffren*, the *Jemmapes*, the *Triton*; one sailing frigate, the *Belle Poule*; three steam frigates, the *Labrador*, the *Asmodée*, the *Orénoque*; four steam corvettes, the *Pluto*, the *Gassendi*, the *Véloce*, and the *Curier*; also eleven smaller steamers, three war brigs, and three store-ships, in all twenty-eight vessels.

On the 6th of August, at eight in the morning, the vessels took up their fighting position without resistance from the enemy, and the bombardment began upon a signal from the *Suffren*. In an hour's time all the outer batteries were destroyed; two works held out longer, the battery of the Kasbah and that

of the marine fort, but the Moors had soon to quit their last entrenchments and retire to the town. At eleven the fire ceased, the Prince commanding the squadron had executed the orders of the Ministry, the exterior fortifications were in ruins, the town had been respected.

When the work of destruction was performed, the squadron went into the Atlantic, passed along the coast of Morocco, and, though the weather was very bad, anchored before Mogador on the 11th of August. The condition of the sea would not allow of the vessels at once taking up their fighting positions. For three days they had to lie at anchor without being able to communicate. At last the weather cleared up on the 15th. The *Suffren*, the *Jemmapes*, and the *Triton*, opened fire upon the fortifications and advanced works. The *Belle Poule* and the other vessels of lighter draught entered the harbour and engaged the batteries of the Marina and those of the island defending the port.

At first the Moors made a vigorous reply, but gradually slackened and then ceased their fire, being crushed by the projectiles from the squadron. The batteries fell into ruins, the guns were dismounted, and the gunners driven off.

The island alone held out, being defended with the courage of despair by a detachment of three hundred and twenty men. The steam-vessels *Pluton*, *Gassendi*, and *Phare*, landed five hundred marines, who carried the position under a sharp fire and drove the defenders out of their last entrenchments. Next day a landing party completed the destruction of the works spared by shot. All the guns not dismounted were spiked, the powder drowned, and all the goods found in the custom-house burnt or thrown into the sea.

At this very time there is a letter from the Marshal to his daughter Léonie, dated from the Oued-Muyade, 10th July, 1814, full of great anxiety for Madame Bugeaud, who was returning to France seriously ill.

Before we give the official report of the battle of Isly, it will be most interesting to give an account of this important event by M. Léon Roches, never before made public, and full of intricate details that he alone could furnish :—

Certainly the battle of Isly, from a tactician's point of view, does great honour to the little army engaged and the illustrious General who commanded it. And yet the very resolution taken by Marshal Bugeaud to give battle is even more worthy of admiration. This assertion requires to be supported by some short explanation.

Though there had been several sanguinary combats between our troops and those of the Moors, the responsibility for which rested upon the Emperor of Morocco's agents, the French Government, fearing serious complications with England, persisted in writing both to the Prince de Joinville, commander of the squadron cruising in Moorish waters, and to Marshal Bugeaud that the French flag affronted not having been insulted there was no reason to declare war against Morocco.

The Emperor's son was encouraged by the inaction to which this political reason condemned our squadron and army, and he contrary to the orders of his father (as we afterwards found, shown by that sovereign's letters that I myself discovered in his secretary's tent at Isly), advanced towards Algeria with the actual intention of turning us out of Lalla Maghnia. Deceived by the reports of fanatic persons around him, and perhaps influenced by Abdel Kader's agents, he even dared to talk of a plan of conquering the province of Oran.

At the head of a large force of regular cavalry, with contingents from all the Barber and Arab tribes that inhabit the vast territory extending from Fez to Ouchda, Muley-Mohammed, her presumptive of Muley Abdel Rahman, Emperor of Morocco, found the number of his soldiers increasing every day. All the tribes of Morocco came to take part in the war against the infidels, and many Algerian tribes prayed for the success of the holy enterprise. How many professions of devotion did not the Prince receive every day from the emissaries of those who called themselves our allies!

According to them, what could the little French army do against formidable masses of gallant horsemen led by the Prince of the

believers. It should be observed that the smallest reverse experienced by the French would have been a signal for a general rising of all the Arabs in Algeria. In the face of such contingencies, was it not rash to risk all upon the fate of a battle? Would it not have been more prudent to temporise? Such was the secret thought of several generals whose courage and patriotism could certainly not be doubted. This was not the Marshal's opinion. He understood that an opportunity offered for striking a grand blow, that should have the three-fold advantage of putting an end for ever to the ambitious plans of the Moorish sovereigns, consolidating our rule in Algeria, and adding a fair page to the glorious annals of France.

It was then the great patriot, the great captain, wrote to the Prince de Joinville adjuring him not to listen to the advice of persons more interested in sparing the feelings of a country professing alliance with us than of guarding the honour of France. He added that he could see no difference between the flag of France afloat or ashore, that the flag ashore had been insulted by the Moors, and that the squadron and the army ought to avenge this insult, quite away from any considerations of policy. In a few days the young prince informed him of the bombardment of Tangier. The Marshal's answer on the 12th of August, 1844, was, 'Prince, you have drawn a bill upon me, I engage to honour it; to-morrow I execute a manœuvre that will bring me close to the army of the Emperor's son, without his knowing it, and the day after I shall defeat it.'

By the 10th of August the Marshal had in his hands a report I had given him containing the most accurate information to be obtained as to the situation of the Moorish camp, the roads leading to it, the composition of the force, and finally the number of horse and foot that composed the army. I have preserved the draft of this report.

Rumour raised the number of fighting men to a hundred and fifty thousand. This was an error. According to my information, the accuracy of it being ascertained afterwards, we had to expect to fight six thousand regular horse of the Emperor's guard, one thousand to twelve hundred picked footmen of Muley-Mohammed's guard, and about sixty thousand horse, contingents from the tribes in the east of the empire.

On the 12th the Marshal had been occupied in preparing instructions for every leader of a corps. He was more tired than usual, and lay down upon his camp-bed immediately after our dinner.

In the morning two regiments of cavalry had joined us from France, and the officers of the Chasseurs d'Afrique and the Spahis had invited all the officers in the camp not engaged on duty to a punch party given in honour of the new-comers.

They had contrived a great garden upon the banks of the Isly, with its boundaries and paths marked by splendid clumps of oleanders

and tamarisks. All the space was brilliantly illuminated by paper lanterns of different colours. What is there not to be found in a French camp?

When my comrades and I being the Marshal's staff saw all these officers of every rank and all arms collected in this picturesque spot, we very much regretted his absence. He would have found in it one of the occasions he was always seeking of putting himself into direct communication with his comrades in arms. But he was very much tired and who should venture to disturb his rest?

Being less restrained than my comrades by the rules of military etiquette I undertook the duty and returned to our tents. The business was to wake our illustrious chief. There were a few sharp words but he was very kind. In two words I told him why I had done it. He had lain down completely dressed and so had only to put on his kepi instead of the notorious cap with a tuft that gave rise to the famous march 'La Cigquette du Père Bugard' and we were off. He still grumbled a little on the way from his tent to the improvised garden for we had more than half a mile to walk over rough ground with entanglements of tent ropes and horses' pickets.

These little discomforts were soon forgotten. Indeed as soon as ever the Marshal had entered the principal path he was recognised and saluted with acclamations that delighted him very much. Everyone wanted to see him. The generals and higher officers were not the only ones who had the honour of shaking hands with him. At last he reached the platform where the punch was served. All present formed a circle round him, the generals and colonels next him. He remarked there was no time to lose as they must rest in preparation for the labours of to-morrow and the next day.

'The day after to-morrow, my friends, he called out with his strong and penetrating voice, 'will be a great day. I give you my word for it. With our little army, 6500 bayonets and fifteen hundred horse I am going to attack the Moorish Prince's army which according to my information amounts to sixty thousand horse. I should be glad if they were twice or thrice as many for the more they are the greater will be their disorder and disaster. I have an army. He has only a mob. I will give you a prediction of what will happen. And first I will explain to you my formation for attack. I arrange my little army in the shape of a boar's head. You quite understand? The right tusk is Lamartière, the left tusk is Ledebour, the muzzle is Pelissier and I am between the ears. Who can stop our penetrating force? My friends we shall split the Moorish army as a knife does butter. I have only one fear, that they may anticipate defeat and escape our blows.'

It would be impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the Marshal's speech. I have given the path of,

peculiar form of his words, so well calculated to fire the soldiers' nerve.

Next day all the army knew of the speech at the punch party, and making itself one with the soul of its chief, like him had but one fear, to see the Moors escape.

The Marshal had sent out foraging parties every day. The whole or a part of the cavalry, supported by the infantry, had gone out to cut wheat, barley, or grass, to feed the horses and beasts of burden. The Moors, who watched us, had become used to this operation, they sometimes checked it, but conceived no suspicion of our intentions. On the 13th the foraging went on as usual, but the whole army went out, and at night, instead of returning to camp, stayed where it was. Express orders were given against lighting a fire, or even smoking, every horseman held his horse by the bridle.

At one in the morning the whole army marched in most profound silence towards the Moorish camp. At six in the morning we had just ascended a hill that separated us from the Oued-Isly, when we caught sight of the Moorish camp: why call it camp? The Moorish camps. They were seven in number, occupying a greater space than the circumference of Paris.

At this sight all the soldiers uttered a formidable hurrah, and threw up the canes that had served to support their shelter tents at night, and their packs during halts by day. This spot obtained the name of the Cane-field. The Moors had just begun to leave their tents. The alarm was speedily given. We soon saw them mounting, and a great many came forward to dispute our crossing the river.

The little French army resumed its march in the formation directed by the Marshal. After the passage of the Isly, effected in perfect order, and without much loss, it advanced through the masses of Moors, who completely surrounded it. One of our Arab horsemen told me it was like a lion surrounded by a thousand jackals.

The Moors made charges of four or five thousand horsemen upon our little battalions. Our foot let them get within short range, and then the volleys of musketry stopped the first rank, and hurled it back upon the second, and that threw the rest into disorder.

For about two hours these charges were repeated with the same ill success, and our little army kept on advancing, without the famous tusks, Generals Bedeau and Lamoricière, having to form their battalions in square, as the Marshal had ordered, in case the charges of the Moors had been better led. We may really be said to have experienced a rain of bullets, in fact, as the cavalry executed their charges in columns of great depth, the fire of the first and second ranks alone was slightly effective; all the others were

obliged to fire in the air, and I do not exaggerate at all, when I say that all of us soldiers, officers, and generals, were hit, at least once, by spent balls.

When we reached the nearest tents the Marshal seeing the disorder of the enemy's ranks increase, launched his cavalry, which he had hitherto kept between the ears of the *Louis* head.

A part of the *Chasseurs d'Afrique*, the *Spahis* and the cavalry regiments, that arrived two days before, under Colonel Yusuf and Colonel Tartas invaded the Moorish camp and took all their guns, fourteen pieces. There was a very sharp fight round the Moorish Prince's tent, and our infantry coming up completed the rout of this immense army, that the Marshal had rightly called a mob.

I do not tell you of the exploit of Colonel Morris, who, pursuing the fugitives more than four miles from Isly, found himself all at once surrounded by six thousand horsemen. He managed to keep them at a distance with his five hundred *Chasseurs* by the power of coolness and courage; but it took the Marshal's keen eye to see and understand the danger of the situation, and repair this rashness. At last, by noon, the Marshal made his entrance into the magnificent tent of the Emperor's son, and we were very glad to swallow the tea and cakes prepared that morning for the unlucky Prince.

We had killed or taken prisoners twelve or fifteen hundred Moors, without counting the dead and wounded who had been carried off by their comrades. We had taken more than a thousand tents, all the artillery, a great quantity of arms of all kinds several standards and an immense booty. We had only two hundred and fifty men killed and wounded.

As for me, I had made the most important prize, namely, a casket containing all the political correspondence between the Emperor and his son. We shall have occasion to recur to this interesting correspondence.

A few more words upon the consequences of the battle. Abdur Rahman's son terrified by this bloody and shameful defeat, did not stop till he reached Taza, and the Marshal proposed to pursue him there. At last, we spread the report by our emissaries. He received orders from his father to endeavour to stay the Marshal's march, by making proposals of peace to him. Next day two chiefs, bearers of an Imperial letter, reached us.

As it was my duty, when campaigning, to take all Arab business I had a much more comfortable tent than the Marshal's and the Mahometan chiefs who came to visit him drew out at their fire.

There I received the two Moorish chiefs. I made it known that I let them in for a solitary inspection of dress that they would be unable to stop the Marshal's march to Taza. As we, however, that we had need to rest more.

soldiers, who had been sustained by the excitement of expecting a great event, began to drop under the violent heat and fatigues of this hard campaign. Nearly two hundred sick a-day went into hospital.

After a lot of discussion, and going and coming between my tent and the Marshal's, I told my Moorish chiefs that the King of France's Khalifa, as I called the Marshal in treating with Arabs in Algeria, would consent to receive them.

When they entered the Marshal's tent, I still made them wait for his coming, and one of them asked me, 'When are you going to take us to the Khalifa's tent?'

I told him, 'You are in it.' And they could not believe me, when they saw how simply the great chief lived.

The Marshal came in. They saluted him with a bearing that was at once humble and noble. The question of an armistice was discussed. The bases were settled; and at the end of the audience I told the Marshal, with the consent of the chiefs, how surprised they were at the plainness of the tent.

This is the Marshal's actual reply:—

'You may tell your Prince that he need not be ashamed of losing the battle of Isly, for he is young and inexperienced, and has never been to war, and had for his adversary an old soldier, grown grey in fighting. Tell him that in war it is always necessary to provide for defeat, and that therefore a man should never encumber himself with articles of luxury and comfort, that may serve as trophies to the enemy, if they conquer.

'If Prince Muley-Mohammed had taken my camp, he would have had nothing to boast of in the captured tent of one of the King of France's khalifas. May my experience be of service to him.'

I have subsequently been reminded of these grave and kindly words by more than one Moorish chief.

The day after the battle, 17th August, 1844, the Marshal sent the following despatch:—

TO THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA, WAR-MINISTER.

*Bivouac near Coudiat, Abder-Rhaman,
17th August, 1844.*

SIR,—The Emperor Muley-Abder-Rhaman's son did not reply to the letter I sent him after his kind of summons to me to evacuate Lalla-Maghrnia if we wanted peace. His army was being daily increased by fresh contingents, and his pride rose with his numbers.

In the Moorish camp there was free talk of taking Tlemcen, Oran, Mascara and even Algiers. It was a real crusade to restore the affairs of Islam. They thought we should be unable to resist such a large collection of the most famous cavaliers in the Moorish empire, and were only delaying their attack upon us till the arrival of infantry contingents of the Beni Senassen and from Rii who were to assail us from the mountains above Lalla Maghrina, while we were surrounded by hordes of cavalry upon the plain.

Behind me minds had been already disturbed by the nine days of uncertainty that had elapsed. The enemy had already attacked me twice in the combats of Djemra Ghazouat and the goodwill of the tribes was ready to waver. Two reconnoissances had come within musket shot of Lalla-Maghrina, and had attacked our advanced posts.

Any longer doubt as to our power or will to fight the opponents before us might have provoked revolt behind us and that independently of other difficulties, would have prevented the supply of provisions to the Army of the West. In such excessive heat I should have preferred to receive battle rather than to make an attack upon an enemy at eight leagues' distance, but the dangers of a longer delay decided me to take the initiative.

General Bedeau having joined me on the 12th with three battalions and six squadrons I advanced on the 13th at three in the afternoon feigning to be a grand foraging party so that the enemy might not find out that it was a real offensive movement. At nightfall the foragers rejoined the column, and we encamped in order of march in silence, and without fire. At two in the morning I moved again.

I crossed the Isly a first time at daybreak without meeting an enemy. When we reached the hills of Djarf el Akhdar, at eight in the morning, we saw all the Moorish camps still in place, extending over the hills on the right bank. All their cavalry had advanced to attack us as we again crossed the river. In the middle of a great mass on the highest spot, we could clearly see the attendants on the Emperor's son, his standards, and his parasol the sign of command.

This was the point I gave to the directing battalion of my Chellomed formation. When we got there, we were to turn to the right and advance upon the camp, holding the top of the hills with the left face of my reserve square. All the heads of the various divisions of my little formation were near me, I quickly gave them their instructions, and after a five or six minutes' halt, we went down to the ford at the simple quick march and with bands playing.

A number of horsemen defended the crossing, they were driven off by my infantry skirmishers with some loss on both sides and I soon reached the plain immediately beneath the highest hill, where

the Emperor's son was posted. I turned the fire of my four field-guns upon it, and a great disturbance immediately took place.

At this moment immense masses of cavalry came from behind the hills on both sides, and assailed both my flanks and rear at once. I had need of all the firmness of my infantry; not a man showed signs of weakness. Our skirmishers, only fifty paces from the squares, awaited these multitudes with perfect firmness, not giving back a step; they had orders to lie down, if the charge reached them, so as not to impede the fire of the squares. The artillery was firing grape in the line of the dead angles of the squares.

The enemy's masses were stopped, and began to waver. I hastened their retreat and increased their disorder by turning upon them the four field-guns that were leading the formation. As soon as I saw that the enemy's attempt upon my flanks had failed, I continued my forward march, the great knob was carried, and the change of direction towards the camps was effected.

As the enemy's cavalry was divided by their own movements, and by my march cutting them in two, I thought that the time had come to send my own out upon the key of the position, to my idea the camp, that I supposed to be defended by infantry and artillery. I ordered Colonel Tartas to échelon his nineteen squadrons by the left, so that his last échelon should rest upon the right bank of the Isly.

Colonel Yusuf led the first échelon, composed of six squadrons of Spahis, very closely supported by three squadrons of the 4th Chasseurs.

Colonel Yusuf cut down a number of horsemen, and entered the immense camp, after receiving several discharges of artillery. He found it full of cavalry and infantry, who disputed the ground foot by foot; the reserve, three squadrons of Chasseurs, came up; a fresh impulse was given, the guns were taken, and the camp captured.

It was covered with the bodies of men and horses. All the artillery, all the magazines of warlike stores and provisions; the Prince's tents, the tents of all the chiefs, the shops of the numerous tradesmen that accompanied the army, everything remained in our power. But this fine episode had cost us dear; four officers of Spahis and fifteen Spahis and Chasseurs had lost their lives, and many more were wounded.

Meanwhile, Colonel Morris, commanding the second and third échelons, seeing a great mass of cavalry again collecting upon my right wing, crossed the Isly to frustrate this charge by attacking the enemy's right flank. The attack upon our infantry failed like the others, but Colonel Morris had to sustain a most unequal conflict.

Not being able to retire without risking a defeat, he determined to fight hard till help came. This contest lasted more than half-an-hour; his six squadrons were successively engaged, and several times

our Chasseurs performed prodigies of valour, three hundred horsemen, Berbers, or Alids Bophari, fell under their blows.

At last, General Bedeau, commanding the right wing saw the great danger the 2nd Chasseurs were encountering, and detached the battalion of Zouaves a battalion of the 16th Light, and the ninth battalion of the Chasseurs d'Orléans to attack the enemy from the hills. This movement decided his retreat.

Then Colonel Morris resumed the offensive, and executed several successful charges along the gorge where the enemy was retiring. This episode is one of the most exciting of the day. 550 Chasseurs of the 2nd fighting 6000 of the enemy's horse. Every Chasseur brought back a trophy of this engagement: one a standard, another a horse, another a weapon, or some portion of equipment.

The infantry had speedily followed the first echelon of cavalry into the camp, the enemy had rallied in a great mass upon the left flank of the Isly, and seemed inclined to retake the camp. The infantry and artillery crossed it rapidly, the artillery went into action upon the right flank and threw grape upon this immense concourse of horsemen collecting from every side. Then the infantry crossed the river, covered by the fire of the guns, the Spahis formed line, and were closely followed by the three squadrons of the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs and the fourth echelon composed of two squadrons of the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs and two squadrons of the 2nd Regiment of Hussars under Colonel Gagnon.

The Spahis, seeing they had good support of both cavalry and infantry, recommenced the attack, the enemy was pushed hard for a league and their rout was complete. They retired partly by the road to Thaza partly by the valleys leading to the mountains of the Beni Senassem.

It was now noon: the heat was great, and the troops of all arms very tired. There was no more artillery or baggage to capture for it was all taken. So I checked the pursuit and brought all the troops back to the Sultan's camp.

Colonel Yusuf had caused the tent of the Emperor's son to be kept for me. In it were placed standards taken from the enemy to the number of eighteen, the eleven guns, the Prince's parcel of command, and a number of other trophies of the day.

The Moors left at least 800 dead upon the field of battle: almost all cavalry, the infantry were few in number, and mostly escaped us through the ravines. The army also lost all its stores, and must have had 1500 or 2000 wounded.

Our loss was four officers killed, ten more wounded, twenty-three non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed and eighty-six wounded.

In the operation of the whole army the battle of Isly is the

consecration of our conquest of Algeria; and it cannot fail to accelerate the conclusion of our disputes with the empire of Morocco.

I cannot give too much praise to the behaviour of all arms in this action, once more a proof of the power of organization and tactics over masses that have only the advantage of numbers. On all the faces of the great lozenge formed of battalion squares, the infantry displayed imperturbable coolness. The four angle battalions were in turn attacked by 3000 or 4000 horse at once, and nothing shook them for a moment; the guns advanced before the squares to fire grape at shorter range; the cavalry, when the moment came, darted out with irresistible impetuosity, and overthrew everything before them.

According to the reports of the prisoners, and Arabs who had seen the enemy's camps, the number of his horse cannot be taken at less than 45,000. They displayed great audacity, but the confusion made their efforts ineffectual; the bravest came to get killed at point-blank range. For a good performance, they only wanted the power of union, and a well-organized infantry to support the movement.

With a government like theirs, it will require many ages to bring them up to the condition requisite for success in battle.

I cannot undertake to enumerate all the brilliant performances that marked this day; but shall not forego the pleasure of mentioning the names of soldiers of every rank that were most distinguished.

I was most perfectly seconded by Lieutenant-general de Lamoricière in the management of this battle, lasting four hours: by General Bedeau, commanding the right column; by Colonel Pelissier, commanding the left column; by Colonel Cavaignac of the 32nd, commanding the head of the centre column; by Colonel Gachot of the 3rd Light, commanding the rear-guard; by Colonel Tartas, commanding all the cavalry; by Colonel Yusuf, who highly distinguished himself in command of the nine squadrons forming the first échelon of the cavalry; and by Colonel Morris,* who maintained the fight upon the right bank of the Isly I have

* Morris, Louis-Michel, born 17th of October, 1803, entered the military school of Saint-Cyr in 1821. Entered the cavalry, went to Algeria in 1837 in the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and became Lieutenant-colonel and Colonel (1843). He was several times mentioned in general orders for his gallantry, especially at the affairs of Graba and Kammiss, the capture of Abdel-Kader's smalah, and the battle of Isly. He became Maréchal-de-camp in 1847 and General of Division in 1851; he commanded a cavalry division in the Crimea; he also was engaged in the campaign in Italy in 1859. General Morris died in 1867. This intrepid soldier was greatly valued by Marshal Bugeaud, and no less by the Emperor, Napoleon III. His two sons are now officers.

described Captain Bonami commanding my sixteen guns, directed his fire very judiciously, and did me great service

On the general staff I would mention my aide-de-camp, Colonel Eynard, Lieutenant colonel de Crenz Châfs de Escadron de Gouyon and de Martimprey, Colonel Foy, doing duty as my orderly officer, Commandant Cuille, who performed the same duty for General Bedeau, Captains de Courson Espivent de Cissey, Trochu, my chief interpreter, M Léon Roches, who distinguishes himself on every occasion of war, being naturally adapted for it, lastly, the chief douair, Kaid Mohammed Ben Kaddour, attached to my person, who captured a standard (Then follows a list of the officers and soldiers mentioned in the order of the day)

Receive, &c,

BUGEAUD

A letter, written from Blidah by Commandant Saint-Arnaud on the 28th of August, to his brother, shows the army's confidence in the Marshal

You probably have more particulars than I of this really skilful battle the Marshal fought against the Moors on the 14th and beat them, as he will beat all, Moors or any others who come and match themselves with him His dispositions were admirable and I will describe them *grosso modo* so that you may understand them A great square of twelve battalions, two battalions in reserve, these battalions in close order so as to be able to form small detached squares in échelon at sixty paces distance the Marshal and his staff behind the first battalion, the guns behind him ready to fire when wanted through the openings between battalions the cavalry right and left inside able to get out and charge through the openings In the centre of all the baggage, the ambulance, and the two reserve battalions In this splendid Egyptian formation the Marshal crossed the Isly, and his little army was immediately attacked, and surrounded by a cloud of horsemen whirling round these formidable squares and meeting with a most active fire Thus they circulated round the army Then the Marshal launched Morris and his squadrons on the right Morris charged most vigorously, and fell upon three or four thousand Kabyles He formed his squadrons in square, and sent to tell the Marshal who despatched the two reserve battalions, then he charged again and overthrew everything The Spahis were surrounded by twenty thousand horse, and were not to be seen for half an hour What courage, what perseverance, must have been necessary to perforate this mass, and put them to flight' It was done, but there were some losses of brave men You know the rest, and the results It

is a brilliant and glorious action, and will raise us in Europe. The Marshal has shown what he could do in a great war, and the army's confidence in him is unbounded.

September, 1844.

Always splendid in his simplicity and ability, he gives the account of his most complete victory, so well won, so cleverly prepared for. He had not a moment's doubt of success, though Lamoricière sometimes displayed anxiety.

The Marshal is really an indescribable man, interested in everything, talking of everything well and animatedly, and especially with remarkable cleverness and good sense, and with all this, illiterate, not able to explain a Latin saying or proverb, but fit for everything, and carved out of a block of granite.

An eye-witness lately told us a little-known event that occurred two days after the battle of Isly :—

The day after the battle, when we had overthrown the Moorish Emperor's son, Marshal Bugeaud was uneasy at the presence of Abdel-Kader, reported to be a day's march on our flank.

Yusuf offered to obtain exact information about the Emir. Marshal Bugeaud having perfect confidence in the sagacity and boldness of his chief of native cavalry gave him *carte blanche*.

In the evening Yusuf chose out a hundred of the best soldiers of his regiment. He dressed the Spahis as Moors—in spoils captured the day before—with a pointed head-dress, a long gun and bayonet, and black burnous; the illusion was complete. About eleven o'clock on a night so dark that it seemed made for his purpose, he started for the mountains at the head of his band of *condottieri*.

After going four or five leagues through a hilly country, the scouts sent forward came upon a post of Arabs upon reconnoissance like themselves. When these horsemen saw the armed shadows, but dimly seen by the light of just breaking day, they approached our Spahis without suspicion.

But when they found out their mistake and tried to escape, Yusuf, coming up at a gallop with the strength of his troop, surrounded them, killed some men who tried to resist, and made prisoners of the rest. Then one among them, who seemed to be their leader, was immediately questioned and searched, when, who did he turn out to be? None other than the Krodja, the private secretary of Abdel-Kader, the bearer of his official seal and valuable letters, giving the much-desired information as to the Emir's march and designs.

I leave the Marshal's demonstrative delight to be imagined

when Yusuf came back to camp about seven in the morning and gave an account of his interesting expedition.

The author of this account also added, that no one was so fit as Yusuf for these acts of daring and audacious enterprises. Under the first empire he would have been the rival of Murat, or Lasalle. While our great struggle with Abdel-Kader was going on, he had no rival. Marshal Bugeaud and General Lamoricière were his noble patrons, they knew how to obtain invaluable services from this able and brave man of war. During the hard campaign in the winter of 1842, when we may be said to have been blockaded at Mascara, Yusuf became the good genius of our little army. If an attack was in preparation against the formidable tribes, that enclosed us on every side, Yusuf, on foot, up to his knees in snow, followed by a few picked men, spent the night in scouting, and did not return till morning, with full knowledge of the enemy's position, and the value of his fire.

The effects of the battle of Isly were considerable, both in France and Europe; this time the King's Government understood that they had acted wisely in confiding to the Marshal the duty of protecting their honour, and sole judgment in military questions. King Louis-Philippe conferred the title of Duke d'Isly upon the conqueror of the Moorish army, and addressed him as follows:—

THE KING TO MARSHAL BUGEAUD.

Neuilly, 29th August, 1844.

MY DEAR MARSHAL,—It is with great emotion that I congratulate you upon the brilliant exploits you have added to all those that have honoured our flag. Your noble resolution to give battle at Isly, with an army so disproportioned to that you attacked

metropolis, has been excited by the extraordinary increase of the exportation of our woven fabrics to the interior of Africa; an exportation that cannot but increase by the new trade routes that we count upon opening out through the little desert.

So our cause is now before the public mind. It will every day be more influential, through the valour and labours of the army, the activity and courageous perseverance of the colonists, and especially the intelligent care of the Government.

MARSHAL DUKE D'ISLY.

This was the proclamation with which the conqueror of Isly announced his impatiently expected return to the colony, after his triumphal journey of five months in France.

The two unfortunate events alluded to in the general order were the explosion of the powder-magazine at Algiers and the surprise of Sidi-bel-Abbès.

On Saturday the 8th of March, at ten o'clock in the evening, two loud explosions, followed by successive detonations, were heard from the dockyard buildings. The lodgings of the Commandant of artillery, and of the artillery and engineer artificers, the houses of the Naval Commissioner, and of the Harbour-master, had been blown away. The military storekeeper, the armourer sergeant-major, his wife and child, 43 artillery artisans, 31 sappers, 10 gunners, and 2 workmen, had been killed, and there were 30 wounded. Only one non-commissioned officer, who was clever enough to take refuge in a casemate at the first explosion, was saved.

There was also the loss to be lamented of the Commandant of artillery, Palard, and the Harbour-master's wife, Madame Segretier.

We find an account of the surprise of Sidi-bel-Abbès in the *Echo d'Oran*, of the 1st and 8th of Feb., 1845.

The fort of Sidi bel Abbès, eighteen leagues south of Oran, half way between Mascara and Tlemcen, is composed of a redoubt and an entrenched camp, a battalion of the 6th line regiment is posted there, and two squadrons of Spahis

On the 31st of January, in the morning Commanding officer Vinoy had gone with his cavalry to a neighbouring tribe, from whom some cattle had been stolen. About ten o'clock, that is to say, the soldiers meal time, some Arabs, to the number of about sixty, arrived at the entrance of the camp with some children in front of them. Most of them carried travellers staves, no weapons were visible. They attended to present a petition to the Commandant. The sentry allowed the foremost of them to enter, and soon, distrusting the men of these visitors, he endeavoured to stop the rest, and was laid dead on the spot by a pistol shot. The report was the signal for attack. All these fanatics rushed into the camp, pulled hidden weapons from under their garments, and attacked our soldiers quite unexpectedly. The Commandant's house was attacked, the orderly killed at the door. Our soldiers rushed for their arms, threw themselves on the Arabs who attempted to escape, the exit was already guarded, all that had entered were put to death, and fifty eight bodies were found. This hand to hand fight, with men determined to sacrifice their lives, cost us dear, our killed and wounded amount to more than thirty.

A cannon shot informed Commandant Vinoy. He brought back to the camp the douars of the men that had been killed, containing only the women, children, old men, and cattle.

Although the event at Sidi-bel-Abbes was less murderous than the accident to the powder-magazine at Algiers, it had a much more grave significance. It taught us that the religious fanaticism of the Arabs had only been momentarily stifled by the boldness and number of the military expeditions incessantly persevered in, for four years, by the Marshal and his lieutenants. This attack, in open peace, by sixty fanatics, sacrificing their lives in the attempt to capture a blockhouse was a symptom, the gravity of which could not fail to be appreciated by Marshal Bugeaud. Landing on the 25th of March he determined to show himself almost immediately in the West, and proceeded thither on the 31st. He made

leagues from the sea? Far from it, we regulate them, we take care of their interests, their religion, and their law. We make them weirs, roads, and bridges, and we war not except against highway robbers. Again, it is the tribes themselves that arrest them, not our soldiers.'

The letter to Colonel Saint-Arnaud from the Marshal which we now give is most instructive. Besides giving some information as to events of the war, it contains the principles of war as applied by the great soldier to his struggle with the Arabs in a short and striking form.

Algiers, 24th April, 1845.

MY DEAR SAINT-ARNAUD, — As it is the Beni-Hidja who have made two attacks upon our little camp in front of Tenès, I have reason to fear that the insurrection will spread through all the eastern mountains, and am taking measures in consequence. I suspend my movement to the east of Algiers; and I send off a battalion of the 64th from Milianah to join you with a convoy of flour. This battalion and the 500 men of the African battalion are to remain under your orders until perfect peace is restored around you, in all your subdivision and all the Dahra. So you will have seven battalions, and I hope you will be able to march with five at least, six would be better, so as not to incur the appearance of a failure that might increase our enemy's presumption.

Do not trouble yourself with the left bank, there are symptoms of a revolt there as I hear from Milianah. I shall go thither on the 3rd with a column large enough to make the Ouarensenis repent of its attempts. I shall also be in a position to operate from there against the Beni-Ferah and Zatima. This is a moment of crisis to pass, and I hope it will turn to the benefit of our rule.

But for that purpose we must strike very hard upon the insurgents, and secure the disarmament and capture of horses as much as possible.

The Beni-Hidja tribe deserve the most severe and most exemplary punishment. You must perseveringly hang on to them like a plague. Deprive them of all their harvests, cut down their fruit-trees of all kinds; they must be ruined for a long time, unless they consent to give up their guns, and horses, and a large war contribution.

General de Bourjolly will not be able to remain long in the

Dahra, because he will be obliged to go and watch the country on the Mina from very close. But he may, on his way back if necessary, search the enemy's country after he has taken up plenty of food at Tenès or Orléansville. I am writing to him to this effect. If it was necessary, you could go with him into the Dahra for a few days.

Act in concert with him to establish our authority firmly in this country. It has not sufficiently felt the weight of our arms, and must now be made to feel it severely.

I send Staff captain Lepasset to take the place of the unlucky Beatrix. He is a clever man, and can speak, read, and write Arabic. I recommend him especially to you.

Now, I want to speak to you of this inconvenient camp in front of Tenès, on the other side of the gorge. I do not know who is the author. Is it Cavaignac or Claparède? Whoever it is I blame him very much. It is such posts, established unnecessarily and against all the principles I have so often explained to you, that bring reverses. It is very fortunate that the disaster was not greater. I had never heard anything about this camp, not a word has ever been said to me about it in any report. I thought that it was only a movable camp of the working parties and even in that case would it not have been much better to let the troops come back to the town every evening when the work was only a league away? I have given orders that it is not to be abandoned at this moment, as that would produce a bad moral effect, but it must be abandoned without scruple when you are acting vigorously against the Beni Hidja.

If it was indispensable, for the road and the water channel works, as I can hardly believe you might leave it till the work is done. After that it must be withdrawn, and this decision will not be reversed. If you keep it, even for a time, it must be impregnable. Without this post there would probably have only been an insurrection in the open, the enemy would not have dared to attack Tenès, as they have not done so, though our force is divided. This detachment of fifty or sixty men tempted the devil, it was the proper time to retire it when Claparède came out with the most available forces. This mania for scattering the forces and making them immovable must be most inveterately fixed in men's minds for them still to follow it so often, against our numerous written and spoken words repudiating the system.

Let me know the position of affairs as often as possible by Tenès and by Milianah. We must take advantage of the opportunity by forming a little territory round Tenès at the expense of the tribes or portions of tribes that have joined in the revolt. Take everything that is convenient to us, and have the deprived ones compensated by the rest of the tribes. We must act as conquerors and masters. *Vae victis!*

A thousand devotions and affections

(Signed) MARSHAL

P.S.—Spare the magazines of Orléansville as much as possible ; victual the columns at Tenès as far as may be so as to avoid carriage from one point to another.

When there was an opportunity to do the work in person, the Marshal was not the man to waste time in barren polemics. After making a diversion to Cherchell by sea on the 25th, he started on the 3rd of May by land, passing by Milianah at the head of the expeditionary column for the Dahra. The Duke de Montpensier was with him.

The operations were constantly impeded by frightful weather. In the Ouarensenis the Marshal kept moving about under torrents of rain, almost without result. The insurgents, who had known him long ago, avoided engaging him, and preferred to fall upon his lieutenant, Saint-Arnaud, operating separately with a weaker column. The Marshal never encountered the mass of the enemy, and only obtained incomplete submission, sometimes only pretended.

From the 4th to the 25th of May there was very little but an attack upon the rear-guard by an insurgent chief, Omar-ben-Ismaïl, on the 13th. The attack was repulsed by Colonel Renault, of the 6th Light. The Marshal sent off the available cavalry, and they killed about a dozen men, and carried off a small number of cattle for these wars, 300 head. On the 26th of May and the 1st of June the column made two more important razzias.

All the honour of this spring campaign belongs to Colonel Saint-Arnaud, who acted on his own right bank of the Chélif with four battalions, while the Marshal was manœuvring upon the left bank with eleven battalions. Colonel Saint-Arnaud, having information that a large gathering had been formed,

under the guidance of the Sherif, who prompted the revolt, had gone to the west of Tenès. On the 21st of May, at daybreak, Lieutenant colonel Bisson of the 53rd, having moved during the night, carried the very strong position held by the insurgents, 150 Arabs were killed on the spot. The same day Colonel Saint Arnaud caught them again, and killed 200 men. The Sherif's standard was taken in the action.

Saint Arnaud's own account of this in his letters is —

Two brilliant affairs a *razzia* upon the Beni Mezroug in the night of the 20th when I killed 150 Kabyles and took 3000 head of cattle. The same day at three in the afternoon I was attacked by more than 1200 Kabyles led by the three sherifs in person with their four standards. I surrounded the enemy by a turning movement of cavalry and threw them back upon a ravine where the 53rd was awaiting them. It was a real little battle. We manœuvred as coolly as if we were on the Champ de Mars. The enemy left more than 200 corpses. I had only seven wounded. Took a standard and a great many muskets.

The blow was heavy, and Bou Maza disappeared for the moment. Our columns of Mostaganem, Orléansville and Tenès, imitating his tactics, ceased to pursue him personally, and turned against the tribes that had supported him. The Sherif fled up the Oued Riou, closely pressed by our *agha*, Hadj Ahmed, who killed all his companions except two horsemen, captured his horses, his standard, two mules laden with powder and silver. Bou Maza took his revenge upon Hadj Ahmed in the month of July following, by coming and killing him in the middle of his son's nuptial procession, all the wedding party were carried off in a *razzia*.

As to the French, they did not see Mohammed ben Abdallah reappear till September in the commencement of the great insurrection. As Colonel

them three times, through subject natives, of the danger they were exposing themselves and their families to. At last he told them that he must 'warm'* them, that the fuel was ready, and that he must make an end. After many delays night came. Faggots were thrown to the mouth of the cave from the rocks above; some time afterwards fire was thrown over in the same way. At one in the morning Colonel Pelissier, whose chief wish was to frighten them, ordered the fire to be extinguished. It was too late, the catastrophe was complete, and more than 500 human beings had perished by suffocation.

The excitement in France and Algeria produced by this fatal event was immense. Perhaps the Marshal-governor was the person most grieved; and it is but justice to him to say that he did not hesitate a moment in upholding his lieutenant, and taking the whole responsibility upon his own person. This he did with great animation; in the columns of the *Moniteur Algérien* of the 15th and 20th of July, Colonel Pelissier's cause is thus argued:

The end of June was very near. It was necessary for the subjugation of the Dahra to be completed by that time. The season was advanced; the heat most severe; Colonels Saint-Arnaud and Pelissier had orders to make a simultaneous attack upon the Ouarensenis. Their movements were to be combined. Saint-Arnaud was to attack by the east, and Pelissier by the west. If the Colonel had gone away, the Arabs would have issued from their caves, and saluted his rear-guard with a sharp fire. The Colonel could not leave the caves, nor lose time in blockading them, for there is a copious stream through the caverns, and they were well supplied with food. Our troops were on the point of failure, and the next day had to be in another direction. To enter the caves and fight the Ouled-Rhia was to destroy them no less

* 'Chauffer,' expression used in the *Moniteur Algérien*, 15th July, 1845.

unmercifully and risk the loss of a great many men. The Colonel thought that the burning faggots would drive them out to be caught. He spent five hours in unsuccessful negotiations. They killed the bearer of a flag of truce and several men. He kept up the fire and the Ouled Rhia perished by their fatal obstinacy.

* * * * *

The attack upon such caves is no new thing. Last year General Crivagnac besieged a cave similarly. He lost Captain Louvencourt of the 5th Chasseurs battalion there and several men. The General placed petards on the rocks and threw shells inside. We even think he made use of fire. The cave was small and its defenders few in number. That was the only reason why there were so few victims.

Was Colonel Pelissier to retire before this obstinacy and give up his task? The consequences of this determination would have been fatal and caused a great increase of confidence in the caves. Was he to attack by main force? That was almost impossible and in any case would have caused great loss. To resign himself to a simple blockade that might last a fortnight was the loss of precious time for subduing the Dahra and refusal of the combination with Colonel Saint Arnaud. After consideration of all these circumstances he determined to make use of the method that had been recommended him by the Governor general in case of extreme urgency.

We would ask whether besieging caverns is more cruel than the bombardment and starvation that we inflict upon the whole population of European cities in war. May there be created in Africa concentrated interests immovable such as there are to be found in all the large towns of Europe and there will be a chance for us to prove that we would not weaken ourselves by running after cattle and people over ravines mountains plains and the desert. But as in all war in order to bring it to a conclusion the interests must be touched &c &c

These last words, 'the interests must be touched,' language so often repeated in the speeches and writings of Marshal Bugeaud about the wars in Africa, are equivalent to a signature. It is really the Marshal in person, defending his lieutenant in the official newspaper of the colony. He acted thus with his habitual generosity, and was in perfect accord with the feeling of the army, as is plain from

their faith, because you are strangers. You now come to take their country, and to-morrow you will want their wives and children. The Arabs asked my brother, 'Lead us, let us begin the war again; every day that passes makes the Christians stronger; let us finish them this moment.'

Q. A great many Arabs know what to think of us, and are devoted to us.

A. There is but one God. My life is in His hand and yours; I will speak openly to you. Every day you find Mahomedans tell you that they love you, and are your servants. Do not believe it! They lie to you from fear or interest. Every time that there comes a Sherif who they think is able to conquer you they will follow him, and even would attack you in Algiers.

Q. How can the Arabs hope to conquer us, led by chiefs who have no army, no cannon, no treasures?

A. Victory comes from God; when He chooses He makes the weak to triumph, and brings down the strong.

The poor wretch was condemned to death by court-martial on the 15th of November. He has been supposed to be the brother of Bou-Maza, because he stated it upon his trial. But Arab fanatics often call themselves each other's brothers without there being anything but a spiritual connexion. The identity of the name Mohammed ben Abdallah makes the blood connexion unlikely.

On the 20th of September another Mohammed ben Abdallah arose in the Djebel Dira, southern part of the Tittery. He began by decapitating our Kaïds. General Marey went after him with a column of not less than 3000 men, and drove him back into the Djurjura, where, in November, he made head against a column D'Arbouville had brought from Sétif, as well as against Marey's. They could not catch him.

He joined Ben-Salem, and disturbed our Eastern marches all the latter part of the campaign. General d'Arbouville, like Saint-Arnaud upon the Chélif, reported several other chiefs also called Bou-Maza.

We find another Mohammed ben Abdallah in the

West before General Cavaignac He gave himself the name of El Fadel, and pretended he was a resurrection of Jesus

There is a most curious letter sent by him

MOHAMMED BEN ABDALLAH SIDI EL FADEL TO GENERAL
CAVAIGNAC

Praise to the one God! There is none joined with Him From the servant of his God Mohammed ben Abdallah to the French leader greeting to him who follows the true path Know that God has sent me to you and to all others on the earth who are in error I tell you that God has ordered us to tell you there is no other God but God and Mahomet is His prophet Do not adopt any other religion God allows of no other but Islam The Jew tells the Christian that he is an unbeliever and the Christian tells the Jew the same The truth for both of them would be to confess the Prophet Mohammed

Cease to do injustice and wrong God loves it not Know that He has sent me for you to submit to me He has said Submit to Me and to My messenger

You know that a man will come who shall reign to the end of time That man is I Mohammed sent by God and chosen from the most holy of the Prophet's followers I am the likeness of him that issued from the breath of God

I am the likeness of our Lord Jesus I am Jesus restored to life as everyone knows believing in God and His Prophet If you believe not the words I speak to you in His name you will repent of it as sure as there is an all powerful God in heaven

This sort of apostles daily raised considerable difficulties before us in Africa We cannot blame military justice, as its duty is to leave them for execution when caught Yet we cannot forego a feeling approaching to admiration at seeing them unconcernedly braving a certain and speedy death, for a cause holy in their eyes

The internal insurrection had gained head everywhere Not taking too much notice of the little Sheriff, the Marshal's only object was to prevent the Emir from penetrating into the Tell Bugeaud had supposed, and not without reason, that after Sidi-

CHAPTER XI.

ABDEL-KADER IN THE SOUTH (1846).

Abdel-Kader abandons the Ouarsenis and goes South—The Moors receive Algeri Fugitives—Duke d'Aumale's Return—Massacre of French Prisoners at Tlemcen—Abdel-Kader innocent of it—Mustapha-Ben-Thamy—Ministry objects to any attack on Morocco—Military Operations—Foundation of the Town Annaba—Mlle. Louise's Marriage—M. Salvandy's visit to Algeria—Circus' Address.

The Marshal only took five days' rest at Algiers after his five months' campaign. On the 5th of March he again proceeded eastwards, sending before him this proclamation:—

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO ALL THE KABYLE TRIBES OF
THE NORTH AND SOUTH SLOPES OF THE DJURJURA.

Algiers, 2 March, 1846.

A few days ago I wrote to you, before entering upon your land to inform you that I was not coming to make war upon you, but only to drive out El-Hadj Abdel-Kader from your country, as well as the other disturbers who are working upon you, to bring you into hostility to us. You have seen that as soon as the ex-Emir left your mountains, I myself returned to Algiers.

But I am informed that Abdel-Kader has called you to meet at Bordj-Boghni, to provoke you again to what he calls the Holy War, as if it was the will of God to plunge all Mahometans into misery, and cause a large number of them to perish, as has already taken place in the centre and west.

Having exhausted all the resources, and goodwill of the Arabs, Abdel-Kader now addresses himself to the Kabyles, and offers them the same fate.

Some of you have answered his appeal: others have refused it, and they are the wisest.

In your interest more than mine, I wish to give you another salutary piece of advice.

Drive from among you Abdel Kader, Ben-Salem, Bou Chareb, and all the other ambitious plotters, who wish to drive you into the horrors of war

I declare to you that I shall treat as enemies all the tribes who have received and assisted these evil men, and shall respect the territory of all those who have not heard their fatal counsel. They may come and trade freely with us they will be respected, and justice always done them. The wicked, on the contrary, shall be treated as they deserve.

The meeting of Kabyles at Bordj-Boghni, that the Marshal mentions, was twice held in Abdel-Kader's presence, on the 27th of February and the 5th of March. Most likely they were not agreed, for the Emir went away, and on the 7th announced his westward march by a grand razzia upon a tribe between Boghar and Berouaghia.

The Marshal had again left Algiers to go by the Fondouk, where his expeditionary column was assembled, towards Bordj-Boghni, the very place where the council of war was held by the Emir and the Kabyles.

Yusuf's cavalry column was launched in pursuit of Abdel-Kader, and an infantry column under Lieutenant-colonel Camou. On receipt of information about the new razzia effected by the Emir, Colonel Camou went in pursuit, caught him in twenty-four hours, and re-captured 2500 head of cattle, 1000 camels, and 250 horses. The combat of the 10th of March, in which Abdel-Kader was nearly taken, gave the Marshal reason to think most highly of brave Colonel Camou.*

There is an account of this affair, and the chase of the Emir by Yusuf's cavalry, in the *Moniteur*.

* Camou, born in 1799 Entered the service in 1815 Made Captain in 1823, Colonel in 1844, General of Brigade in 1848, General of Division in 1852 (in special Guard) died in 1859

and managed to reach the French out-posts. This is his account of the horrible butchery :—

On the 27th of April, the Deïra was encamped about three leagues from Mouilah. Our prisoners occupied about twenty gourbis ranged along the river ; round them were some hundred gourbis for the regular foot, amounting to about 500. To make it easier to guard this camp, it was surrounded by a thick hedge of brushwood with only two openings in it. The remainder of the Deïra amounted to about 110 tents. The misery became terrible, and the desertions frequent ; the Moors refused to sell corn for the paper money issued by the Emir.

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In the afternoon of the 27th, about two or three o'clock, there came a messenger from Abdel-Kader ; and unusual measures were almost immediately taken. Three horsemen came to the prisoners' camp and took away the chief prisoners, under the pretence that they were to be present at a feast given by the khalifa Ben-Thamy. Those thus saved from the massacre were MM. Courby de Cognord, Lerazet, Marin, Nillerin, officers ; Thomas, Adjutant ; Testard, troop-sergeant-major of the hussars, Trottet, and two more.'

A little later they made all the prisoners leave the camp, to the number of 270, and divided them into fractions of seven or eight men, that were again distributed among the regular foot-soldiers. So these were also divided for the execution into groups of two or three gourbis, of which one was used for the captives ; at night-fall they were at once compelled to enter, and found themselves packed weaponless amid their murderers. Roland relates that he and his six comrades determined not to go to sleep. He had managed to get a knife, and to escape by stabbing the first soldier who came to kill them in the middle of the night. Although shot in the leg he contrived to reach a hill, where he heard the murderous firing and saw the gourbis catch fire ; from the uproar he supposes that his comrades defended themselves.

Information of the massacre did not reach Algiers till the end of May. General Cavaignac's column was sent as quick as possible to Moulah, but could not recover any of our unfortunate soldiers. The trumpeter Roland reached Lalla-Maghrina, and was brought in on the 17th of May by a man of the Beni Senassen.

In response to the general feeling of indignation, the Governor-general issued the following proclamation to the Arabs —

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO THE ARABS AND KABYLES

Perhaps you have heard of the barbarous act done upon 300 French prisoners by the son of Mahi Eddin, whom you formerly called your Sultan. Seeing that these prisoners were claimed by the Emperor of Morocco where they would have been set at liberty by our army, or because there was difficulty in feeding and guarding them, he ordered that they should be killed and they are killed.

Every Arab gifted with common sense and religious feeling will understand that this is an act of despair that shows the son of Mahi Eddin is forsaken by God and man. It will be understood that he is no more merciful to Mahometans than to Christians for when he killed the 300 prisoners of Djemâa Ghazaouat he exposed to our vengeance the 4000 or 5000 Arab prisoners who are in France, or in our strongholds on the Algerian coasts. Failing religion, this fear should have stopped him, but he is become as savage as the lions and panthers. He will reap the fruit of his dreadful conduct. The Emperor Muley Abdel Rhaman will not take any more interest in him, and the Arabs who still remain attached to him cannot preserve their affection for him who has committed an unnecessary murder upon 300 prisoners.

Do not fear that we shall reply to his barbarity by a vengeance that might be twenty times as extensive. No harm will be done to the Arab prisoners, and they will be treated as before. You will thereby see the vast difference there is between our humanity and Abdel Kader's disposition, and you certainly will regret that you have sacrificed your property and persons in defence of the cause of such an execrable man.

The Marshal in this accuses Abdel-Kader of murdering our prisoners. We do not seek to think

if the interests of policy prompted his words. In any case we do not believe in the Emir's guilt.

First, we must remember that when the murder took place, Abdel-Kader was in the south, being hunted by General Yusuf's column, and that he was near Gharza in the east of the Ouled-Nail's country, in the meridian of Bou-Sada, 680 kilomètres (some 500 miles) from the Deïra, as the crow flies.

He had left the Deïra in September, 1845, and did not return to it till the 18th of July, 1846. During his absence, many of his khalifas held in succession command over the Deïra; first it was Ben-Arach, who had formerly taken part in the treaty of Desmichels; then Bou-Hamidi; and lastly Ben-Thamy. Ben-Arach received the prisoners, and treated them as well as he was enabled to do, when all at the Deïra were suffering from want. Bou-Hamidi was kinder still to them. Lastly, the coming of Ben-Thamy made no change in their position till the time of the massacre.

As soon as this infernal idea was hatched in his brain, he called the chiefs of the Deïra together, informed them of his plan, and, being only opposed by Bou-Hamidi, persuaded them to get rid of the useless mouths; the very same evening the crime was accomplished.

After it, Abdel-Kader always protested that he was innocent, and he did everything he could to save and set at liberty the officers, whom the chiefs of the Deïra (perpetrators of the massacre) still kept as hostages. His habitual humanity, the care he always took of his prisoners, and, later on, his splendid conduct towards the Syrian Christians, make his participation in such a crime unlikely.

As this massacre was perpetrated beyond our boundary, it certainly gave grounds for a fresh invasion of Morocco, yet the Marshal, who always hugged this notion, and thought that there only could he destroy Abdel Kader's power, had to give up his warlike projects. It was the wishes, rather than the arguments, of M Guizot confidentially and cleverly presented by M Roches, that won the day against the design so firmly fixed in the Governor-general's mind. More resigned than convinced, but sincerely resigned, he wrote the following letter to M Guizot —

Algiers 30th April 1846

What you tell me of the line of conduct we ought to pursue towards Morocco seems to me to be very just when I look at it from your point of view, and that is what one should take. Under an absolute government and only considering the military question and the success of our undertaking in Africa I should argue differently. But you must have seen by my despatches and the instructions I have just given to MM Lamoriciere and Canignac that I entirely enter into your policy so have no anxiety on this account. It shall be done as you intend and I am going again to make use of your own language to make the generals on the frontier feel it thoroughly.

A few days before, in an access of discouragement and moral weariness, the Marshal had confided his intention of retirement, after the summer campaign.

11th April 1846

I know you want to defend me from the tribune and would defend me well but would your eloquence efface the wrong that is done and will be done every day? Do you think that a man can continue to hold this laborious and confused position under such circumstances?

My time is ended that is clear the work having become something everybody takes hold of it every one wishes to throw a stone at it good or bad. I cannot oppose this torrent and I will not follow it so I leave its banks. I have already written the letter, in

which I request the War-Minister to submit my request for a successor to the King. I found my request upon my health and my age, not allowing me to bear such a burden any longer, and on my family affairs. But between ourselves, I tell you that my great reason is that I do not choose to be a promoter of the mistaken notions that very generally prevail as to the grand questions of Africa. I do not fear the great labours of the war or of the Government; my brave soldiers and the administrators of Algeria know that very well; but I fear public opinion gone astray. I am always full of gratitude for this grand duty having been entrusted to me. I have not forgotten that I owe it chiefly to you, and shall never forget it whatever happens. I also know that it is to you I am indebted for the good assistance I have received in this noble task. Thus you may count upon my grateful attachment, as I reckon upon your respect. Now I ask you one favour, that is, to procure me a definite leave for the beginning of July, with permission to appoint General Lamoricière as temporary governor, as well as to prolong my stay for some weeks, if I find myself encountering serious events. In three months I shall be delivered from this hell.

BUGEAUD.

The scene at the Deïra was being acted during the princely receptions, the festivities and balls given to the Czar Nicholas's brother at the Government Palace. The Governor-general left Algiers on the 6th of May, intending to make his way into the Ouarensenis in pursuit of the sherifs, and to terminate the resistance of the mountaineers.

His letter to the Duke d'Aumale is the most complete and true account of the Marshal's and his lieutenants' operations :—

Bivouac of the Oued Figuesal, 12th May, 1846.

MY PRINCE,—I received your telegraphic despatch of the 7th a few moments after your two despatches of the same date. In the last you give me information about Abdel-Kader, and tell me that General Yusuf is sent into the Djebel Amour, with four battalions and his cavalry. You communicate to me the instructions you have given him, not only about military operations, but on the policy to follow with regard to the Djelloul and Ain-Madhi; lastly, you inform me of the state of the fines you have desired General Yusuf

to impose and to receive in the Djebel Amour from the Ouled Nail, whose pacification he is to complete

I can only praise these arrangements. It is very good soldiering and policy to have sent General Yusuf into the Djebel Amour and I should have been sorry if it had not been done. The whole population must be convinced that we shall follow our enemy wherever he goes and that we shall punish any one who gives him asylum or assistance, it is the best way to deprive him of both the one and the other, if it is employed with perseverance. It is also a proof of our power of locomotion, one of the great strengths of the French army

* * * * *

I have already had the honour to tell you that I should consider it very annoying if the operations in the desert were prolonged beyond the first fortnight in June. By that time General Yusuf's troops will be very tired, if they are not so before. Now I cannot see any means of renewing them, especially in cavalry therefore it is necessary to persevere in the employment of force and to trust to the needs of the desert tribes for coming to the Tell to find food for cattle and buy corn that comes from our forts, if not grown in the country

* * * * *

We have learnt how to make our way into the desert, our experience must not remain without value for the future, we must pursue it and this is the way I intend to establish at Boghar, Taret and Dhaya, some of the bases essential for the organization of three light columns like that of General Yusuf, which has produced such happy results, so that it may only be necessary to make requisition for sufficient transport among the tribes, and for us to collect the cavalry and infantry force necessary to act in the desert as we have done, and this will secure the fidelity of the Djedid, the Ben Aouda and others better than all the other things, that must, however not be neglected

* * * * *

No doubt, sooner or later, a magazine fort must be established in the east of the Tittery, not to control the country, for nothing can control it but sufficient movable columns but to have provisions ready, and some resources for the wounded and sick, within easier reach of the operating columns

* * * * *

By the 15th of next April, as soon as there is grass work should be begun and be far advanced by the month of June. Before the winter of 1847, this post will be in good order

* * * * *

Our affairs in the Dahra are going on very well. General

Pellégrin has made all the fraction of the Beni-Zerouel capitulate, either in the open country or in their caves, which have been mined and made untenable after their execution. This time there has been no recourse to the method of fire, that afflicted our philanthropist so much. But it is right to tell the tender souls that the recollection of the Ouled-Riah's fate has induced the submission of the Beni-Zerouel, without great shedding of blood, and will induce submission of many others.

Bou-Maza, finding himself pressed by General Pellégrin, Colonels Saint-Arnaud, and Canrobert, has gone into the mountains on the left bank of the Chélif, escorted by 34 horsemen. He was carried stretched out upon a mule, as his wound continues in a very bad state.

The Beni-Lenties-Medouna have made their submission to M. de Saint-Arnaud. The insurrection, beaten three times by him and Lieutenant-colonel Canrobert, is now confined to the Aachacha and Ouled-Djounes, who live in a very difficult country on the sea-coast. When M. de Saint-Arnaud found matters were in this condition, he returned to Orléanville with some of his force. He will enter the Ouarensenis by the Oued-el-Ardjens on the 14th or 15th. He will hunt for Bou-Maza among the Ouled-Bou-Sliman, and then turn our way to fall upon the people we shall drive towards him.

I am establishing a *biscuit-rille* on the Oued-Figuesal, just at the foot of the mountains, and shall not really enter them till the 14th, when I shall take some battalions through them without packs.

Now this is the news of the western frontier. The Beni-Amer, numbering 15,000 persons, of whom 600 to 700 are horsemen, have left the Deïra, and buried themselves in Morocco, escorted by 300 of the Emperor's horse. This is a literal violation of the treaty of Lalla-Maghrnia, but it cannot be denied that it is within its spirit, for it is a great dismemberment of the Deïra, and consequently a serious blow to the Emir's power. It is believed that Bou-Hamidi, who is with his master, has himself favoured this migration.

I think this act of the Emperor's is an accommodation of conscience with his subjects. He wanted to injure the Emir's power, without any risk of being called a bad Mahometan. The interning of Miloud-ben-Arach with all his followers is a fact of the same import as the escape of the Beni-Amer.

In contradiction to this conduct, the Emperor has replaced the authorities of Ouchda by men who aforetime have favoured Abdel-Kader very much. This can only be explained by the habitually incoherent policy of this court.

On another side, the Emperor is gone to Mequinez, and his son—the one who was beaten at Isly, is collecting a force at Fez. I cannot believe that it is against us. It is not characteristic of him to want

revenge more likely he intends to keep a little better order on the frontier and take away our wish to intervene and expedite the dispersion of the Deira.

General Cavaignac thinks differently about this but I none the less keep my own opinion and write to him that all the late events ought to prevent us from undertaking a long and distant enterprise upon the Moorish territory. I write to him to confine himself to some short expeditions for inflicting chastisement upon the nearest tribes that have perpetrated hostilities against us favouring the return of our tribes. These return in small parcels and the two bands of the Tafna are being refurnished.

On the whole I consider that the situation on this side is much improved. If Abdel Kader enters in his present state of dilapidation he cannot but increase the state of discouragement considerable even now among the emigrants still with him.

A proof of the greatness of this discouragement is that the tribes of the south and east of Tlemcen who were going towards the Deira by the south have turned back eastwards when they learnt the position of the emigrants.

Receive my Prince my thanks for the good service you do us and the assurance of my respect and devotion.

MARSHAL DUFF D'ISSY

In a letter written a few days afterwards to M Léon Roches secretary of embassy to Morocco, the Marshal mentions the Emir's state of distress —

Algiers 31st May 1840

MY DEAR ROCHES — I do not mean to excuse myself from writing to you though I have so little time and my letter to the Consul general might be sufficient for both. In fact I have not much more to tell you only that every day particulars come in confirming our absolute success.

All the desert tribes from the meridian of Tinet as far as Bou Sida are organized and as humble as their own sleep. They have paid heavy contributions without the smallest difficulty. Yusuf is bringing back 400 horses all fit for cavalry remounts. Independently of this there are a lot of cattle and sheep and money.

General Yusuf's chouefs have followed the Emir as far as the western extremity of the Ouled Sidi Cheikh. They say that there were about 100 scattered horsemen on the way some dismounted some dragging their horses by the head others mounted on starved and wounded jades.

the difficulties of the work, and my inability to satisfy the country's expectations.

I have long hoped you would resume the Governor-generalship. I am convinced you could add fresh services that no one else could render to the very great ones you have already done. If every hope is gone in this respect, if no other arrangement seems acceptable to the King's Government, I will not refuse an eminent position in which I could do active service to my country. I am under no illusion as to the difficulties with which the question bristles, the attacks that will be directed against me, and the deceptions that await me; but I shall take to the performance of my duties an entire abnegation of self, and the devotion of all my time. I shall most carefully preserve the recollection of everything useful and grand I have seen you do in this African land, and shall do all I can to follow in your tracks and continue your work.

Allow me to thank you here for all the kind things you say to me in your letter. You have always shown me a sympathy that is most precious to me, and you know that I reply to it by the greatest esteem and most sincere attachment.

Your affectionate

HENRI D'ORLEANS.

P.S.—I had hoped to do the honours of Chantilly to you either this autumn or this winter, and to talk about war and farming there with you sometimes. If I am not at Paris when you go there, I hope you will do me the kindness to go and shoot some of the hares there that nibble my plantations.

We have been fortunate enough to find Marshal Bugeaud's reply to the Prince's letter. In truth, can anything be more touching than this agreement and community of ideas, this attachment that so closely united the old soldier with the young Prince, in one thought, in one object, the good and glory of France?

La Durantie, 9th August, 1847.

MY PRINCE,—Your admirable letter of the 3rd of August did not require any reply from me, but I could not resist my wish to express to you some of the impressions it has produced upon my mind and heart. It breathes the greatest devotion to the country and the King. You are not led away by the brilliancy of the command; you know all the rest long ago. You have estimated the difficulties, you have foreseen the criticism and even the calumny, and yet you brave even all that for the sake of serving France and obeying your father.

This noble conduct would be a criticism on mine if I had not paid my tribute for six years and a half, and especially if I had not hoped that I should better serve the interests of Algeria by retiring than by remaining at the post that had been entrusted to me. My views are already being realised because you are destined to be my successor. You know the only reason why I have not advised this course is the fear of laying a further moral responsibility upon the monarchy. As the King's Government does not think so I congratulate Algeria and France.

This will not be the only advantage of my retirement. My views on colonisation ought to gain credit by it. There can be no more doubt of a conviction for which I have given up the finest command in the country, and then I shall be in the Chamber to fight the false notions and hollow theories of the Dufaures, Tocquevilles, Berumonts and the rest, who fancy that nothing is wanted to level all obstacles but some liberal civil institutions. If there were only no Arabs in Algeria or if they resembled the effeminate peoples of India I should have taken very good care not to advise my country to have made a basis of colonisation with a military element by force of the budget. But the existence of this nation, so vigorous, so well prepared for war, so superior in that respect to the European masses we could introduce into the country, lays upon us the absolute necessity of establishing above it, by its side, in the middle of it the strongest population possible and where can that be found if not in the army?

But to leave this digression, I think in this respect you share my opinion. Let the contractors for colonisation be tried if there are any to be found, their inability will soon be understood.

To return to your letter. I should be very glad if I might publish it and put the factious to the blush and the blunderers who so often calumniate your noble family. As I cannot publish it I shall read it as often as I can to my friends and sometimes to the enemies of the dynasty raised by the Revolution of July. By it I will show them even more than by my argument that it is perfectly legitimate, because it rests not only on the national desire but also on its ardent patriotism, on its services, and the superiority of mind.

I am very thankful for your kind expressions as to Commandant Ferry. You will soon be in a position to make him feel the good effects of it and I am convinced you will not lose an opportunity.

But how is it that no effect has ensued upon the recommendations for rewards to the army of Africa before I left it? What is such delay to be attributed to? I confess it begins to make me indignant. Never at any time has the army of Africa been more deserving than in the period from 1846 to 1847. Not only has it been fighting and made numerous and prolonged expeditions for the consolidation of our rule as far as the confines of the little desert but it has also done immense works, and not left off till the end of July. ^

On the 5th of October the Prince arrived in the roads of Algiers on board the *Labrador*, and landed among enthusiastic and unanimous shouts of 'Vive la Roi! Vive le Duc d'Aumale!'

The notion of a Viceroyalty in Algeria, and the selection of a Prince of the blood was not new to Marshal Bugeaud. In fact as long ago as the 23rd of October, 1843, he wrote to M. Blanqui, the deputy:

I should be glad for a Prince to be my successor here; not in the interest of the constitutional monarchy, but of the question, that things will be given him that would be refused to me. The Duke d'Aumale is, and will be still more every day, a capable man. I hope I shall leave him the work in good train; but for a long time there will be a great deal more to do: it is a work of giants and ages.

In the course of the year 1845 he wrote to his friend M. Guizot:

As to the Duke d'Aumale's Government, the only inconvenience I see in it is for the monarchy: it will be a responsibility the more to undertake. The young Prince is capable, and his experience is growing fast. I expect that from the beginning he will be an administrator, and will become a very distinguished soldier; in this point he will only want a little more experience and thought.

While the King of France's son was making his glorious beginning in Africa as Viceroy-governor, Marshal Bugeaud, in the retirement of his home at La Durantie, was setting himself in, and trying to establish his children there by the purchase of a property near his own. His letters to his son-in-law and daughter show how carefully he attends to their interests, and neglects no particulars:—

La Durantie, 19th October, 1847.

MY DEAR FERAY,—I think I wrote to you at Algiers on the 6th to tell you that I have bought Linty for you, at the price of 120,000

frances, and to ask for your power of attorney to complete the contract. It seems to me impossible that you should not be able to get a long enough leave to visit your family. The condition of Algeria allows it. So you must come and spend some time with us, to see your nice property, and we will study together the plans of improvement that I am making to increase the revenue from 8 to 10 000 francs. Do not be afraid of the expense, I hope not to ask for a sou out of your pocket. The wood to sell, not clearing but improving, will cover the repairs, with the gradual increase of cattle.

* * * * *

The *Moniteur Algérien* of the 23rd of December says, 'The long-expected solution is at last accomplished. Abdel-Kader has surrendered at the French camp. The same day he was presented to H R H the Governor-general by Lieutenant-general Lamoricière.'

This time the King's son writes to his former chief from Algiers, the seat of his government. A letter, dated a few days before the Revolution of February, once more shows the attachment and reciprocal esteem that drew these two soldiers together. What joy, what an honour it was for the young general to be able to relate to his old master in the art of war the outcome of their long campaigns, their bloody struggles, the immense result at last obtained by the surrender of Abdel-Kader! The chief care of Marshal Bugeaud's successor is to inform the first conqueror of Algeria. He does not forget to tell him that his name is in every mouth, and that Algeria become French still reckons upon his devotion for her defence in Parliament.

H R H THE DUKE D'ALVALE TO MARSHAL BUGEAUD

Algiers, the 2nd of January, 1848

MY DEAR MARSHAL—The events in Morocco and the life of Abdel Kader, have had the conclusion that you are

your last letter, and I had not dared to hope. As soon as this great event was accomplished your name was in every heart. Everyone remembered with gratitude that it is you who put an end to the contest, that it is the excellent direction you gave the war, and all Algerian affairs, that has ruined Abdel-Kader morally and materially. May one of your old and modest lieutenants be allowed to offer you on the occasion of the new year his personal good wishes, and those of the whole army you so gloriously led for seven years. We are confidently expecting the result of the parliamentary discussions that will take place concerning the affairs of Algeria. I am rejoiced to know that you will take part in them, and I have no doubt that you will throw a great light upon the situation, and the needs of the country still so little known.

Receive, my dear Marshal, the expression of the high respect and sincere friendship with which I am,

Your affectionate,

H. D'ORLEANS.

Marshal Bugeaud answered him:—

Paris, 15th January, 1848.

MY PRINCE,—I was sure beforehand that you would think as you write to me about the fall of Abdel-Kader. Your mind is too just not to appreciate the real causes of this event, and your soul too lofty not to do justice to everyone. Like all men capable of doing great things, you only want your share of the glory, and at need would yield a little of it to others. In this matter, my Prince, you have done me great honour; but you are still more honoured. If your letter could be published it would double the respect, great as it now is, that the country and the army bear to you. Not being able to publish it I have it read as much as possible, and several persons have taken copies of it, notably two ministers; they all admired as much as I did the noble feelings that dictated it.

I am afraid they will want to reduce the army too much; this would be imprudent, militarily and politically; it would also be against general economy and the speedy utilisation of the conquest. The end of the Emir is not a complete security for tranquillity; the Arabs remain, and though weakened their revolts are still to be expected; they will not endure the cruel revolution we bring upon them without often making resistance, and men will be found ready to serve their discontent. The troops are not wanted only for restraining them, but also to forward great public works, and in this way are less expensive than in France, as being able to produce more than they cost. There would be no economy in withdrawing troops from Africa, unless they were disbanded. Now, considering the

fermenting state of Europe, I do not think that the French army can be reduced

Some letters say that a fort is being established at Hamza. I can hardly believe it. You would not like to increase your permanent posts if your strength is reduced, you would rather do away with some. I always say that Lalla Maghrnia should be done away with, and Temouchent, and Ain Moussa upon the Oued Riou. I presume that there was some need for a temporary occupation of Hamza, and thence arose a report of the establishment of a permanent post, that I think would be more than useless, it would be injurious.

Accept, my Prince, the assurance of my respect and devotion

MARSHAL DUKE D'ISLY

The meeting of the Chambers, and politics, took the lord of La Durantie back to Paris. The following letter to Colonel Feray, written a short time before the sad revolution of February, shows us the Marshal perfectly reconciled to the King and his Ministers, if any coolness had ever existed in the intercourse between the Government and the late Governor-general of Algiers. In fact, his name was mentioned with praise in the address, and the Chamber elected him vice-president.

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL FERAY

Paris 5th January, 1848

MY DEAR FERAY,—It is a long time since I wrote to you but my wife was always writing to you or I éonnie, and so you were kept informed. Then the trouble of the move to Paris and the business the Deputy marshal had to do on reaching the capital, the opening of the Chambers, the new year's day visits &c, &c. At last I am a little freed from these absorbing preliminaries, and seize the chance for a talk with you

* * * * *

I was very well spoken of in the speech from the Crown and my reception by the Chambers was no less favourable, as they made me vice president for the present session.

I am not so well pleased with an article in the *Debats* of the 3rd, on Abdel Kader's surrender. Read it, to see how newspapers write history, and with what justice and fairness they distribute their

praise. Everybody has done almost as much as I did to produce this great result, even Berthezène by his defeat,* and others by their inability to advance the conquest one step. Tell me what you and the army think of this.

I often see the Salvandy family, and like them better every day. Just now they are all at Paris.

Opinion is pronouncing strongly against sending Abdel-Kader to Egypt or Syria. The Ministry will have a majority, but the situation is very difficult. There are so many questions moving at home and abroad.

Your mother embraces you, and highly approves what I say about Léonie's voyage. Adieu. I embrace you with all my heart.

MARSHAL BUGEAUD.

The progress of events now brings us to the fatal epoch for France, the 24th of February, 1848, the date of the foolish revolution, that flung France into an era of events and humiliations, from which she is not yet delivered.

The people of Algeria were struck dumb with astonishment at the fall of King Louis-Philippe. The Duke d'Aumale, after arranging temporarily for the government, was joined by his brother, the Prince de Joinville, who had himself given up the command of his squadron. They left Algiers on the 3rd of March, 1848.

An eye-witness lately gave us an account of this dramatic scene. 'It was one of the greatest griefs, the most heart-rending sights I ever saw in my life. The day they went away, I remember, the rain was falling in torrents. The square and the landing quays were perfectly crowded. When the Duke d'Aumale appeared with his people, and the Prince and Princess de Joinville, there was an outburst of tears, and shouts of despair. The Arabs flung

* In 1831.—Ed.

themselves at his feet; all of us wanted to keep him, the officers and soldiers wept like children, while the Princesses sobbed as they went down into their boat filled with flowers, a last remembrance, last homage. Alas! we all felt that with the Prince departed the soul of old France. Ah! if our young chief had consented to remain, if he had said one word, or made one gesture, the whole army and Algeria would have risen. What would have happened in France then?

The Duke d'Aumale's last proclamations may be interesting:—

INHABITANTS OF ALGERIA,—Faithful to my duties as citizen and soldier, I have remained at my post as long as I thought my presence useful to the service of the country.

This is no longer the case. General Cavaignac is appointed Governor general of Algeria. Until he reaches Algiers the duties of temporary governor will be performed by General Changarnier.

Submitting to the national will, I depart, but in exile all my prayers will be for your prosperity, and the glory of France, whom I should have been glad to serve for a longer period.

HENRI D'ORLÉANS

Algiers, 3rd March, 1848

True copy

Colonel, second in command of the general staff

L de Crény

GENERAL ORDERS

Head-quarters, Algiers, 3rd March, 1848

General Changarnier will temporarily perform the duties of Governor general until the arrival of General Cavaignac, appointed Governor general of Algeria.

As I leave an army that is the pattern of honour and bravery, in whose ranks I have passed the fairest days of my life, I can only wish it fresh success. Perhaps a new career is opening to its valour, I firmly believe it will be executed with glory.

Officers, non commissioned officers, and soldiers, I had hoped to fight again with you for our country. This honour has been

refused me ; but in my banishment my heart will follow you everywhere that the will of the nation may send you ; it will glory in your success ; all its prayers will always be for the glory and happiness of France.

HENRI D'ORLEANS.

A true copy.

Colonel, second in command of the general staff.

L. de Crény.

CHAPTER XIV.

ARAB OFFICES.—SOLDIERS.—COLONISATION.

Administration of the Arabs—The Marshal's Kindness to the Natives—His great Care for the Private Soldier—Father Bugeaud's Cap—Regulations—Arab Offices—Bugeaud's Principles of Colonisation—Trappists of Staoueli—The Jesuits

MARSHAL BUGEAUD's military fame rests on an unshaken basis, and his grand soldierly figure now holds a large place in the history of Algeria and of France. But what is not sufficiently known, is that Marshal Bugeaud, as far as lay in human power, employed the little leisure left him by military expeditions, and the command of an army of a hundred thousand men, in administration properly so called. Without going into particulars, it is useful to remember the productive impulse he gave to works that in seven years changed the face of Algeria. He it was who contrived, with equal kindness and firmness, according to his famous motto, '*Ense et aratro*,' to unite for the same object those two instruments of conquest and civilisation, the spade and the sword. It is to him that France owes those gigantic works, those splendid roads the Romans would have been proud of. It would be very interesting to give, or at least to analyse, his numerous decrees, reports, and circulars, going into all parts of the service, and showing unwearied care for the men whom he was sent to govern, without distinction of race, at the same time displaying

a rare spirit of organization and of practical application.

A great many of Bugeaud's circulars relate to the government of the natives, a delicate and serious matter, so difficult of solution, and still the subject of passionate controversy, although his successors have made many attempts at solution.

As for himself, he attended to the government of the Arabs with quite paternal care, and was far from treating the conquered nation with the contempt, arrogance, and cruelty, too often adopted on principle, and systematically, by certain African generals, and especially by the pretended Liberals and Republicans of the colony. His instructions to his generals show this constant care.

'It is not enough to make a good selection of Arab authorities; they must still be looked after, be directed, their instruction cared for, so as to form them by degrees; at the same time they must be treated with consideration, so as to keep up their dignity, and make them respected by their clients.' So much for the authorities.

'The simple Arabs must be treated kindly, equitably, and mercifully. Their complaints and claims must be heard, and carefully examined, so as to do them justice if there are grounds, and to punish them if they have wrongly complained.'

Bugeaud attached especial importance, as he said, to giving the natives a government suitable to their manners, that should make them prefer our rule to the Emir's. Equitable conduct was sufficient for this purpose. The principle of recompenses was maintained, but the application of it was so arranged,

that each one had to pay or receive what was actually due.

In his circular of the 2nd January, 1844, he maintains the responsibility and union of the tribes. At the same time he shows on what conditions this grand principle would be especially efficacious. He unites the chief's responsibility to that of the tribe.

‘The authorities, who enjoy the advantages and privileges of power, must, more than any others, be careful to preserve order, and repress robbery.’

Possibly, when the Marshal was speaking to the Arabs, he rather too much felt as if he was speaking to the people of Périgord, to the peasants of La Durantie. He forgot, alas! that the Arabs, a conquered race, looked upon us, and not without some reason, as oppressors. Anyway, his intentions were upright and noble.

How often history is unjust. To most people, Marshal Bugeaud passed for a fierce man, almost brutal. We have seen his extreme care for the natives and his soldiers; but that is not all. There is one anecdote among many that gives a capital picture of the great soldier's character, the man of hasty manners and rugged exterior, concealing a soul full of delicacy and ingenuousness.

The scene was in tents on the Moorish frontier: the Marshal's secretaries and aides-de-camp were in a camp close to the Governor's. One day the Marshal called to one of his aides-de-camp: ‘What are Rivet, Roches, and Trochu, about just now? Send me one of them, I want one; are they very busy?’ The officer answered, ‘I think not, sir, they are reading out Lamartine's new book, *Jocelyn*.’ ‘Oh!’ said the

them awake, and they often understood the indirect lessons given them by their old Marshal:

Another time he would look to the sentries; neglecting no detail. His constant care was to preserve his soldiers' health, watch over their comfort, and avoid useless fatigues for them. The Duke d'Aumale told us lately, 'he had the secret of obtaining obedience without murmurs.*' Any general but he would never have dared to expect, still less to obtain, from the troops what Marshal Bugeaud thought it quite natural to require, and obtained the performance of.

There is a general order dated from Oued Tirouet, that no doubt was much better received by the infantry soldiers than by the officers:—

The Governor-general has observed that, contrary to regulations, and orders several times given, many company officers have saddle-horses in the ranks. This abuse must be immediately put a stop to. Infantry officers must not lose sight of the fact that the surest method of obtaining from their men the self-denial and energy required to endure toilsome marches, under a burning sun, is to set the example of going on foot, like them.

There is no reason to be surprised that the higher officers often were in a fume against the

* One night the Marshal was walking about the camp, as he often did, and heard a dispute between two Zouaves. One said, 'What a dog's life! I have been wet through three days, and not a chance to dry myself; if only we had a little bread and a drop of brandy there would still be a chance to sing "*Mère Godichon*." But there is nothing at all, and, into the bargain, those rascally Arabs, whom we cannot catch to pay off our ill-humour on their backs.' An old soldier answered, 'Conscript, you have no business to grumble. If you had been, as I was yesterday, on duty at "*the Casquette's*" tent, you would put away your complaints! Marshal of France and Duke that he is—listen, conscript—I saw him with my own eyes, all alone, making no complaint, as he gnawed at a bit of biscuit, and drank a cup of water after it. When God has nothing, what do you expect the saints can have?' The squad cried out, 'The old one is right. Shut up, conscript! Down with the conscript!' When the Marshal told this little story he said he felt as pleased as he had ever done in his life.

Governor, while the privates adored him when the army had such an order of the day as this before them :—

Camp Ain Kebira, 20th January, 1846.

The Governor, Marshal of France, is informed that several commanders of corps have allowed themselves to divert mules intended for the special service of the ambulance canteens to private use. An abuse so prejudicial to the good of the service must immediately be put a stop to.

All commandants of columns are, therefore, required whenever they leave a victualling-post, to ascertain that every battalion is provided with its ambulance mule, with its canteens completely furnished with medicines, lint, &c.

Any commanding officer who acts in contravention to the present order will be severely admonished to observe the regulation, and his name will be published in general orders of the army as not being careful of the most important thing of all the health of the men of whom he is placed in charge.

One of the Marshal's greatest cares was the administrative organization of the Arabs. The conquest would be completed by placing the native territory in charge of officers, who should establish a military administration after having subdued the Arabs. The officers chosen as administrators were to be able to speak Arabic, to try causes, to stifle the germs of insurrection at its birth, and lead the warriors to fight.

To set against some officers of bad character, and two or three robber generals, whom the riches of Sallust must hinder from sleeping, what an interminable list there is of officers brave and faithful under every trial furnished by the Arab offices. How many of them were martyrs to duty, killed at their posts, among the Arab tribes, at the moment of risings foretold by them, and generally brought on by the ignorance or evil passions of French politicians or Algerian Radicals.

The office for Arab business was abolished in 1839, and restored by a decree of General Bugeaud, dated August 17, 1841.

It is easy to see that the establishment of the Arab offices was nothing but the administration of the country by the officers who had just conquered it. The colonist arriving at an early period of the occupation, or even coming later, desiring to penetrate into the interior, and leave the coast towns, thus found the country governed by the military. Contests often began from the first day, arising from the colonist coming with the fixed idea of making the most out of the conquered race.

The most usual pretensions of some colonists were directed to these points, that their native neighbours should without pay cultivate the land given gratuitously by the Government; that the natives should be compelled to labour on promise of a fixed payment; then either this payment be altogether refused, or less given than the settled price. Other colonists, and they were the most, wanted the Arabs' property and merchandise without paying for it at all.

These people just landed, who would have liked to renew on the Arabs the famous exactions of the Spaniards and Portuguese from the Indians of the New World, found themselves confronted by a simple sub-lieutenant, attached to the Arab office. Generally he was a picked officer, selected from his regiment for his good education, high views, and good breeding, to exercise the authority; and the duty of this representative of mercy and civilisation was to reduce the colonist to better notions: he had to work, and not make others work; he had to keep his word, and not take other

people's property ; he must not think he was in the New World, or had to do with Indians. France was there, with her civilisation and justice, represented by an officer : a modest one certainly, but energetic, and disposed to make the conquered respected. Thus it was that the officer of the Arab office, the foe of yesterday, to-morrow became the natural protector of the native, and, it must be said, his best friend. As the number of colonists increased, their pretensions took another shape ; they were purified, but became no less dangerous to the Arab. They renounced openly the right of making the most of the Arabs, their neighbours ; but they contrived another programme, and resolved to take the natives' lands by the right of conquest. In this new way the colonists again found their road blocked by the Arab offices, who undertook the protection of the natives' property. The colonists clothed their claims in a thousand different shapes, some of which were very clever, so as to endeavour to obtain their acceptance. At the bottom, they only coveted one thing, to take the Arabs' land. They got a number of allies, notably almost all the Algerian press, by a certain apparent moderation. At different times their requirements were, that the Arabs should be pushed back into the Sahara ; that they should be quartered in a portion of the Tell ; that the property of insurgent tribes should be sequestrated ; lastly, their expropriation with a larger or smaller indemnity.

The Arab offices protected the property of the natives against these unwholesome appetites, appealing to justice, and respect for promises solemnly made on the taking of the country, also to the fear of a general rising, and they were supported by servative governments of the capital.

There is not one of Marshal Bugeaud's principles, either in war or in colonisation, that has not at least the great advantages of clearness, precision, and practicability over the plans of his adversaries or detractors.

The army is everything in Africa, said he. It alone has destroyed, it alone can rebuild. It alone has conquered the soil, it alone will make it productive by cultivation, and can prepare it for the reception of a large civil population by great public works. In order to the performance of this double task, only two things are necessary, to keep up its strength to the present numbers, and to preserve the military rule now flourishing in Africa. His last point is the most important. As the army is everything in Africa, nothing is possible there but military power.

Thus, to Bugeaud's mind the reduction of the army in Africa, and a change from the military rule, was not only to annul the good effects of the war, but also to stifle the germs of colonisation.

His first practical attempts at colonisation go back to the year 1842. He founded three villages near Algiers, and having no farmers at command, he filled them with soldiers. One, Fouka, was filled with time-expired men; Mered and Mâelnâ with men who still had three years to serve.

His plan of colonisation, that might have been crowned with as great success as his system of war, if he had put it in force, consisted in selecting soldiers, who had already served two or three years, marrying them, and making a military establishment of them in villages they had built. They would be legally compelled to serve the country for five years more; at the end of that time, free. How

many of these men, married, settled, become land owners, living on the soil, would have broken the agreement? The idea was great, simple, and productive. The Marshal had carefully prepared all the calculations, all the accounts, and asked for sixty millions in ten years. How many millions have been squandered since, and thrown to the winds with the successive attempts and chimerical plans patronised by the Government?

Every village with its own life, with a service organization, and a chief to lead it, and the men, soldiers at need, workers without stint, would become wonderful colonists, occupying the Tell, that is to say, the best lands. Surely to meet the Arab cultivator of the land, always armed, the Marshal's idea of a soldier-farmer was suggestive and practical.

Marshal Bugeaud's plan was *military colonisation*. The contrary system of private colonisation, assisted and protected, was much approved in the Chambers. MM. Dufaure, Bignon, de Barante, de Tocqueville, and especially MM. de Beaumont and de Lamoricière, stubbornly and systematically opposed the Marshal's views.

In the course of the year 1843, after a good deal of negotiation between the French Government and the General-superior of La Trappe, the religious colony of Trappist fathers was sent to Algiers. The founders had to choose between three concessions, in different places. The domains of Mouzaïa and Arba were then almost in the enemy's territory, and also too far from Algiers. Staouëli was selected. The community of Staouëli was registered as a civil society, and contained forty-five monks. At first Bugeaud, always full of his plan of military colonisa-

tion by means of married soldiers, had not liked the notion of introducing these celibate colonists. However, as soon as the Trappist fathers arrived, he spoke out at once, declaring that they were welcome, and he would help them as much as he could. The Commanding-officer of Engineers was ordered to supply them with everything required to put up their workshops at cost price from the contractors, and six sappers and a serjeant were sent to set the work going, while a detachment of military convicts was placed at their disposal. Marshal Bugeaud laid the first stone upon a bed of bullets, picked up on the battle-field of Staouëli. In all his campaigns, the Marshal thought of God, and never failed to give thanks for his success by an offering to Staouëli.

It was not the Trappists alone who received help and protection from Marshal Bugeaud in Algeria. Another religious order, the Jesuits, found a warm and able patron in him; and there was a letter published by him in the *Journal des Débats* in June, 1843, full of the most conclusive arguments in favour of these much-calumniated priests, though he begins by saying he is neither Jesuit nor bigot.

CHAPTER XV.

REVOLUTION OF 1848—PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

The Days of February, 1848—State of Minds in France—The Marshal's Deeds—Sent to Command the Troops—King's Abdication—Bugeaud's Resistance—Lamartine's Account and Castilla's—Republic Proclaimed—Return to La Durantie—Demagogues in the Country—Tales of a Hut—Common Labour—Correspondence with Roches and Trochu—15th of May

WE need not dwell upon those ever-inauspicious days of the month of February, 1848, fatal days that assumed, it must be said, a character of expiation. There was accomplished in Paris the most inopportune, the most useless, the most foolish revolution that has ever overturned France. The fearful consequences of this disastrous folly still weigh heavily upon France; and when we think of these disorders, we cannot prevent ourselves from cursing, with our whole soul, those who were the authors and accomplices in them.

The first days of the year 1848 found France not disturbed, but remarkably divided. The attacks upon the Ministry went beyond all limits; the aim acknowledged by the opposition was long past, and the attacks reached the throne. The Conservative party, victorious in all the elections, in supporting the King and the Ministry, adopted a pride and bitterness they made no attempt to conceal. The opposition, on their side, even the dynastic opposition, attacked the Government with extreme passion; and did not recoil from any method, any compromise, for fighting and weakening their political adversaries.

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The opposition journals poured abuse upon the King, the royal family, and all defenders of the established order of things. To listen to these irreconcilables, there was no honour, virtue, or patriotism, except in the ranks of an intolerant and systematic opposition.

They were kind enough in joke to allow the King to be—a good father and husband, but represented him as a greedy miser without a conscience, who was robbing the crown domains, and making sad cuttings in the forests. According to the opposition, he was a lawless and faithless man, a hypocrite full of duplicity, selling France to the foreigner, following the policy of peace at any price.

This is the aspect, only much mitigated, under which the members of the opposition daily, in their writings, speeches, and newspapers, held up to France the wise King who ruled her.

And yet France was prosperous and glorious; never had Government been able to make the people more prosperous or safer. Never had Government more scrupulously respected liberty or individual rights.

The royal family presented to France and Europe an example of all the virtues. The Queen and her daughters were the most accomplished and virtuous of women; the princes were rivals in patriotism and military virtue.

What madness was it that affected a party in France, and made them dare to overturn the throne of the most paternal of sovereigns? Why this unloosing of violence and hatred against one of the best and most honest governments France has ever possessed?

The criminal folly that France committed the day she overthrew King Louis-Philippe she has been expiating ever since. The cruel expiation commenced immediately. Our country, just before so rich, began to encounter difficulties and pains from the first miserable days of the first revolution.*

Marshal Bugeaud, more than any other Conservative deputy, was exposed to the unjust and malicious

* *Louis-Philippe prided himself on having destroyed the good understanding between public men of eminence, having made them eager rivals and jealous enemies by the allurements of office, and on having founded on the destruction of parliamentary leagues his personal system. His grand merit was no doubt in having so long maintained the peace of the world. But peace was more than once maintained at the expense of the dignity of France in her relations with other courts. This timid policy suited the position and temporising character of the man, and for a time found favour with the middle classes, on whose support the monarchy mainly relied.*

Louis-Philippe did not himself rise much above the level of this class, a class which he did not seek to elevate, or to inspire with better instincts than the desire to get rich, and to get rich speedily. On the foundation of this universal selfishness there arose an organized system of corruption and cupidity, which sapped and undermined public and private virtue.

The great and fatal mistake of the King was in attempting to govern as well as to reign, to be not only the King, but the Minister of France. At home, as well as abroad, this led to a system purely personal, and the honour of the country and its great interests were sacrificed to considerations purely dynastic.

The personal character of the monarch had much influence on the politicians round him. It had the effect of rendering public men more servile, insincere, and dishonest.

No man so much encouraged and sustained M. Guizot in resistance to reform as the King himself, but at the decisive moment, when it was necessary to show resolution and energy, the spirit of the King faltered, and his cause was lost. To do his Minister justice, M. Guizot never faltered or flinched to the end — *Encyclopædia Britannica, Eighth Edition, Art. France*.

A letter from the Prince de Joinville to the Duke de Nemours, dated 7th November, 1847, found among documents left behind, says, 'There are, in fact, no Ministers, their responsibility is as nothing. Everything proceeds from the King. He is now of an age when he will listen to no observations whatever. Our position is not good. After seventeen years of peace, the state of our finances is not brilliant. . . . We come before the Chamber detestably as to home affairs, as to foreign, our position is not better. All this is the work of the King alone, the result of the old age of a King who wishes to govern, but who wants the energy to take a manly resolution. . . . All this is traceable to the King alone, who has tampered with our constitutional institutions. I look upon all this as very serious. — *Ibid*

attacks of the opposition ; and the grand citizen, who had given Algeria to France, and brought victory back to our standards, found himself despised and almost suspected. He, whose lofty person should have been one of the strongest supports of the throne, had been attacked with so much perfidy and falsehood that he was almost degraded in popular estimation. In short, all the political quacks who talked of succouring the throne, and gathering up M. Guizot's inheritance, rejected the Marshal's support as compromising and unpopular.

As for him, strong in his conscience and in duty done, he was at Paris, modestly fulfilling his duty as deputy when the Revolution broke out.

The following letter, written to one of his colleagues, M. Léonce de Lavergne, gives a most circumstantial account of the part he had to play during those ever-to-be-regretted days. This letter was written in the month of October, just at the time of the Presidential elections, and was to be communicated to the personages who had a notion at that time of putting up Marshal Bugeaud as a candidate against General Cavaignac :—

MARSHAL BUGEAUD TO M. LÉONCE DE LAVERGNE.

La Durantie, 19th October, 1848.

MY DEAR FORMER COLLEAGUE.—It was at two o'clock in the morning of the 24th of February that one of the King's aides-de-camp came to summon me to the Palace. I went there as quickly as I could, and was offered the command of the troops and of the National Guard. I quite understood that it was too late, but thought it would be unworthy of me to refuse. The late Ministers, Guizot and Duchatel, were sent for to countersign the decrees appointing me. All this took a great deal too much time, and it was not till half-past three in the morning that I was able to place myself in communication with the troops that were in the Place Carrousel and the court of the Tuileries. I made them a speech that

was certainly energetic. It has been very inaccurately reported by some of the newspapers.

The troops were very much demoralised. They had been kept for sixty hours in a timid and even disgraceful attitude before the mob, their feet in the mud, their packs on their backs, quietly allowing the insurgents to attack the Municipal Guards, burn the guard rooms, cut down trees, break the lamps, and make speeches to the soldiers.

The only food they had received was three rations of biscuit, all eaten up long ago. Generally they had but ten rounds a man, and the best provided battalions had not more than twenty. There were only three waggons of small arm ammunition in the Place du Carrousel; there were none at all at the Ecole Militaire nor anywhere else in Paris.

The only store was at Vincennes and that was only thirteen waggons. This was the only reserve and to bring it up a way would have had to be made through the whole mob and thousands of barricades. The horses of the cavalry were exhausted and had no corn. The men had been kept in their saddles almost all the time.

All the troops detached to the Bastille, to the Hotel de Ville, on the Boulevards, at the Panthéon, had orders to retire upon the Tuileries at daybreak. I sent them orders as quickly as possible to stand firm upon their posts, telling them that as soon as day dawned columns would be sent to join them and we should proceed to offensive operations.

I spent the rest of the night in arranging my columns and lost no opportunity of raising the confidence of those about me. This had some success. I saw a gradual clearing of the faces that had been very melancholy following on the measures I was taking and the orders I was giving. I had about me at least a hundred and fifty officers of the general staff of the army and of the National Guard; a whole crowd of generals came to offer their services. There were too many of them; every one wanted to attract my attention and make profession to me; they made me lose precious time. Add to all of this that hundreds of bits of news were brought me at once and hundreds of orders asked for.

I required information about the National Guard. Jacqueminot was in bed very ill. He was found in a little room up four pair of stairs. He came in a very bad humour and offered his resignation. I told him, "There is no question of that; tell me the arrangements made with the National Guard." I could get nothing out of him.

The commander of the division was almost as dumb and the only person I could get information from was his chief of the staff, Colonel Rollin, who showed himself to be a brave and clever man. At 1st at daybreak, half past five in the morning, four columns started from the Place du Carrousel animated with a good spirit.

mind to it. My horse was at the door, I was mounting it, and I was calling upon all the spectators to follow me. Just at this moment, M. Crémieux came out of the Palace and caught me by the

He had obeyed this order with vexation, and hastened to the King, to represent to him the danger of abdicating when defeated. As he entered the Tuileries he was informed of the abdication, and he hurried to the Cabinet, as we have seen. He was by the King's side, who was sitting at a table with a pen in his hand, slowly writing his abdication, with special attention to the handwriting, in capital letters, that seemed to convey the majesty of the royal hand to the paper. The Ministers of the evening before, of the night, and of the day, the courtiers, the officers, the Princes, the Princesses, the children of the royal family, filled the apartments with a crowd, with agitated groups, with confusion, with dialogues, with chatterings. The faces bore the expression of terror that precipitates resolutions, and breaks the will. This was one of the supreme moments when hearts show themselves in their nakedness, when the masks of rank, title, and dynasty fall from faces, and allow nature to be seen, often degraded by fear. The sound of the firing outside the court of the Louvre was audible above the noise in the room. The Marshal's practised ear detected the whistling of one ball, as it flew up towards the roof. The Marshal did not tell those about him of the ill-omened meaning of this sound. The palace of the King might have become a field of battle. In his eyes, this was the moment to fight and not to capitulate.

"What! sire," said he to the King, "they dare to advise you to capitulate in the middle of a fight? Do they not know that they are advising you to worse than ruin—to disgrace! Abdication in peace, and with freedom of deliberation, is sometimes the salvation of a country and the wisdom of a King. Abdication under fire always looks like weakness; and, more," added he, "this weakness, which your enemies will translate into cowardice, would be useless at this moment. The fighting has begun; there is no means of proclaiming this abdication to the numerous masses that are rising; a word from the advanced posts would not stop their impulse. Restore order, and then take counsel."

"Well," said the King, rising as he spoke, and pressing the Marshal's hands with a loving grasp, "you forbid me then to abdicate?"

"Yes, sire," answered the brave soldier, with respectful energy; "I dare to advise you not to yield, at this moment at least, to a counsel that will save nothing and may lose all."

The King appeared radiant with joy at seeing his feelings shared and confirmed by his General's firm and martial language. "Marshal," he said, much affected and in a tone of supplication, "forgive me for having broken your sword in your hands by taking away your command and giving it to Gérard; he was more popular than you!"

"Sire," answered Bugeaud, "if he but save your Majesty, I grudge him none of your confidence."

The King did not return to the table, and seemed to give up the notion of abdication. The groups of councillors seemed struck with consternation. They adhered to this notion, some of them as their own saving, some as the saving of royalty, some of them perhaps through secret ambitions. At least, all of them saw in it one of those solutions that make a diversion at critical moments, and relieve the mind from the weight of long uncertainty.

The Duke de Montpensier, the King's son, who seemed more than anyone else influenced by impatience for a conclusion, came close to his father and endeavoured to persuade him to sit down again and sign. The Queen alone, in this tumult and contagion of timid counsels, preserved the greatness, the coolness, and the resolution of the wife and mother of kings. After joining with Marshal Bugeaud in

leg, calling out, 'Do not go, Marshal, you will get yourself killed to no purpose. All is over.' I got away from M. Crémieux, and I hurried to the Place du Carrousel, quite determined to take the offensive. But with grief and astonishment, I saw that all the troops had broken off by sections right and left, and were leaving the Place du Carrousel by all the exits. I suppose that whilst I was gone to the Palace, Marshal Gérard had given them orders to go back to barracks.

I could not stop this combined movement, the heads of the columns were already on the quays or in the streets. I held up my hands to heaven and went on escorted by only one officer, the artillery captain Fabar. I went along the waterside quay. When I came to the house of the Chamber of Deputies, I found the place deserted, and the gates shut, no sentries, no caretakers, no person at all. I had thought that the Chamber was not sitting because I had seen several Deputies at the Tuileries and about it. But I was going to find out, when a band of rioters coming down the Quai d'Orsay began to shout 'Down with Marshal Bugeaud!' I went to them and said 'Do you know what you are saying? You shout 'Down with the conqueror of Abdel Kader.' Down with the man who can lead us to victory over the Germans and Russians.' Before a month is out, very likely you will want my experience and courage.' These words altered their notions towards me, and they shouted 'Long live Marshal Bugeaud!' while all the lot of them wanted to shake my hand. At the opening of the Rue de l'Université, I met another band, and the same scene was repeated. These two diversions made me lose sight of the Chamber of Deputies. However, I remembered that the Palace was unguarded, but thought that Marshal Gérard, who was in command and could dispose of five or six thousand men who were in the Place de la Concorde, would provide for it. So I went home to take off my uniform as quickly as I could, and hurry to the Chamber. Some generals came and made me lose half an hour.

When I reached the square of the Palais Bourbon, I saw the

opposing the notion of a precipitate abdication, she yielded to the pressure of the crowd. She retired into the recess of a window and looked back at the King with indignation on her lips, and great tears in her eyes.

'The King handed his abdication to the Ministers and joined the Queen in the recess. He was no longer King but no one had legal authority to take possession of the kingdom. Already the people were not marching to fight against the King, but against royalty. In a word, it was too soon and too late.

'Marshal Bugeaud again respectfully pointed this out to the King before his departure. "I know, Marshal," said the King "but I do not choose that blood should be shed any more for my sake. The King was personally brave, and so the expression was not an excuse to cover his flight nor a cowardice. This sentence may console the exile, and make history kind. 'What God approves, men have no right to scorn.

Deputies coming out of the Palace quite terrified and with astonishing faces. Those who could speak told me, 'All is over; a Republic is to be proclaimed.' I went to a detachment of the 10th Legion, who had piled arms in the square, and seemed to have no notion of what was going on, and said to them, 'Do you choose to have a Republic?' 'No, *sacrebleu!* we will not have it.' 'Well, come into the chamber to protect the Regent, and have the Regency proclaimed.'

There were about 150 men under a young chef-de-bataillon; they unplied arms slowly. At this moment, Oudinot came out of the court to find the National Guards. He made a speech to them with a warmth and animation that gained him my respect. I shook him warmly by the hand: we went into the court, and I took an Invalid's musket. It was too late, a dozen Deputies were running out, and told us, 'All is over! The Duchess is going to the Invalides by the Presidency Gardens; the Republic is proclaimed.'

The National Guards stopped; there was nothing to do, we were not strong enough to restore matters.

Thus fell this monarchy, having given France seventeen years of peace and prosperity. History contains nothing more shameful and deplorable.*

* 'At six in the evening,' says a republican writer, whose sincerity and independence cannot be disputed, M. Hippolyte Castille, in his *History of the Second Republic*, 'after the firing in the boulevard des Capucines, it was still possible to have saved the July monarchy. To do this, it would have been necessary immediately to decree a state of siege, not to appoint ministers; give orders to all the troops for a speedy and crushing initiative, and let Marshal Bugeaud act. Power is not kept up by negotiating. In a similar situation Louis Bonaparte set an example that any Government may profit by, monarchies or republics, who think they ought to resist insurrections.'

* * * * *

'Marshal Bugeaud's powerlessness did not come from want of energy or incontestable military ability. Coupled to a ministry of conciliation, that had obtained the King's permission to stop the firing, it was literally impossible for him to act. The King, naturally indisposed to effective measures, opposed the Marshal, who had been indiscreet enough in his plans to show him Paris swimming with blood. The city was cut up with barricades in every direction, communication became almost impossible, officers with orders only arrived after immense delay, or did not arrive at all. Portions of the troops were obeying previous orders when the plans had long been changed. Others supposed they were still under the command of the Duke de Nemours, when, for several hours, they had been under Marshal Bugeaud. The Generals, better informed, saw that there could be no serious repression with a ministry of conciliation.'

'Now in these extreme crises, every officer, civil or military, thinks of the future. The feeling for keeping their places plainly mingling with that of fidelity to the Government, they fear to act when the master hesitates; and if the opposition seems likely to win the day, they do not care to make it irreconcilably hostile. The causes of the army's inaction must be sought for in these simple human causes, in the enormous waste of time, and the discussions of the night.'

I had promised you a succinct narrative according to what I saw. I have not kept my word, and, though I have omitted a quantity of particulars and incidents, I have been very long, and I hope you will not complain of it.

You will quite understand, my dear colleague, that this account must not in any case be published. The most you can do is to allow a few friends to read it, but not take copies. I have not told the whole truth, but I have told nothing that is not quite accurate, and attested by thousands of witnesses.

I have had the most positive information, by several letters from officers of the army, and of the National Guard that far from having fallen in the opinion of those who saw me under these cruel circumstances, I have risen.

An unheard of concurrence of events paralysed me. I could make no use of my experience, and the military ability nature has given me. As I said at the beginning, I only had the shadow of a command, the Ministers, the King, the Princes, the townspeople, all hindered me. How much did I wish, at the time, for the Court and the Government to be at Vincennes. But, above all things, it would have been necessary for me to be in command of the troops for a fortnight before, so as to identify them with my mode of action, and furnish them in every respect, with all things requisite for such a struggle. In this respect, everything had been neglected, against my repeated official advice. There was no plan for various actions for fighting for the retreat of the Government. There was no instruction given to the troops as to how they were to act, the quantity of ammunition was ridiculous. No stores of food at the principal points within the city, no tools for breaking open doors or cutting holes in houses, nothing in fact that showed the smallest foresight. Nothing at all had been done but to give the different corps a route for going to the chief spots to be occupied. This itinerary had been prepared, revised, and added to as long ago as 1834*.

'This was all that the geniuses could invent, who had to guard the destinies of the monarchy.' When I wished to call the attention of the Ministers, and of M Guizot himself, to this dangerous want of caution, they listened to me with a distracted and tired air, and I

* M Thiers, alone among the members of the new ministry, showed any energy or decision at the beginning of the crisis. He advised the King at once to go to St Cloud collect his troops there, and make an offensive return to Paris. The Marshal approved of this plan. Unhappily, the fatal party of abdication prevailed. And so those two grand advisers of the crown M Guizot, the personification of authority, and M Thiers, the personification of true liberty, foundered beneath a miserable rising, organized by the National, to obtain a simple electoral reform.

saw it written in their sneering smile that they thought I was jealous of those in command, and was making a bid for it. They did not understand all the devotion there was in my exhortations. Adieu, my dear colleague ; heartily yours,

MARSHAL BUGEAUD D'ISLY.

After the terrible pain and deep sorrow of these days, the Marshal, feeling himself useless and suspected, went back to La Durantie. The following notes, communicated by his daughter the Comtesse Feray, give some precious information of his life at this time :—

After the fall of the monarchy, my father, in great sorrow, returned to La Durantie, whither my mother and I had preceded him.

The new Government had deprived the Marshal of his aides-de-camp, and arranged for supervision round the house. Receptions of every kind awaited him. The evil-disposed of the surrounding communes, excited by emissaries sent from Paris, met together to make an attack upon the house, and arrest the family. A large band, composed of men and women, armed with guns, pitchforks, and scythes, marched upon La Durantie. These wretches had been made to believe that the King had entrusted to my father a sum of thirty millions in five-franc pieces ; that this sum had been brought down in his carriage, and hidden in the cellars of the house, to be divided between the King and my father after the restoration of order.

When the peasants of La Durantie, who remained faithful, heard of the danger, they hastened to defend us. A mendicant was sent by the bandits as a spy ; she entered the park, saw the armed men upon the hall doorsteps, and upon her report the band decided not to attack us until they had collected more strength. This was our salvation. My father had not chosen to take any precautions, only some forty ill-armed countrymen had installed themselves in a room of the house against his will. His heart was full of bitterness to see the children of the country that he loved with perfect devotion coming to him with notions of murder and pillage. On these facts becoming known to the military authorities of Périgueux, they sent a force to the house ; however, the assailants had vanished, and did not appear again.

Our days passed sadly, full of fears for France. My mother was engaged in attending to my brother, and her duties as mistress of

the house, my sister taken up with her little children. Being the only one disengaged, I now composed my father's whole stuff and wrote continually to his dictation. By four in the morning we were at work. very often he would break off, and sadly say to me, 'Do you see, I could have saved them, but they did not choose it. Think that I have never been beaten, it is strange, I have always done more than I promised. It is not through interest or ambition that I have served my country. I never asked for anything and I am without fortune. What blindness seized upon the King when he wanted to avoid civil war. He did not understand that if he had let me act I should have saved my country from anarchy.'

Great tears filled his eyes, I tried to console him. 'No, my dear daughter,' said he, 'I ought to have saved them in spite of themselves, and told him, Sire, I restore your throne to you and peace to my country.' He often referred to this dreadful day in our talk, this remembrance overwhelmed him.

How kindly and patiently did he receive my observations, when we, my mother, sister, or I, made him alter a sentence that might have been misconstrued by his enemies when he poured out in his letters all the patriotic grandeur of his mind and I observed that his confidences were addressed to men incapable of understanding them. He also saw everything as good and kind. How many selfish men, how many inferior men, have abused this openness, this frankness, this transparency of heart!

In the course of March, 1848, when there was a moment when Bugeaud believed in the possibility of a European war, he offered his services to M. de Lamartine, the most moderate of the ministers; but his offer was declined. It was then that, being insulted by the journals and demagogue papers, he determined upon sending the War-Minister, Colonel Charras, the bold and high-spirited letter, in which he complained of having been improperly blamed, and denied all participation in the alleged massacre of the rue Transnonnain, giving proofs in support.*

The new doctrines now spreading unrestrained through Paris, the senseless humanitarian dreams of the communists, socialists, and other idea mongers, had

the gift of enraging Bugeaud's lucid mind. So his friends were not astonished to see him start for the fight, and refute the principles that were opposed to his admirable good-sense. We find in a little work, a kind of treatise, published at Lyons in 1848, with the title, *The Socialists and Common Labour*, little tracts of political economy, masterpieces of logic and clearness. Wishing to oppose the notions of labour in common, he takes a specimen from agriculture, and proves his point in a picturesque and interesting way :

Men do not engage in the arduous labours of the field, unless they are driven to it by personal interest, family affection, or the need to provide for wife and children. Men do not work, or hardly work at all, for a general community, without the expectation of directly reaping the fruit of their labours. Each man trusts to all the rest for securing the produce required by all. Some kinds of work, like sowings, can be well done by regulation, and statute labour; but it is well enough known how work is done for the public. The performance of the duty upon vicinal roads stands as a lesson.

Look at a poor exceptionally zealous maire. He summons a hundred persons for five o'clock in the morning to repair an impassable road. Ten come at eight o'clock; they work carelessly till nine. Then comes the breakfast, taking two hours, and only at the poor maire's reiterated exhortations do they resume their picks, and let them fall softly till the time comes for another meal. The workplace, if it deserves the name, is deserted before the sun sets: this is public work. And you expect that the nation would be more abundantly fed than it is with such kind of work. You must know that, to make it live tolerably well, there are twenty-four millions of persons working very hard all the days of their life, from dawn to sunset, driven by necessity and family affection. With labour in common, the harvest of every year would not furnish half of what France requires to eat.

The Marshal could not keep silence in presence of the revolutionary propaganda, the odious books and pamphlets that every day made attacks upon family, religion, and property. He drew up one of those familiar dialogues, after the manner of Franklin, under the name of *Tales of a Vendéen Hut*, but bringing

out his precepts and wise advice in plain and easy language In it he says—

I lament, when I see such large numbers of people in our great towns, walking about doing nothing, even the day labourers while in the fields, we find a melancholy solitude, except near the large towns Most of the work remains to be done, and what is done is very imperfect That is a very rich mine to be worked to the advantage of the happiness and morality of the nation If the people have a more rational education they will no more believe in the chimeras of socialists, and will better appreciate country life Instead of massing themselves in the great towns, they will stay in the villages They will understand that if their labour is harder and their pay less, they have a safer and freer life, more independent of political and financial crises

In a time of disturbance the peasant is not so well off as in time of peace But he does not suffer hunger, and he can wait till order the great benefactor of humanity, is re established Meanwhile he sows his corn, and watches it grow, he attends to his cows and sees the calves born But the town workman is a prey to want, and complete idleness when work ceases Then it is that evil ambitious men take hold of him, drive him to despair, and make him get up a riot, in which numbers pay with their blood for the elevation of the tribunes who have stirred them up Immediately afterwards the mass is still more wretched, but the quacks are in power, then they make empty speeches and laws, and, as they are well placed they now call on the people to be orderly and patient Oh detestable deceivers of the people how I hate, how I despise you'

About this time he wrote the following letter to his friend, the great journalist, Louis Veuillot; it was published, and had a great effect:

La Durantie, 7th March, 1848

MY DEAR FRIEND—You appear just as I have always supposed you would, you neglected me in my prosperity, you come to me when you see that I am unhappy You say you do not approach me with consolation and you are very right In personal matters I have no affliction, no regret I pray that France may be happily delivered from this severe trial I give my cordial support to the men brought into power by circumstances I have no grudge against them for their past, although they largely contributed to the crisis we are now labouring under It is enough for me to declare themselves for the maintenance of order, and

of persons and properties. When I saw them boldly and cleverly struggling against men, who wanted more than a Republic, I understood that it was right to give them support, morally at least, and I made haste to offer my services.

In the Departments, as at Paris, all honest and sensible men feel the same.

The acts of the provisional Government in general give proof of wisdom. Yet I very much regretted, for them, and for us, their promise to secure work for the people. God alone can perform such a promise. The duty of any Government lies only within its power, and I defy all the theorists put together to find a solution of the problem. The men actually in power have preached in their writings the doctrine of a right to work; they must regret it now when they have to meet the difficulty. To keep the workmen patient, they are appointing a commission. They say they are making inquiries; they say they, with the workmen, are preparing a bill to be submitted to the National Assembly. This ought to have been done before the doctrine was spread abroad in the workshops. The only labour establishment it has been possible to open yet is one for doing earth-works. But the weavers, the embroiderers, the workers in iron-mongery, in jewellery, in joinery, &c., &c., will they go and move earth when neither their hands nor their backs are used to that sort of work? They must have work in their trade given them, and how could it be imagined that a government would be able to do this? Where could the vast sums required be found? And if, we imagine they were found, how could the Government look after such various works? Where could it get rid of the produce? for it would only undertake this immense task if nothing was being sold. If there was profit to be made, there would be no need of government: the manufacturers would provide work, the capitalists find money.

My dear friend, none but the people can find work for the people. The tailor finds work for the shoemaker, and reciprocally in all trades. The Government can do nothing in it directly. Indirectly it can favour trade, by good customs tariffs, by good treaties of commerce, by the multiplication and improvement of roads of communication, by the maintenance of peace abroad, and of law and order at home.

These two last conditions are much more essential to what is called the people, than to the rich. The rich man can wait for the restoration of order; his fortune may be a little diminished, but he will get his food and clothes. The very life of the people, on the contrary, is immediately affected by any disturbance; they have no time to wait, for they live from day to day by their labour. If you know M. Louis Blanc, tell him this from me.

You have then, my friend, some texts that your pen can expand

much better, if you choose to take them up. Be certain that just at this moment, they are much more important than the discussion of religious questions, or even of liberty of teaching. The most pressing need is to make the workmen of our great towns understand that there is nothing more impossible to resolve or more absurd, than the questions they have advanced as to the organization of work, and the association of workmen.

Are we not all associated in fact? Is not the workman's interest intimately bound up with that of the head of the factory? If the head does not make his money how can he continue to supply work? And if he has to close his factory because of his workmen's demands, have not they killed the goose with the golden eggs? If the factory is left to the associated workmen they are not much better off, they are deficient in capital, as well as skill and unity of direction. They would have to appoint a council of administration paid in proportion to the superiority of its ability, over that of the other workmen, and it will absorb more of the returns than did the master's profit.

The simple workmen would share the risk of losses by bankruptcy, by the reduction of prices and by accidents of all kinds. They would have to wait for the annual making up of accounts, to know if there was any bonus. But men must have something beforehand to be able to wait till the end of the year for payment, but if instead of a bonus there is a loss, as often happens to manufacturers, the passed accounts would have to be reported to the whole number, would that be possible? And if impossible what becomes of the enterprise? It is dead. The associates would disperse of themselves and be eager enough to ask a settled salary from a head of a factory, who would undertake to find the capital, the tools of trade, and bear all the risks of loss.

My friend, it is the time, the force of circumstances or God Himself, as you like to say, that has organized the working world as it now is. Do our learned writers pretend to be cleverer than God? Probably they imagine they are, because they want to reform what is the growth of ages.

No doubt everything is not of this kind. There are happy and unhappy, many workers and some idle. Some men grow rich by labour, and most remain poor. This is melancholy, no doubt, but this miserable world is thus organized and all the attempts men make to change this order of things, will only result in evil, all that can be done by human means is to apply some palliatives by institutions, and by charity.

When the dearth of work does not depend on a general cause, when only one or two towns are suffering, the Government can give them some relief, and ought to. But the principle established, that it is the duty of Government to

the wise principles that govern it at this moment, an amnesty will soon come. They would not like to be less generous than the July monarchy.

Adieu, my dear children ; love me as I love you, and come soon.

MARSHAL BUGEAUD.

At the time of great social crises, when revolution throws families into disorder and trouble, parting relations and friends, everyone feels a wish to exchange impressions with those he loves ; man becomes more confidential, more communicative. The two following letters, written to his sincere friends, M. Gardère and M. Roches, clearly display the condition of the Marshal's mind after the catastrophe at Paris, and give excellent information.

La Durantie, 29th March, 1848.

I cannot tell you, my dear Gardère, how happy I was to get your letter of the 26th. I was asking everyone about you, when you had gone to Havre upon the first symptoms of the cataclysm ; is he in England, America, or Bordeaux ? At last you are at Paris. God be praised. Your business, from its nature, is less affected than that of others. God be praised again ; and when I say that my own interest comes in for a small share of it. Here we are quiet, because our neighbours, town and country, love us. I am really very popular all over our country. I might have been elected for the national representation by a great majority ; but I thought I had supported the constitutional monarchy too warmly, for it to be proper for me to go and found a republic within a month of having opposed, I do not say fought with it in the streets. My presence would have made the republicans of the time just past, and of the streets, suspicious. I should have been more injurious than useful. And besides, I should have suffered much from the declamations I must have heard. I should have been a real contradiction. I therefore announced in the newspapers of the department that I could not accept the votes offered me on all sides.

I received most touching letters from the army.

Around me there is a great wish for an honest republic ; but a feeling that spreads every day, and far in the south and south-west, is that a hateful tyranny must be resisted. It would not be easy to establish a terror, or to attack property ; this would be the signal for civil war.

As for me, my dear friend, I am so glad to return to my farming life, for I have a horror of a political life and of certain people in the towns still more, detestation for the plotters or false minds that deceive this people. What madness is this organization of labour, the right of work, association, destruction of competition &c. Madmen! You would overturn trade and society, perhaps you may cause streams of blood to flow, and then things will again become what time, necessity, and God Himself, has made them.

A thousand friendships, &c

TO M. LEON ROCHES, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, AT TANGIER

La Durantie, 4th May, 1848

MY DEAR ROCHES,—I was glad to receive your letter from Algiers, I found your whole heart and soul in it. I was much gratified, and be sure I return your feelings. My wife wishes me to say the same for her.

Yes, great events have taken place since our last exchange of letters. Alas! if it were only a republic substituted for the monarchy that the King thought he ought not or could not defend. I would take my part in it. In reality, from my childhood my manners have been very democratic, I have always lived in intimacy with the people, either in camp or in the fields, and in those two positions I think I have proved my love. But, my friend the arrival of a pure democracy has given rise to a multitude of absurd and dangerous theories and bad passions that very much endanger the future of the republic. All the world had received it, not with transports, but, at least, with a resignation mingled with hope. The great principles at first proclaimed had caused the disappearance of some of the fear and reluctance that naturally arise from the remembrance of what the elder sister was. But that confidence soon disappeared, because it was found that all the proceedings and all the talk of '93 came up again, except the guillotine. Commissioners were sent into the departments to revolutionize them and manipulate the elections, these very soon divided the people into two categories, the pure and the impure, the late and the future republicans. The worst of the street rabble were stirred up against the bourgeoisie and the rich in many towns, and in some countries this in the committed deplorable outrages.

I was myself threatened with robbery, and perhaps death, by a neighbouring commune, that a bad lawyer had addressed to the power of law. I was saved by the well known devotion of my peasants and also perhaps by the knowledge that I was surrounded by thirty or thirty-five glances, armed with death. Indeed I am myself I had five double-barrelled and four single-barrelled guns.

The revolution followed the normal course, and excesses speedily followed the follies. We think it interesting to give a confidential letter from M. Thiers' to Marshal Bugeaud, written a few days after the invasion of the Chamber by the Radicals of the time, 15th May, 1848:—*

Paris, 18th May, 1848.

MY DEAR MARSHAL.—I am going to try to write more legibly. MM. Dezaimon and Dupont have shown much ill-will towards me, and so there is no use in thinking about them any more. In general it takes a good deal of courage to nominate me. I am a representative of the past; what they call the reaction, and it is known that I should like things quite contrary to the spirit of the times. Also I am nominated everywhere, for those people are in a minority everywhere.

I am nominated in the Seine Inférieure, in the Seine, in the Orne, and the Gironde, besides several other places where my candidature is not so serious. Now everywhere, by the side of bold partisans, who come to the front, of their own motion, unknown to me, there are fastidious people who consider it unseasonable or dangerous that I should be nominated. Thus I cannot tell if I shall be elected with so many nominations. I incline to think not. I have not much hope except at Paris, and that will be a terrible fight. But the national guard that has preserved order, such sort of order as is left us, are not afraid of dictators, and will freely support me. There is nothing to fear then but cheating, and M. Louis Blanc's eighty thousand pensioners, paid by the treasury at forty sous a-day. I have my opinion, and shall speak about property, taxes, finances, good or bad government, unbearable things at the present time. If I had been in the Assembly during these last days, I should have wished some results to have ensued from the crime committed against it; and so should be as inconvenient to my friends as odious to my enemies. At the bottom of my heart I doubt my use in the Assembly; and I only go thither because I am bound in honour. I think it would be better if they left me to die

* This letter shows M. Thiers, who was not a Deputy, much engaged with his numerous candidatures for the Legislative Assembly. Was not this a sort of plebiscite that the late minister was already dreaming of, a plebiscite that was eighteen years later to be an honour paid by France to his patriotism? It certainly would have been curious in 1873, just when M. Thiers, as chief of the state, was treacherously stirred up against the Conservatives by the extreme Radicals, to remind him of what he thought of his future allies in 1848.

in retirement, as I could always be brought out if there was anything useful to be done. Anyway I do not choose to make myself ridiculous by standing in too many places, and shall retire from those where there is no chance. As the Dordogne seems one of these, I think, my dear Marshal, you must spare your pains, and hold hard. At least I think so, MM. Dupont, Dezaemon, and others, being quite against me. I leave you to judge.

You cannot imagine how many tricks, follies, and double-faced proceedings M. de Lamartine is perpetrating, it is he that has been the cause of everything these latter days. It is he that has caused doubt of the orders given; he objected to the arrest of Blanqui, demanded by Caussidière. I keep on waiting, and have a great wish to hear the expression of your concentrated anger. I have written legibly to you to get this expression as my reward. I repeat that I trust to you about the candidature for the Dordogne, but it seems a useless trouble for you, and an unlikely chance for me.

Cordially yours,

A. THIERS.

As we have M. Thiers' letter, it seems interesting to give another written by Commandant Trochu, formerly an aide-de-camp of the Marshal's, to his former chief.*

* The Marshal's affection for M Trochu had already lasted some years, as shown by these letters.

^c MARSHAL BUGEAUD TO KING LOUIS PHILIPPE

Algiers, 3rd June, 1846

'SIR,—At the same time as I send a request to the War-Minister for the promotion of Captain Trochu, my sole aide de camp, trusting to your kindness, I address myself directly to your Majesty, with a request that you will grant me this favour. I shall look upon it as a personal recompense for the services I have been able to render in this eight months' crisis that Algeria has gone through.

'And yet, sir, in requesting the rank of chef d'Escadron for M. Trochu, I believe that I am doing the state good service. When we meet with men of military capacity and qualities above the general line, they ought not to be kept in the ordinary groove. If they are left to grow old in inferior rank, the country is deprived of the great services they might do it in a more elevated position.

'Too many incapable men come to the top by seniority the number of them
' the future of the country, they might

being still young when they reach the rank of General Officer, they may be a warrant for the safety of France, and the honour of her standard

'Captain Trochu completely answers to these views of the national future. If he did not belong to a special service nothing could be easier; he has been three years in his present rank, with six years' service and distinction in Africa. How many

COMMANDANT TROCHU TO MARSHAL BUGEAUD.

Tours, 16th May, 1848.

MARSHAL,—Since the last letter I had the honour to write you, I have been obliged to go twice to Paris to expedite the arrangement of my father's business, and provide for the speedy conveyance to Brittany of the part of my family that is at Lyons, in the difficult position you know of. The important events that have taken place at Paris will be reflected in the provinces. Lyons will be in a great state of agitation. And there is reason to fear that some of those violent scenes that have often occurred in the history of that unfortunate city will take place. You may rest assured, sir, that as soon as I am free from anxiety about my family, and I know that they have started on their journey back to their own country, I shall not lose a minute in hurrying to La Durantie.

I saw Fourichon in Paris. He was very melancholy, and did not see the country's future in my rosy light. He could see nothing in prospect for himself, and lived from day to day as all the world now does in France. Everybody in Paris was very anxious as to the chances of a violent manifestation directed against the National Assembly, although the streets were quiet.

To-day's papers tell us that it has taken place, and ended quietly enough after the arrest of some of the demoniacs. Three months ago France made a revolution to have an electoral reform; she has got universal suffrage, and here she is trying a revolution against it. How like it is to the story of spoilt children crying out for a little bit of sugar, getting a great deal, and then wanting the moon.

cavalry and infantry captains have become superior officers in war-time with less claim than he has. But on the staff it would be exceptional, a great reason being in the considerations I have laid before Your Majesty.

'Sire, you ought not to be appealed to for anything but extraordinary matters of great interest, public or private. I do this with confidence, being sure to be understood.

'I am, with profound respect

'MARSHAL D'ISLY.'

KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE TO MARSHAL DUKE D'ISLY.

'MY DEAR MARSHAL,—I read the letter you wrote me in favour of your aide-de-camp, Captain Trochu, with very real interest. I spoke to the War-Minister about it, and do myself the pleasure of telling you that I found the best disposition in that quarter; you may also reckon upon me, and I expect that M. Trochu will not be long before he obtains the promotion that his good services, and your testimony in his favour, deserve. Believe, my dear Marshal, all my feelings towards you.

'Your affectionate

'LOUIS-PHILIPPE.'

Rivet still does not write to me. The letters I receive from Algiers still show the greatest anxiety for the future. General Cavagnac has declined a good deal in estimation during his short government. There is General Changarnier who is going to take to it his practice in *managing the troops by his will and power of conquest*. I think he will want these great qualities and several more that he does not possess to as great a degree.

I have heard that Mme Ferry came to Algiers alone in better health, and most bravely encountering the trials she had to go through. We hope that she is now with the Duchess, and request you to convey the expression of our deep and respectful sympathy to those ladies.

I am, with respect, Marshal your most sincerely devoted,

J TROCHU

There is a portrait of Marshal Bugeaud from the hand of his old aide-de-camp, General Trochu, given in *l'Armée Française*, that is a fitting sequel to the affectionate letter above —

Could any one not bow to the sincerity of his patriotism the firmness of his incomparable good sense the breadth of his views the wealth of his experience the really antique simplicity of his life and habits?

Perhaps the most remarkable of these grand natural faculties was the singular intrepidity that he displayed in danger, boundless and without preparation. To this he owed the precious advantage of preserving at the most exciting moments a steadfastness of observation a solidity of judgment that allowed him to choose his line with a mind inaccessible to disturbance, great sagacity, never agitated by even the heaviest feeling of responsibility. He was permanently in the condition of a military professor propagating what he called "proper notions" with unwearied activity, without the smallest care for the rank or quality of his hearers. He was a whole treasury of professional knowledge, where the principles of war founded upon an attentive observation of the various states of the human soul and the mind of troops in the midst of danger, were supported by the exciting tales of events that went back to the battle of Austerlitz and extended to the struggles of the First Empire.

The letter below written to the Marshal by General Bedeau, shows that thoughts

turning to the conqueror of Isly, and that his African lieutenants were turning their eyes towards him as the future preserver of order and society.

Paris, 19th May, 1848.

MARSHAL,—You know the events of the 15th of May, and the fearful anarchy we were falling into, but for the vigorous action of the National Guard. Still we are daily threatened with a fresh attack, though I do not believe in it much, because some of the chief ringleaders have been arrested, and others are afraid to compromise themselves any more, wishing to preserve an influence on the assembly and Government, that will be refused them; lastly, because, being entrusted with the duty of securing the independence or the defence of the legislative palace, I am careful in my precautions; but that does not advance us any further. The Assembly is distrustful of the executive power, and jealous, although they would give the Assembly their confidence in a way that has been already ill-rewarded. These questions will be settled some of these days. I think that the Chamber will not give up its power, but the struggle continues. As in statics two opposing forces annul each other, we must expect a *status quo*, and barren debates wearying the country.

The Assembly, Marshal, has done me the honour to put me in command of the forces destined for its protection. I have accepted this as the duty of a good citizen, but probably in a few days I shall resign the important duty, because the executive power is too jealous of me, and is every moment putting sticks into my wheels. If we do not come to a decision to have one commandant for all the troops at Paris, the movable national guard, and the stationary national guard, who have independent chiefs, we shall come to a state of anarchy, and perhaps to a general movement of the national guard, dangerous to the Government it despises, to the republic it loves, notwithstanding the sufferings that have been, and still are, the consequences of the installation of this Government. Perhaps you will take me for a modern Cassandra; I hope so. I begin to grow old, and men are said to dote when they grow old; but these are my prophecies, Marshal; God grant that they come not true.

I have communicated your kind remembrance to Négrier; he is very much gratified, and desires me to convey his respects to you. As for the 900 muskets and cartridges he is said to have bought, to arm the representatives and give them the means of resistance, it is a story. All the world, Marshal, is not as energetic as you are, and does not know so well how to use the sword, or speech, or the plough.

I thank you, Marshal for the kind things you say to me I can never forget the campaigns I made under your orders any more than the good feeling there was between us and the constant kindness shown me by the Duchess have the goodness to be my interpreter to her and convey to her my respectful homage and yourself receive the assurance of my most devoted feelings

BEDEAU

CHAPTER XVI.

THE DAYS OF JUNE. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1848).

Days of June—Weakening of the Republic—Letters to Jamin and Féray—The Marshal consulted on the choice of a Governor for Algeria—Constitution of September—The Presidential Elections—Bugeaud a Candidate—Letters to Lavergne—Resignation—Letter to Ducrot—The Era of the Cæsars—Letter to L'Heureux.

THE days of June were brought about by the letting loose of the passions of the rabble, added to the unpopularity, the weakness, and isolation of the republican government; that is to say, one of the most sanguinary and formidable insurrections France has had to endure. When we think of the torrents of blood that flowed in the streets of Paris to enable the republicans of the National to keep their power a few months more, we cannot prevent ourselves from remembering the abuse and calumny heaped on the heads of King Louis-Philippe's Government, and Marshal Bugeaud, in consequence of the repression of riots got up by those same republicans, who recoiled from no violence that might preserve their power when they had become members of the Government.

During these days of woe, the Marshal was at La Durantie, and God spared the conqueror of Isly the sorrow of shedding the blood of Frenchmen. The following letter written to Colonel Jamin, sometime aide-de-camp to the Duke d'Aumale, incidentally touches upon the grave events that had taken place.

TO COLONEL JAMIN, COMMANDING THE 8TH REGIMENT OF THE
LINE IN ALGERIA

La Durantie 4th July 1848

MY DEAR COLONEL—One of my neighbours and friends begs me to recommend to you his son Antoine A. who has joined your regiment as a volunteer. I hope he is worthy of the recommendation I send you, if he is you will oblige me by giving him his stripes, and afterwards keeping an eye upon him, to push him if he deserves it.

What cruel events, my dear colonel! Your heart must have been wrung by them as much and more than mine for you have had a closer view than I have of the noble and excellent family that deserved quite another fate. It had not failed in any of its promises it was the victim of shameless ambition and socialist ideas.

The demagogues the false or perverse minds have seized the power, the gate was opened to them by the ambitions of the dynastic opposition who thought the Ministry had lasted too long.

No doubt there were faults in parliamentary and government tactics. The Ministry should have been dismissed sooner the men changed to satisfy the ambitious and make some concessions to these notions of reform, but they have been punished as if they had committed crimes. In other words the catastrophe and crisis were only retarded by giving way, for the fall might have been avoided by more strictness and foresight.

Socialist ideas the excesses of the press the permanently factious could not fail to bring an attempt at revolution upon us. This had been written, for me, long ago, and therefore in February I did all I could to urge energetic preparation against the storm. The Ministry and perhaps the King himself attributing my advice to personal interest thought that I was thus making a bid to be Governor of Paris and they attended very little to me for two months. They wanted to give me the command but did not venture to leave Duchatel who thought that Jacqueminot would be humiliated if he was commanded by a Marshal of France! However Jacqueminot was very ill, and could do no useful service. The troops were under a lieutenant general but there could be no unity.

The troops remained seventy hours under arms in presence of the rioters, who were breaking the lamps, burning the guard rooms cutting down the trees in the Champs Elysées and the Boulevards without being hindered in any way. At the same time they were covering the National Guard with abuse, and softening the hearts of the Line by a lot of speeches. 'You are of the people as we are you are our brothers, you would not fire upon us when we only want our liberty' and they were allowed to talk like this not two paces off.

At last it was decided that I was to have the command, and I took it at three in the morning of the 24th. At seven, when all my arrangements were made for a powerful resistance, and one column had taken the offensive in several places, the new Ministers, Thiers and Barrot, came and brought me the King's order to withdraw the troops and mass them around the Tuileries and garden. I long resisted this fatal order, not understanding all the meaning of it, but had to yield to fresh commands. At last, when the solemn moment came, when shots were falling on the Palace, and it ought to have been defended, the command was taken from me and conferred upon Marshal Gérard. And the King had abdicated! Hearing firing in the direction of the Louvre, I hurried to repulse the attack, although no longer commanding, when I found all the troops evacuating the Place du Carrousel, and going out by all the exits. At the same time I heard that the King was making his way out by the garden. I could do no more than raise my hands to heaven and groan deeply over the fall of the monarchy that had given France seventeen years of peace, liberty, and progress of all kinds.

I will not tell you about the march of events for the last four months, nor the dreadful days of the 23rd, 24th, 25th, and 26th of June. The papers will have told you all I could say. I think that the red Republic is beaten for some time, but the socialist notions always exist; and if most energetic measures are not taken against the promoters of anarchy, a little sooner or a little later we shall see the struggle begin again.

Adieu, my dear colonel. I think you are very lucky to be in Africa, far from these melancholy disputes between civilisation and barbarism. The Arabs we call barbarous are infinitely less so than we are. Recall me to the recollection of our brave army; I bear it in my heart, and am sorry I ever left it.

A thousand friendships.

MARSHAL DUKE D'ISLY.

Though the Marshal had little confidence in the Republican Government, he was above all things a man of order and authority, approving sincerely of General Cavaignac's energy in repressing the riot.

Colonel Féray, the Marshal's son-in-law, being then at Paris, was confidentially sent for by the President of the executive power, General Cavaignac, and asked by him to consult the old governor of the country on the choice of a Governor-general, and various questions relating to Algeria.

The reply of the old conqueror and organizer of Africa was sent without delay, and there is no occasion to expatiate upon the interest and value of this document, a kind of confidential memoir of high import.—

La Durantie, 23rd July, 1848

MY DEAR HENRY,—Before I answer the questions you put me in your letter of the 21st, I wish to tell you that, having this moment again read that of 21st July, I have been more struck than on the first reading by what Cavagnie told you about me. There prevails in his words an ardour of sincerity, loyalty, and patriotism that compels conviction and belief. I certainly have more confidence in it than in the words of the other personage, whom I have always considered less sincere, less patriotic, and very selfish. Perhaps we have been too severe in our opinion of him. He certainly has undoubted qualities and I am very glad that his conduct in the four days has deserved public esteem. He is one more man to protect society, and we have none to spare.

Now for your questions.

I think an attempt should be made to find the Governor general among the *maréchaux de camp* (major generals) whose career has been in Africa. But if a man with the proper qualifications cannot be found among them, then go to the colonels or lieutenant colonels. Among the *maréchaux de camp* made in the last two or three years, I own I am rather in a difficulty. Saint Arnaud would suit by his fervour, his ability, his bravery, his quick determination and his power of command. But he is too light in his private conduct, he has debts, and is always inclined to make more. So he must be set aside, though with regret.

Pélissier has many qualifications, but is not wide enough in mind. He is very brave, but has not much notion of war. Then his character would not chime in well with the civil power. Though a very good man, he is very violent at times, and also rather ridiculous in his ways. Anyhow, he is a man of energy, honest, very well disciplined, very exact in obedience to orders. He might be taken up again if we find no better.

I know MacMahon very little. I know he is an excellent fighting officer, very soldierly, very firm, but I do not know if he has the breadth of mind necessary for the government of Europeans and Arabs. I am doubtful of him.

As far as I have seen, General Morris has seemed to me more intelligent, more capable, he is also an excellent fighting officer, and I believe very honest. But his alliance with a Jewess, though

If it had slightly purified the departmental administration, while waiting, it would have done good service to order; and we might have hoped for elections that would have given a large majority in the Assembly to a moderate Republic. I have no hopes from the character of MM. Dufaure and Vivien. They are not of the stature to save the country; they are only clever debaters for a government regularly established. Can they impose a salutary fear upon the red and socialist factions? I am far from believing it. I much more think that their audacity will increase. As for conciliating them, if MM. Dufaure and Vivien hope this, they are very idiotically artless.

I, therefore, do not expect any decisive service from them; and, like you, I am afraid that they will divide our party by their talent in debate, and the personal consideration they enjoy as honest men.

It is very evident to any clear-sighted man, that this bastard and lame combination has only been invented to give a chance for Cavaignac's candidature. It is a bid for votes, and nothing else. All the same, many people will be caught by it, if a large number of the accredited organs of the press do not expose the snare.

I did not know the behaviour of the *Siècle*; I do not see it. I have let my subscription to the *Débats* expire; I only receive the *Press*, the *Assemblée Nationale*, the *Constitutionnel*, and some well-written country papers.

The *Constitutionnel* has surprised me a little; but I thought, and still think, that its indecision, and perhaps its support, were only a trick of war to get greater influence afterwards by the moderation displayed at first. If it was not that, the reason must be in its having abandoned its chief prompter, who has, nevertheless, great claims on the Republican Government. I do not know if this personage, whom I appreciate still more than I did for his late speeches, and his book upon property, has received communications from Louis Napoleon; what I know very well is that no overture has been made to me from that side.

Some one has written to my friends to tell them to persuade me to go to Paris, as some important personages there wish to converse with me. I answered that I was waiting in my fields till France wants me, either at home or abroad; that I would present myself in answer to the appeal of the public or of the Assembly, but not to that of one or many individuals, especially when they are unknown to me.

I am entirely of your opinion; the party of social order can no longer retire from the field; it has only done too much so far. It must have its candidate for the Presidentship, must bring him forward openly, and as actively as possible. If they disappear, they will make themselves forgotten or abandoned by all weak men without political faith; and that is the majority.

Is the candidate to be the person you mention? That is for

you, gentlemen to determine All that I can say is, that though he is not concerted enough to think himself the providential man he would not consider that duty above his devotion, his courage and his firm resolution, but would assist with all the power of his soul and body in bringing France back to the basis that might produce the restoration of order to her, by the reign of wise laws, and prosperity to the fullest extent through order

In the last fortnight overtures have been made to him from Paris, and various places in France, similar to yours They come from men of almost all shades of politics—except the red, you may be sure Journalists from the west and south have offered the support of their circulation He is, besides informed that in several departments the Legitimists have joined with the old and new Conservatives in this notion, that some of the former have written to Rome to endeavour to obtain the Pope's recommendation to the clergy, that others have written to England to engage high personages to support his candidature with their friends but without the publicity of the press

I tell you these things confidentially because one confidence is worth another, but I should not have spoken of it to you if you had not challenged me But as you have the notion it is well that you should know everything that I know on the state of the question, for your guidance

I hope you will think that the person you have in view would never have dared to pretend to so great and formidable an honour, but you must equally understand, that if by an almost impossibility, it came to him, he would not recoil from this great mission He feels conscious of all the power of soul necessary for the situation, but he knows that he may not have light enough for certain things, he will provide for this by surrounding himself with the most capable men, whose names have long been fixed in his mind

He is not at all inclined to allow himself to be ruled by a fractious minority, that always appeals to force against the decisions of the majority In this case he would accept war, and carry it on with all the energy he is capable of It is much to be feared that the actual crisis can have no other solution, that appears to him, unhappily, to be written in the near future All the consequences of this will be accepted There is no belief in the possibility of a coalition with the demagogues and modern socialists They desire the destruction of existing society It is, therefore, war to extremity

I think that the Bonapartist party ought to be very glad to see the friends of order produce their candidate, for if this candidate is only supported by the votes of the men of order, who think and reflect, and he has not the mass of the people for him as is to be feared,

I am proud to say I was, had, with rare and wise boldness, devoted himself to the future work that the signs of a coming civil war pointed out to him. Under the shade of his chestnuts, in the poor country of Périgord, where, pick in hand, he had presented such a valuable model, from the commencement of our troubles he had undertaken a bold reactionary movement against the anarchists. His high renown as sage and warrior rallied round him as a centre the action of ten surrounding departments.

I have kept the precious letter in which he told me that if the agitators of Paris should oppose the installation of the Constituent Assembly, he was determined to leave his retreat and march upon the capital with 500,000 men who were ready to join his flag. I am sure he would have had them under him before he had gone fifty leagues, and more than one regiment would have followed him. His masculine speech, clear and penetrating, his firm and confident gesture, and an indescribable mixture of power and simpleness, made Marshal Bugeaud one of the men with whom the crowd was most in sympathy.

His calm features very speedily became animated; he was able to throw so much charm and interest over his dry recitals. He was a sight to see, standing upon a rough platform, ruling a close throng of labourers, teaching them the great art of farming, in which he was a master, and, in the pleasing dialect of the country, combating bad methods as well as bad notions.

God had also been pleased to lodge this energetic and simple mind in a body that nothing could shake. Inclement weather, weariness, labours in war or sport, had no effect upon his robust health. I do not suppose that any son of Adam has less known the want of sleep, except the Emperor Justinian, who only slept one hour. His rustic manners, that he laughed at sometimes, were repugnant to the luxuries and elegancies of life. He had the repose of Probus, and, like him, would have astonished the messengers from the Persian court, when they found the Emperor eating the remains of some bacon and peas in the middle of his conquering legions.

His bold visit to Abdel-Kader's camp will be remembered when, thinking the Emir remained seated too long, he raised him up with his strong hand, in front of twenty thousand native Arabs. The vigorous touch of this character was contrasted in high relief with the shades of the picture of the times.

So what an ascendant he had when he began to make his way across France, and went to the army at Lyons! Every step gave him a faithful recruit, every word a devotee. No man gains more by being known. The child-like kindness of the soldier lent an indescribable charm to the appearance of his home, his patriarchate in his family, and the conversation of his hearth. By degrees and inevitable progress, minds had appreciated his value, his qualities,

his sincere patriotism, starting from the unjust popularity of 1849

The following letter from Bugeaud, aide-de camp, Colonel L'Heureux, gives able information :—

La Durantie, 15th Nov

et
BONAPARTE

I knew, my dear L'Heureux, that you were warm
me at the time of the last elections for the Seine, and I
you would do as much towards the Presidency. Believe
double thankfulness, indeed I may say triple, because you
about me to your friends of the Charente Inférieure. They told
my chance was going well. I should have been too un-
had intended to recommend General Cavaignac when I resigned,
besides that, I do not consider him to be the man for the work,
I personally have some reason to complain of him. His behaviour
to me was not open. It would take too long to tell you all my little
complaints. I confine myself to telling you that my wife wrote to
him twice in favour of a dismissed collector, and that his Highness
did not deign to answer her with one line.*

I am not much better pleased with Lamoricière or Charon. My
reason is not entirely satisfied, to tell the truth with the selection of
Prince Louis Napoleon. It is very risky, anyway I prefer this
solution to the domination of the infamous National.

If the party of order had not been divided into two or three
camps I would have remained on the ranks. But we ran the
risk of only getting a great minority and putting the nomination
into the hands of the Assembly. It would have been the establish-
ment of the rule of the National. Now, between two dangers—one
certain and immediate, the other eventual—I avoided the first.

I want to have my lodging as near as possible to the Chambers
or among the first second, and third legions. Nor should I be sorry
to be in the neighbourhood of the first military division, because
there is always a small kernel of troops.

BUGEAUD

* We feel sure that these letters were never placed under General Cavaignac's
eyes

The Marshal's private letters show what a troubled life he was leading, how much he had to move about, his occupations and incessant receptions. Less than a year after the revolution of 1848, Lyons was a dangerous spot for the man upon whom the Republican press so unjustly persisted in laying the responsibility of the bloody repression in the rue Transnonnain.

When the Commander-in-chief arrived, a red Lyons newspaper, the *Peuple Souverain*, repeated the usual calumnies. The Marshal did not spare this paper. The next day he desired the President of the order of advocates at Lyons, M. Vachon, to lay an information for libel. A week afterwards, the criminal court, overruling an argument as to jurisdiction brought for the defence, sentenced the editor to a month's imprisonment, 1000 francs fine, and 500 francs damages. The sentence was confirmed on appeal.

The Marshal had no hesitation about appearing in public. The day after he arrived he went to the club in the rue Bourbon; on the 20th February he went to see a bridge thrown across the Rhone, and returned by the populous suburb of the Croix Rousse; on the 5th of March he visited the western fortifications beyond Fourvières. There were more people at each of these expeditions, and more enthusiastic. As observed in his letters, there were fewer and fewer shouts for the Republic.

He went wherever he thought duty called him. Thus on the 24th of February he, with his staff, was present at a service in the cathedral of St. Jean, in honour of those who perished in the revolution of the 24th of February.

The halts on his principal excursions were made at St. Etienne, 27th February; Boturgoin, 20th March; Voiron, 21st March; Grenoble, 22nd March; Valence, 24th March; Villefranche, 15th April. The more second-rate the place, the warmer was his personal welcome, especially from the rural populations.

There were several pleasing events connected with meeting several old soldiers of the armies of Spain and the Alps; we will only mention two.

At the club of Grenoble on the 24th of March was General Marchand, now over eighty. Marshal Bugeaud went straight to him, embraced him, and told the Dauphinois, who crowded round, 'Gentlemen, Marchand was a lieutenant-general when I was a private under him.'

At Villefranche, on the 15th of April, some retired officers presented themselves, wearing their old uniforms. One of them, M. Perraud, reminded him that they had fought together at the siege of Lerida, in Spain. 'I commanded,' said M. Perraud, 'one of the two companies that led the assault; you commanded the other.' The Marshal's memory and presence of mind were rarely at fault, and he answered, 'You were shot in the thigh?' M. Perraud assented; and the Marshal said, 'You were luckier than I; I was not wounded in the affair,' and shook hands with his old comrade.

Prince Napoleon's election was far from having quieted revolutionary passions, and, thanks to the demagogue leaders, Paris was still a prey to agitation and effervescence—inevitable consequences of the letting loose of all covetousness and desire.

During this year, 1849, barely half of which the

Marshal was to behold, being suddenly recalled to political and military life, compelled to organize an important military force amid revolutionists, he was able to command the honest and wholesome popularity that his loyal nature obtained from all those who came in contact with him.

Absent from his dear family, he was always thinking of them above all things, and in spite of the cares of business. He also thought of his crops, as well as of social defence; no more did he forget the great work of his life—the conquest and colonisation of Africa. His great interest is shown in a long letter written to his successor, Lieutenant-general Charon, only a few days before his death: a kind of testamentary deposition of his views for the colony. The postscript to the letter is:

I was on the point of being one of the Cabinet, or making one up myself. By the fault of some politicians, the power has fallen into the hands of those who are called the third party, who, I thought, had been destroyed by the revolution of February. It seems that some undecided fastidious spirits, who spare the wicked more than they do the good, are not cured by the revolutions and dangers that threaten society.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ASSEMBLY—DEATH (1849).

Marshal Bugeaud's Position towards the New Government—Elections to the Legislative Assembly—Deputy for Charente Inferieure—Sitting of 30th of May—Death, 10th of June—The Prince-President—Louis Veuillot's Discourse—Funeral at the Invalides—Speeches of Mole and Bedeau—Statues—Conclusion

THE new chief of the State might have taken umbrage at the unrivalled position of Bugeaud, Marshal of France, former Governor-general of Algeria, Commander-in-chief of the army of the Alps, if he had not appreciated the patriotism and political probity of the great soldier. Indeed, it was in all sincerity, and without afterthought, that the ex-candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, had, with all the men for order and discipline of all parties, rallied round the latent dictatorship of Prince Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte.

The victor of Isly had never hesitated to lend the new Government the support of his name, and the influence of his military popularity, whatever might be his political preferences. And, indeed, we must say that Marshal Bugeaud, holding a great military command in France, and being a deputy to Parliament, in presence of a *de-facto* Government, like that of the Republic under the Presidency of a Bonaparte, had in a sort of way more elbow room, and could be more at ease in haranguing his soldiers, and speaking to the Ministers, than when he was

confined within the narrow bonds of parliamentary practice, and restrained by his respect for the King, and the tender affection he had conceived for the Duke d'Aumale.

In Paris Marshal Bugeaud had 107,437 votes at the election of May 20th, 1849. Twenty-eight deputies were elected, he came twenty-ninth. A very good proof of the confusion and disturbance of mind then existing, as now, is the fact that the first elected for Paris was Prince Lucien Murat, with 134,825, and the second Ledru-Rollin with 129,068 votes.

The Legislative Assembly, having made room for the National Constituent Assembly, met at the Palais Bourbon on the 28th of May. Two days afterwards, on the 30th of May, there was a scene of disturbance. The provisional committee was retiring. There was an exchange of very bitter language between the President by seniority, M. de Keratry, and M. Ledru-Rollin. The moderate party was represented by 505 members; the Ultra-Democrats by 229 votes. These last made up in violence for their inferiority of numbers.

When there was reason to fear that the Assembly's excitement would be repeated on the tribunes, Bugeaud, supporting a motion to order of Ledru-Rollin, the leader of the Mountain, spoke the celebrated words that had a high significance in his mouth more than in that of any other person.* This is the account given of the termination in the *Moniteur Officiel*.

* The Ultra-Democrats were out-numbered in the proportion of more than two to one, and at the sitting of the 30th, Ledru Rollin complained, with some show of reason, that the majority were about to take an unfair advantage of their superiority.—*Quarterly Review*, No. 312, p. 491.

M. Ledru-Rollin.—I appeal to the justice of the Assembly. The late committee retired because they thought that the tribune was not free. The President's words have removed all trace of the incident. As for me, I think the secretaries should resume their places.

A Voice.—We will not give in to you.

M. Ledru-Rollin.—The Assembly cannot adopt such a sentiment. I think it will be an act of justice for the committee to resume its duties; the committee shared the feeling that caused me to leave the tribune. Their resignation was only conditional. I declare in my turn that if the opposition is continued, I shall give up speaking, as I must think that the tribune is not free.

M. Bugeaud.—I hope that I may often find myself in agreement, during the course of the session, with Monsieur Ledru-Rollin, or citizen Ledru-Rollin if you like it. I support his conclusions. Majorities, gentlemen, are bound to more moderation than minorities.

The grand words of the Marshal-deputy attracted much attention. His generous appeal to moderation, conciliation, and justice, was at the moment received as it deserved. Unhappily, minds were over-excited; the hatreds of those in the minority by universal suffrage, were too much inflamed for the mitigation claimed by the Marshal, to be able to last more than one sitting.* Anyhow, he spoke those grand and noble words, the last speech he ever made.

Although the deputies had elected the Marshal

* The effect was temporary, and the overthrow of that very Assembly was mainly owing to the abuse which the party of order made of their majority — *Quarterly Review*, *ibid*

President of the fourth committee, he had no intention of remaining long at Paris. He knew that imperious duties recalled him to Lyons, and he prepared to resume the command of his Army of the Alps, when the terrible malady, then prevalent at Paris, suddenly seized him. During his short stay he had been the guest of one of his friends, Comte Vigier, formerly peer of France, whose house was No. 1 on the quai Voltaire.

The strong soldier first felt the attack of cholera as he was returning from the Chamber on the 6th of June, about four in the afternoon. M. Léon Roches told us, 'I was in a carriage, and going to the Marshal, when I saw him dragging himself along the quai with slow steps, opposite the barrack on the quai d'Orsay. He was pale, his face streaming with perspiration, his walk tottering; he made his way leaning against the parapet of the quai. I jumped out of my carriage, and helped him home. He lay down never to rise again.'

The *Journal des Débats* printed this in its number of the 9th of June, 1849:—

'All thoughts at this moment seem concentrated on one man alone, because he is at once the personification of patriotism, military honour, and the standard of order. This man, there is no need to name him, is Marshal Bugeaud.

'As soon as it was known that he was attacked by the cruel epidemic, which is spreading desolation within our walls, all Paris has been coming every day and every hour, to inquire for the great captain and great citizen, whose life is in danger.

'As soon as the President of the Republic was informed of the serious illness, he was one of the

first to come and convey to the Marshal the expression of the immense interest taken in his health by all ranks of society without exception. Few words, but much feeling, marked this visit, which does equal honour to him who paid, and to him who received it. As M. Louis Napoleon left the man, on whose support he had so much reason to reckon, he could scarcely control the tears that filled his eyes.'

The *Evènement* of the same day gives further particulars :—

' This morning, at eleven o'clock, the President of the Republic was by the Marshal's bedside. Colonel Vaudrey, the President's first aide-de-camp, Colonel Féray, the Marshal's aide-de-camp and son-in-law, Colonel l'Heureux, aide-de-camp to the War-Minister, and M. Achille Vigier, were in the sick room.

' The Marshal's hand was affectionately grasped by the President, while he said, " I am very glad to see you, Prince ; you have a great mission to accomplish. You will save France, with the union and help of all good men. God has not thought me worthy of being left here to assist you. I feel that I am dying."

' The President answered, " All hope is not over, we are in need of you, and God will save you." The persons present retired, on a sign from the Marshal, and a conversation lasting ten minutes took place between the President of the Republic and the brave Marshal.

' As the President went away he said, " I shall come and see you again." The Marshal answered, " You have other duties to perform. Thank you ; I see all is over for me."

By the evening of the 9th, the Marshal's condition left little hope. From ten in the evening till four in the morning, an almost continual drowsiness took possession of him. The pain abated, ease gradually supervened.

His host, Comte Vigier, Colonels l'Heureux and Trochu, MM. Genty de Bussy, Maigne, General de Bar, the Abbé Sibour, vicar-general of the diocese of Paris, watched by the sick man, with a young student of the Hôtel Dieu, placed with the Marshal by Doctor Chomel.

At five in the evening symptoms of fever appeared. The Abbé Sibour remaining alone with the Marshal, prepared to administer the last sacraments. The old African interpreter, M. Léon Roches, the two aides-de-camp, and all friends of the last moment, were kneeling round the bed.

The Marshal received the Holy Communion with all the fervour of a Christian and the calm of an honest man. Before the priest administered the *viaticum* he spoke a few words of exhortation to resignation and a good death, the Marshal repeated these three words after God's minister, '*Fiat voluntas tua.*' A few moments afterwards Doctor Chomel came to listen to the Marshal's heart, when the sick man said in a strong and natural voice, 'It is all over with me.' As soon as he had received the last sacraments, alarming symptoms appeared in his features. The agony commenced; it was neither long nor cruel. God deigned to be merciful.

The Marshal drew his last breath at half-past six, amid the tears and sorrows of his faithful friends pressing round the bed to kiss his hand for the last time.

A few minutes after the last moment, General Cavaignac, Count Molé, and the War-Minister, General Rulhières, entered the room. General Cavaignac's grief was especially keen, he knelt by the bed and burst out sobbing.

The Archbishop of Paris arrived at half-past seven, expecting to see the Marshal a last time. Generals Tartas and Gentil arrived at the same time. The prelate kneeled before the calm and serene figure of the grand soldier and honest man, and gave his final benediction.

The chief of the state received the intelligence with great sorrow, and seating himself at his desk, gave M. Maigne, who brought him the information, a letter for Colonel Féray.

This 10th June was one of the most fatal days of the epidemic. The number of deaths by cholera at home and in the hospitals amounted to 672. The weather was stormy, the air stifling. Paris was greatly grieved at hearing of the event. The city was shocked. We are ashamed to say for the honour of the French name, that some republican journals of Paris and Lyons gave free expression to their delight at the disappearance of the Conqueror of Algeria, the implacable foe of revolutionists.

By a strange coincidence, the sickness and death of the illustrious man of war seemed to be a signal of conflagration. Revolutionary passions seemed as if they had chosen to await the very moment of his death-struggle, to burst out more vehemently than before. Indeed, it was a very near chance that the Duke d'Isly had not a bloody funeral. The very day after the Marshal had been obliged to leave the Palais Bourbon on the 7th of June, Lebrun Rollin

with wonderful bitterness and singular vigour of language questioned the Government on the affairs of Rome. On the spot he lodged a protest founded on article 5 of the constitution, which forbids any war against foreign nationalities. This speech ended by these words, 'The constitution is violated, we will defend it by all means, even with arms.' At the same time he moved for the prosecution of the President of the Republic and the Ministers.

Next day, the 10th of June, the Marshal died. On the 11th, as soon as the sitting began, the Chamber put an end to the discussion of the affairs of Rome by a pure and simple order of the day, passed by 360 votes against 203. A dull agitation was afloat in Paris; large groups were standing about around the Palais Bourbon. On the 13th, the deputies of the Mountain retired in a body as soon as the sitting of the Chamber opened; they published a proclamation to the people of France declaring outlawry against the President of the Republic, the Ministers, and the portion of the Assembly that had acted with them. The National Guard was summoned to meet, the workshops to be closed, and the people to remain alert.

At the same time, Ledru-Rollin, at the head of a certain number of the Mountain deputies, and escorted by the artillerymen of the National Guard came down into the street. The insurrection was just going to spread everywhere when their leader, Ledru-Rollin, and his friends met at the Conservatoire. What occurred is known; they were surrounded by the troops, and there was a panic in the ranks of the agitators. The tribune escaped by a casement

window, and disappeared for ever from the political arena. As for his accomplices, they were tried a few days afterwards by the high court of Versailles.

The day after the Marshal's death, the French papers announced the catastrophe. M. Louis Veuillot's funeral oration appeared at the head of the columns in the *Univers*.

Letters of condolence were sent to the Marshal's family from all sides, including one from the Duke d'Aumale expressing his great attachment to the Marshal.

Mdme. Féray was at La Durantie with her mother; they had been going to join the Marshal at Lyons when he was sent for to Paris by the President to endeavour to form a ministry. He was already ill, but Colonel Saget had brought favourable intelligence as they were just starting for Paris, and said the Marshal was immediately to be moved to La Durantie as his best cure. The preparations for departure were converted into preparations for his coming, his favourite flowers were got ready, when, alas! the doctors advised twenty-four hours' delay, and that was fatal. The Bishop of Périgueux came to bring information of the dreadful calamity.

* * * * *

The whole country was in consternation. There was a compact crowd round the house. The servants were kneeling round the Duchess in tears. A peasant woman pressed her hands and said, 'Our master is gone; the great protector of the village, what will become of us?'

At the commencement of the sitting of July 11th, in the National Assembly, President Dupin made a funeral oration over Deputy Bugeaud; it was short, but its very laconicism is eloquence, and its four lines are worth a long speech.

‘Gentlemen, I regret to have to announce to the Assembly the death of Marshal Bugeaud. This loss will be keenly felt by all France. The Marshal was at once a great captain and a great citizen. (Great applause.) I will draw lots for the deputation to attend his obsequies.’

Several members.—‘We will all go.’

The funeral was solemnized on the 19th of June, at the Invalides in the presence of the Prince President, followed by a numerous staff, and was attended by a very large number of the marshals of France, generals, and officers of all ranks, the president and vice-president of the Assembly, and almost all the representatives.

When the troops had defiled past the bier, M. Molé, for civilians, and General Bedeau for soldiers, recapitulated the Marshal’s services.

Algeria put on mourning, and the Akhbar on the 19th of June initiated a movement for a monument to their hero. On the 15th August, 1852, the Governor-general of Algeria presided at the inauguration of this statue. And in September 1853, another monument was erected in the town of Périgueux.

We have reached the termination of our work and are troubled. Were we worthy to revive such a personage? Was not the history of this high-souled life a real epic poem, above our power? However it may be, if the grandeur of the subject has crushed

the writer, he does not regret the time devoted to this patient study ; he only hopes that as the reader turns these pages, he will find the great delight and comforting thoughts, that he himself has had in composing them.

* * * * *

THE END.